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Indian Ocean raid

Coordinates: 20°S 80°E / 20°S 80°E / -20; 80
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(Redirected from Indian Ocean Raid)
"Operation C" redirects here. For the 1991 video game, see Operation C (video game).
For the later Japanese raid, see Indian Ocean raid (1944).

Indian Ocean raid
Part of the Pacific War and the Second World War

British heavy cruisers HMS Dorsetshire and Cornwall under Japanese air attack and heavily damaged on 5 April 1942.
Date31 March – 10 April 1942
Location
Indian Ocean and British Ceylon
20°S 80°E / 20°S 80°E / -20; 80
Result Japanese victory
Belligerents
 Empire of Japan Japan
Commanders and leaders
James Somerville
Units involved
United Kingdom Eastern Fleet Empire of Japan Kido Butai (Combined Fleet)
Strength
  • 5 Fleet carriers
  • 1 Light carrier
  • 4 Battleships
  • 11 Cruisers
  • 23 Destroyers
  • 5 Submarines
  • 275 Aircraft
Casualties and losses
  • 18 aircraft destroyed
  • 31 aircraft damaged
  • 32 killed

The Indian Ocean raid (Operation C) and the Battle of Ceylon in Japanese, was a sortie of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) from 31 March to 10 April 1942. Japanese aircraft carriers (Admiral Chūichi Nagumo) struck Allied shipping and naval bases around British Ceylon but failed to find the bulk of the British Eastern Fleet (Admiral Sir James Somerville) the British were forewarned by intelligence and the fleet sailed before to the raid; its attempt to attack the Japanese was frustrated by poor tactical intelligence.

Following the attack, the British expected a Japanese offensive in the Indian Ocean. The main base of the Eastern Fleet moved to East Africa and Ceylon was reinforced. Somerville kept his fast carrier division, Force A, "in Indian waters, to be ready to deal with any attempt by the enemy to command those waters with light forces only".[1] The Japanese had no plans to follow up their success and within the year, operations in the Pacific made it impossible to do so.

Background

[edit]

Ceylon

[edit]

The island of Ceylon commanded the Indian Ocean, controlling access to India, the Allied shipping routes to the Middle East and the oilfields of the Persian Gulf. After the fall of British Malaya, Ceylon became the source of most of the British Empire's rubber. The harbour and naval base, Trincomalee is on the east coast. Japanese propaganda had an effect on some of the Sinhalese population, who awaited their arrival.

The fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 broke the British eastern defensive perimeter of the Bay of Bengal and the Japanese occupation of the Andaman Islands on 23 March gave Japan control of the Andaman Sea, enabling ships to supply Japanese troops in the Burma Campaign. German and British authorities anticipated the Japanese capture of Ceylon to consolidate control of the Bay of Bengal and disrupt British supply for the defence of India, Australia and perhaps the Middle East. Ceylon was hastily garrisoned by Australian troops returning from North Africa and HMS Indomitable was used as a high-speed aircraft ferry, shuttling fighter aircraft to Ceylon.[2]

A Japanese offensive into the Indian Ocean were postponed in March 1942; the IJN was needed in the western Pacific against the United States and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) refused to allocate troops for an invasion of Ceylon. The IJN planned a lesser effort, Operation C, a raid into the Indian Ocean in early April. C aimed to destroy the British Eastern Fleet and disrupt British communications in the Bay of Bengal in support of the Burma Campaign. British intelligence uncovered the Japanese plan, the Americans were notified and the Doolittle Raid took on the additional role of a diversion.[3]

Japanese preparations

[edit]

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto issued the order to proceed with Operation C to the southern force of the IJN (Admiral Nobutake Kondō) on 9 March 1942. By 16 March, the plan was to depart from Staring Bay, Celebes, on 26 March for an attack on Colombo (C day) on 5 April to catch the Eastern Fleet in port.[4] The Japanese force, commanded by Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, had five aircraft carriers, Akagi, Shōkaku and Zuikaku in Carrier Division 5 and Sōryū and Hiryū in Carrier Division 2. The carriers were accompanied by all four Kongo-class battleships and both Tone-class cruisers.[5]

Japanese intelligence on the composition of the Eastern Fleet was reasonably accurate, while overestimating the air strength on Ceylon.[6][7] The 19 March operational order vaguely advised that a "considerable" portion of British naval and air forces in the Indian Ocean were "deployed in Ceylon area". The Japanese stationed submarines outside of the British anchorages at Colombo and Trincomalee to keep watch but their effectiveness was limited. At least one submarine went to scout the Maldive Islands but failed to detect that Gan (Port T) at Addu Atoll was a fleet fuelling base.[8]

Malay Force

[edit]
Bay of Bengal location map

Concurrent with Operation C, the IJN dispatched Malay Force (Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa) on a raid in the Bay of Bengal. The force departed from Mergui (now Myeik, Myanmar) on 1 April consisting of the aircraft carrier Ryūjō, six cruisers, a light cruiser and four destroyers.[9] The Eastern Fleet was far to the south, operating against Operation C and the British were incapable of defending the merchant ships in the Bay, having only a couple of Indian sloops and the Greek destroyer Ierax; merchant ships sailed in small groups and hugged the coast.[10] On 5 April, at 16°N, 88°E, the force divided into North, centre and South units to search for targets south of False Point (20°20′N, 86°44′E) and Cocanada. On 5 April aircraft from Ryūjō sank a ship and Calcutta (now Kolkata) where ships had begun dispersing on 31 March, cancelled sailings on 6 April.[11]

On 6 April, aircraft from Ryūjō bombed the coastal towns of Cocanada and Vizagapatam causing minor damage and a panic that led to an exodus from both places. In three days, Malay Force managed to sink 20 merchant ships and damage three more of over 130,000 GRT in attacks by aircraft and ships.[11] On the eastern side off the Bay, off Akyab (now Sittwe) in Burma at 20°7′N, 92°54′E, the Burma Coast Force was attacked by land-based aircraft and lost HMIS Indus a Grimsby-class sloop with ten men wounded. During the chaos caused by Operation C and the raid by Malay Force, the Japanese were able to get a convoy of troops and equipment into Rangoon.[12] Another 32,000 GRT of shipping was sunk by Japanese submarines off the west coast of Indiat during the month.[13]

British preparations

[edit]
Japanese operation in the Northern Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal in 1942. Nagumo's forces are shown at the bottom of the map

The reinforcement of the Eastern Fleet depended on transfers from Britain and the Mediterranean. In late December 1941, a reassessment of the threat posed by Japan envisioned the Navy transferring the majority of the big ships to the Eastern Fleet. Matters were made urgent by the Attack on Pearl Harbor that sank much of the United States Pacific Fleet, that exposed the weak forces in Malaya to attack. Heavy units were freed by American reinforcements in the Atlantic. The pre-war rearmament was beginning to yield more big ships. The Mediterranean Fleet transferred far less reinforcements than expected due to its losses in 1941.[14]

Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville assumed command of an Eastern Fleet in March 1942 that was smaller than envisioned in December 1941. Somerville divided the fleet into a fast Force A with the aircraft carriers HMS Formidable and Indomitable, the modernised battleship HMS Warspite (as flagship), as well as the modern cruisers and destroyers. Force B was formed around the old carrier HMS Hermes and four un-modernised Revenge-class battleships; a few submarines were also available.[15][16][17] The ships had not operated together before and ship and air crews were deficient in training.[18]

Allied intelligence accurately assessed the strength of the Japanese force. Somerville planned to evade the Japanese during the day and at night close for torpedo attacks with radar-equipped Fairey Albacore bombers. The plan was based on information from the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB), which identified only two carriers in the Japanese force. FECB also believed the Japanese would sail from Staring Bay on 21 March and that C day was 1 April. Somerville sailed early, expecting to fight a smaller Japanese force, particularly in aircraft strength. Somerville had orders from the Admiralty, to protect the communications in the Indian Ocean and to keep the Eastern Fleet in being by avoiding risks.[19]

After the attack on Pearl Harbor the Ceylon air defences were reinforced. On 7 December 1941, the air defences consisted of four obsolescent three-inch anti-aircraft guns at Trincomalee with no fighters or radar. By 4 April, there were 67 Hawker Hurricanes and 44 Fairey Fulmar fighters, radar station at Colombo and Trincomalee and 144 anti-aircraft guns. There were 37 or 38 operational Hurricanes around Colombo on 5 April in three RAF squadrons, two at Colombo and one at Trincomalee.[20] There were two squadrons of RN Fleet Air Arm (FAA) Fulmars.[21] Other squadrons increased from eight obsolete torpedo bombers, to seven Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boats, 14 Bristol Blenheim IV bombers, and 12 Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers. On the eve of battle, RAF forces were part of 222 Group (Air Vice-Marshal John D'Albiac).[22]

Raid

[edit]

26 March−3 April

[edit]
The Combined Fleet heading for the Indian Ocean on 30 March. (Left to right, Akagi, Sōryū, Hiryū, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna and Kongō, taken from Zuikaku.

The Japanese sailed from Staring-baai (Staring Bay) on 26 March as planned. Somerville sailed on 30 March, expecting an attack on 1 April and took the fleet to a patrol area 100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi) south of Ceylon. Ceylon air defences and forces went on alert, with land-based aerial reconnaissance concentrating on the south-east, where the Japanese were expected to approach for attacks on Colombo and Trincomalee.[23] Late on 2 April, the Eastern Fleet retired toward Port T 600 nmi (1,100 km; 690 mi) south-west of Ceylon to fuel. Somerville detached several ships to resume their commitments; the heavy cruisers HMS Cornwall and Dorsetshire were sent to Colombo and Hermes to Trincomalee.[24] The air defences stood down, except for Catalina patrols.[25]

4 April

[edit]

At about 16:00 on 4 April, PBY Catalina flying boat (AJ155/QL-A) from 413 Squadron, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) flown by Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall spotted the Combined Fleet 360 mi (580 km) south-east of Ceylon on a course that would have entered the British fleet patrol area from the south.[26] The Catalina transmitted the sighting but not the size of the fleet before being shot down. Somerville was refuelling at Port T; Force A sailed eastwards toward the Japanese upon receiving the sighting; Force B could not be ready until 5 April.[27][21] Catalina FV-R from 205 Squadron took off at 17:45 to shadow the Japanese fleet, making its first report at 22:37 on 4 April and a final report at 06:15 on 5 April while 110 nmi (200 km; 130 mi) from Ceylon. FV-R was shot down about 90 minutes after the final report.[26]

Within an hour of QL-A's report, D'Albiac met to brief his staff on an anticipated Japanese attack after dawn and 222 Group issued a warning and units went on alert at 04:00 on 5 April. On the morning of 5 April, six Swordfish from 788 Naval Air Squadron (788 NAS) flew from China Bay, near Trincomalee, to Colombo, to be ready for an attack on the Japanese fleet.[28] Admiral Geoffrey Layton, at Ceylon, ordered ships to disperse from harbour. Cornwall and Dorsetshire, that had just reached Colombo, were sent back towards Force A late on 4 April. Hermes sailed from Trincomalee and was ordered to hide north-east of Ceylon.[29] The Japanese did not perform an aerial reconnaissance along their intended course on the afternoon of 4 April, and a planned reconnaissance of Colombo harbour by cruiser seaplanes was cancelled.[30] The Japanese intercepted a signal from Colombo asking QL-A to repeat its report, showing that they had lost surprise .[31]

5 April

[edit]
Main article: Easter Sunday Raid

Japanese intelligence on the morning of 5 April 1942 indicated that British carriers were absent and the Japanese morning air search was limited accordingly.[6] At dawn, Japanese aerial reconnaissance aircraft flew off to the south-west and north-west; they would fly out to a maximum of 200 nmi (370 km; 230 mi) over the next few hours. A reconnaissance Fulmar launched from Force A at 08:00 spotted one of the Japanese aircraft at the extreme edge of the south-west search area at 08:55 about 140 nmi (260 km; 160 mi) ahead of Force A.[32]

Shortly after 06:00 91 Japanese bombers and 36 fighters began taking off for the attack on Colombo.[33][21] British early warning failed to detect and identify the incoming strike, forcing British pilots to scramble under fire when the first Japanese aircraft appeared over them at 07:45. The defence Ratmalana airfield by British fighters left the harbour undefended. The armed merchant cruiser HMS Hector, the Norwegian tanker Soli and the old destroyer HMS Tenedos were sunk; three other ships were damaged. The port was damaged but was not put out of action.[21] Twenty of the 41 British fighters that took off were shot down. At least one fighter was damaged taking off and crashed. The six Swordfish of 788 NAS arrived during the battle and were shot down. The Japanese lost seven aircraft.[34]

Nagumo changed course to west-south-west at 08:30, unknowingly causing the opposing fleets to steam toward one another and recovered the Colombo strike from 09:45 to 10:30. The size of the attack on Colombo was Somerville's first evidence that the Japanese force had more than the expected two carriers; he continued to steam toward the Japanese fleet at 18 kn (33 km/h; 21 mph). Radar-based fighter direction would allow Force A to avoid surprise attack by neutralising shadowing Japanese aircraft.[35]

Loss of Dorsetshire and Cornwall

[edit]
HMS Cornwall burning and sinking on 5 April 1942

At 10:00, an aircraft from Tone searching the southwest area spotted and began shadowing Dorsetshire's force; the aircraft reported that the cruiser was heading south-west and making 24 kn (44 km/h; 28 mph).[35] The cruisers reported the shadower but had no means to drive it off.[36] Nagumo increased speed from 24 to 28 kn (44 to 52 km/h; 28 to 32 mph) upon receiving the sighting. Carrier Division 5's reserve strike force was ordered to rearm with torpedoes, replacing the bombs intended for a second attack on Colombo. The rearming was too slow and Carrier Division 2 attacked instead.[37]

Soryu and Hiryu began launching dive bombers at 11:45.[37] Radar of Force A detected the attack on the cruisers at 13:44, putting the aircraft 34 nmi (63 km; 39 mi) to the north-east. Cornwall and Dorsetshire were sunk at 14:00 and 424 officers and crew were lost.[38] The Japanese did not find Force A after sinking the cruisers. Had aircraft shadowing the cruisers flown another 50 nmi (93 km; 58 mi) along the cruisers' course before returning to Tone, it would have detected Force A if it had flown south-west for another ten minutes. Nagumo recovered the attacking aircraft at 14:45.[39]

5 April, afternoon

[edit]

Somerville launched four Albacores from Indomitable at 14:00 to search an arc to the north-east out to 200 nmi (370 km; 230 mi). Nagumo's south-easterly course would have taken the Japanese fleet right through the centre of the arc. At 15:00 or 15:30, Nagumo changed course to the south-west. Carrier Division 2 did not immediately follow; it performed a series of kinking manoeuvres starting at 15:00 that initially took it north-west. Carrier Division 2 was spotted by the two northerly Albacores around 16:00. Hiryū launched Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters to intercept the scouts; one Albacore was damaged at 16:04, and the other shot down at 16:28 without reporting. The two southern-most Albacores missed Nagumo's main body.[40]

Somerville did not receive the damaged Albacore's sighting report until 16:55; the report gave the position of Carrier Division 2 with reasonable accuracy, placed the Japanese 125 miles (201 km) away, but contained no other data. At 17:00 he received signals intelligence (SIGINT) from Colombo reporting the Japanese course at 14:00 as south-westerly, at 24 kn (44 km/h; 28 mph). Somerville ordered a course change to the southwest at 17:26, not knowing that Nagumo's main body was 120 nmi (220 km; 140 mi) away, and that Carrier Division 2 was only 100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi) away. The course change was presumably to maintain distance between a superior enemy that was believed to be still closing, or to cover Port T from attack, but it also meant the British lost an opportunity to meet the enemy; had Force A continued on its easterly course, Carrier Division 2 would have passed right in front of it at 21:00 at range of about 20 nmi (37 km; 23 mi).[41]

The damaged Albacore landed at 17:45, less than a half-hour before sunset and the crew was debriefed. There were two revisions to the 16:00 sighting, which were transmitted to Somerville at 18:00 and 18:17 respectively and differed significantly from each other and the original report. The final revision correctly identified the two carriers of Carrier Division 2 but also claimed they were heading toward the north-west at a position 25 nmi (46 km; 29 mi) or the original sighting. The course heading conflicted with the first revision, which suggested a course toward the south-east. Late on 5 April, FECB decrypted a JN 25B message containing Nagumo's planned movement on 6 April, but this did not aid Somerville as the transmission to the fleet was garbled. Somerville declined to launch a strike based on poor information and opted to head north-west in pursuit. One radar-equipped aircraft was launched to search a northern arc out to 200 nmi (370 km; 230 mi). Aircraft were sent later to search the easterly arc but it was too late to re-gain contact with the Japanese.[42]

For the Japanese, too, there was a lost opportunity to find the British before night fell. Nagumo did not order a search for the British carriers at the appearance of British carrier-based aircraft. Search aircraft might require homing signals from the carriers to return, that the British could use to locate the Japanese. The Japanese fleet continued south-east at 20 kn (37 km/h; 23 mph) ignorant of the presence of Force A. Carrier Division 2 rejoined the main body's track at 18:00 and caught up at 22:00 180 nmi (330 km; 210 mi) due east of Force A.[43] The Japanese circled wide to the south and then east in preparation for an attack on Trincomalee.[36] The Japanese suspected the presence of British carriers and on the morning of 6 April they launched a much denser westwards air search but still found nothing.[44] Further searches on route to Trincomalee were equally unsuccessful as the British carriers were by that time far to the west.[36]

6–9 April

[edit]

By 6 April, FECB decrypts of Japanese wireless codes indicated the force contained four carriers and three battleships, that Somerville realised was beyond the capacity of the Eastern Fleet to engage without undue risk. The declining serviceability of his fighter force also reinforced his caution. Somerville did not immediately withdraw or return to port; Force B rejoined early on 6 April. In the afternoon 1,122 survivors from Dorsetshire's force were recovered, while maintaining a look-out for the Japanese force with all-around air reconnaissance.[45] Intelligence from Ceylon put the Japanese between Port T and Ceylon. Somerville cautiously arrived at Port T from the west at 11:00 on 8 April and refuelled.[36] By 8 April, the Eastern Fleet had withdrawn and the Japanese fleet was approaching Trincomalee from the east.[46] The Japanese fleet was detected by a RAF Catalina at 15:17 on 8 April and the harbour at Trincomalee was cleared that night.[47] Hermes, escorted by HMAS Vampire, was sent south along the coast.[48]

The Japanese air search on the morning of 9 April was limited as British carriers were no longer expected.[6] The Japanese strike group of 132 aircraft was detected at 07:06 by AMES 272 91 mi (146 km) from Trincomalee. The RAF and FAA scrambled 17 Hurricanes and six Fulmars in good time and a section of Hurricanes, already airborne on dawn patrol, attacked three Zeroes and shot down two. The China Bay airfield and the port were severely bombed and the monitor HMS Erebus was damaged.[49] SS Sagaing (7,968 GRT) a merchant ship carrying aircraft and ammunition was set on fire and abandoned, with two men killed of 138 crew; eventually the hulk drifted into Malay Cove.[50] Eight Hurricanes and a Fulmar were shot down and several unserviceable aircraft were destroyed on the ground; the Japanese lost four aircraft. At 07:16 another Catalina from 413 Squadron RCAF spotted the Japanese fleet and was shot down while reporting.[51]

Around 10:25, nine un-escorted Blenheims from 11 Squadron attacked Nagumo's force and eluded the combat air patrol (CAP).[52] Hiryū spotted the aircraft but failed to relay a warning to the other ships and the attack achieved surprise.[53] The bombers attacked Akagi at 11,000 ft (3,400 m) and the bombs fell close to Hiryū but none hit.[54][53] Four Blenheims were shot down after they had bombed and turned for home by Zeros of the standing patrol, two claimed by Kaname Harada and another by Japanese aircraft returning from the attack on Hermes. A Zero was shot down near the carriers and another in the formation returning from Trincomalee.[55] This was the first time a Japanese carrier force had faced a concerted air attack.[53]

Hermes sinking after Japanese air attack on 9 April 1942.

Hermes and Vampire were 65 nautical miles (120 km; 75 mi) away when Trincomalee was attacked. At 09:00 they reversed course.[48] Shortly after the attack on Trincomalee ended, a reconnaissance aircraft from Haruna spotted the ships. Eighty Aichi D3A Val bombers, held in reserve on the Japanese carriers, began an attack at 10:35 and the ships were sunk off Batticaloa before noon.[56] Hermes was hit by over forty 500 lb (230 kg) bombs and sank with the loss of 307 men; eight of the crew on Vampire were killed. The nearby hospital ship HMHS Vita was not attacked as it rescued 600 survivors. Aircraft from Soryu attacked HMS Hollyhock, a Flower-class corvette that was escorting RFA Athelstone and sank the corvette with the loss of 53 men.[57] The tanker MV British Sergeant and the cargo ship SS Norviken were also sunk. British Fulmars arrived from Trincomalee too late to help Hermes but shot down four Vals for the loss of two of the Fulmars. Nagumo disengaged after recovering the strike on Hermes.[52]

Aftermath

[edit]

British reaction

[edit]

The Japanese damaged port facilities, sank one carrier and two cruisers, destroyed a third of enemy ground-based fighters and nearly all of the ground-based anti-shipping aircraft. The Japanese sank 23 merchant ships, totalling 112,312 GRT including those by the Japanese Malay Force.[58][46] The Japanese lost only 18 aircraft (six fighters, ten dive-bombers and two high-level bombers), with damage to about 31 more; yet the Japanese failed to destroy, or even locate, the main bulk of the British Eastern Fleet. The British overestimated the danger, Ceylon and the Eastern Fleet were required to safeguard the sea lines of communications and Signals intelligence suggested that the Japanese were preparing a deliberate advance across the Indian Ocean.[59] The raid demonstrated that the RAF was too weak to defend Ceylon and the naval anchorages and that the navy was ill-prepared to meet a Japanese carrier force.[1][60]

The Eastern Fleet transferred its main base to Kilindini, at Mombasa in the Kenya Colony in East Africa, temporarily ceding the eastern Indian Ocean to Japan; from there it contested control of the central Indian Ocean on better terms.[61] Force A, including its two aircraft carriers, Indomitable and Formidable, retired to Bombay and Somerville regularly sent a fast carrier force to the central Indian Ocean over the next six months, during which he operated from or near Ceylon for about half that time.[1] On 18 April, naval planning accorded the Eastern Fleet the highest priority for reinforcement, that also included transferring most of the carriers from the Home Fleet and the Mediterranean with the intention of returning to Ceylon in September.[62]

By June, Ceylon had three RAF fighter squadrons (64 aircraft, plus reserves) three anti-shipping squadrons (including one of Beaufort torpedo bombers) and much improved radar and anti-aircraft defences. The Ceylon ground defences were manned by two Australian army brigades. The invasion scare was short-lived, because British intelligence detected the movement of the Japanese carrier force eastwards in mid-April and their arrival in the Pacific in mid-May. After the Battle of Midway in June, the threat of serious Japanese naval activity in the Indian Ocean was at an end. In September, British intelligence predicted Japan would go over to the defensive; the reinforcement of the Eastern Fleet stopped and it was reduced in size in late July.[63]

Japanese reaction

[edit]

The Japanese did not exploit their victory as the British feared, the decision to postpone offensive operations in the Indian Ocean was upheld. The Japanese aircraft carriers needed maintenance and replenishment after months of intensive operations and there was already difficulties in maintaining the strength of frontline air units.[64] Nagumo and officers such as Mitsuo Fuchida (commanding Akagi's air group) felt that the losses inflicted on the British did not justify the loss of experienced Japanese air crews.[65] Japanese attention also lay elsewhere and in early May, Japanese carriers fought the Battle of the Coral Sea in the south-west Pacific, followed in June by the Battle of Midway.[66][67]

Losses constrained Japanese options further. In June, the IJA planned an offensive in the Indian Ocean, including an invasion of Ceylon. The Germans were advancing in North Africa, which made an Axis link-up in the Middle East attractive. The IJN had to reject plan, especially once the Guadalcanal campaign started.[67] The limit of Japanese operations in the Indian Ocean was against trade, using submarines and armed merchant cruisers. A submarine group patrolling off East Africa attacked the harbour at Diego-Suarez in Madagascar during the Allied invasion Battle of Madagascar.[68] The Allies wanted to forestall the Japanese to prevent them from making a base there to attack trade.[69] Japanese attacks on shipping had success but after 1942 the IJN could not contest the Indian Ocean.[70]

Criticism of Nagumo

[edit]

Andrew Boyd called Nagumo's leadership rigid and unimaginative, that contributed to the escape of the Eastern Fleet. The manoeuvring of his fleet was mainly to facilitate strikes on Colombo and Trincomalee; the possibility that the British might be at sea was apparently not seriously considered. He failed to appreciate that the direction that Dorsetshire's force was sailing, and the later appearance of British carrier-based aircraft, were related. Lack of aerial reconnaissance provided Nagumo with little information of what was around him, especially to his front and exposed flanks. He was not well served by the confidence that there was nothing else to be found outside of the few searches made.[7] The limited air searches conducted at the start of the battle reflected contemporary IJN practice, where the intensity of air searches was determined according to expected threats. The stronger morning search on 6 April reflected the suspicion that British carriers might be present. The intensity of later air searches dropped off when the British carriers were not found and there was little expectation of encountering them. Ultimately, all navies suffered from inadequate air search planning during this period.[71]

Japanese carrier failings

[edit]

The raid provided early examples of problems with Japanese carrier operations. Inadequate aerial reconnaissance failed to locate the British fleet in time, there was difficulty in the rearming aircraft for a different mission at short notice and the penetration of the CAP by The Blenheims due to the lack of radar-directed fighter control recurred at the Battle of Midway.[7]

Somerville

[edit]

Somerville took risks, some bordering on recklessness an example being the deployment of the fleet on 30 March. Somerville relied on radar sets with inexperienced operators, to find the Japanese fleet to attack at night. If the Japanese approached as expected from the south-east and the British failed to find them before dawn, the two fleets would be no more than 100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi) apart; the British would be detected by Japanese aerial reconnaissance at sunrise and could face air attacks all day. The British would have been just as vulnerable had they still been on station when the Japanese arrived from the south-west.[30] Somerville's decision to refuel at Port T, rather than at Ceylon on 2 April, meant that the Eastern Fleet avoided Nagumo a few days later and perhaps saved the Eastern Fleet. The failure of the Japanese fleet to appear on 1–2 April led Somerville mistakenly to believe that all of the Allied intelligence on Operation C was flawed. He detached Cornwall, Dorsetshire and Hermes, that were sunk in areas overflown by Japanese aerial reconnaissance.[8]

Andrew Boyd wrote that Somerville

...underestimated the risks he was running at least up to dusk on 5 April. He drew over-optimistic conclusions from the...intelligence, he grossly underestimated IJN air strength and he hazarded his fleet in direct contravention of his instructions from the chiefs of staff. Ceylon was not his finest hour.[72]

and the Admiralty broadly agreed.[72]

Somerville faced challenges not apparent in the Atlantic or Mediterranean. Japanese air superiority made it difficult to scout, close and attack during the day. Radar-enabled night attack was the only alternative but this was risky, careful positioning, luck and Japanese errors nearly produced the conditions for an attack on the night of 5/6 April. The Combined Fleet was within 125 nmi (232 km; 144 mi), an hour away in an Albacore but information on the Japanese vector was missing. Even then, it required experienced air crews to find their targets at night using new tactics and radar sets with a range of 20 mi (32 km).[73]

Japanese order of battle

[edit]
Combined Fleet[74]
Ship (English) Flag Class Notes
Vice-Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, C-in-C 1st Air Fleet
Air attack Group
1st Carrier Squadron
Akagi Red Castle  Imperial Japanese Navy Amagi-class aircraft carrier
2nd Carrier Squadron
Sōryū Blue [or Green] Dragon  Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier
Hiryū Flying Dragon  Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier
5th Carrier Squadron (reserve)
Shōkaku Soaring Crane  Imperial Japanese Navy Shōkaku-class aircraft carrier
Zuikaku Auspicious Crane  Imperial Japanese Navy Shōkaku-class aircraft carrier
Zuikaku Auspicious Crane  Imperial Japanese Navy Shōkaku-class aircraft carrier
Battleships
Kongō Mount Kongō  Imperial Japanese Navy Kongō-class battlecruiser 3 Nakajima E8N (Dave) floatplanes
Hiei Mount Hiei  Imperial Japanese Navy Kongō-class battlecruiser 3 Nakajima E8N (Dave) floatplanes
Kirishima Mount Kirishima  Imperial Japanese Navy Kongō-class battlecruiser 3 Nakajima E8N (Dave) floatplanes
Haruna Mount Haruna  Imperial Japanese Navy Kongō-class battlecruiser 3 Nakajima E8N (Dave) floatplanes
8th Cruiser Division
Tone Tone River  Imperial Japanese Navy Tone-class cruiser 6 Aichi E13A (Jake) floatplanes
Chikuma Chikuma River  Imperial Japanese Navy Tone-class cruiser
Guard Unit, 1st Destroyer Squadron
Abukuma Abukuma River  Imperial Japanese Navy Nagara-class cruiser 1 Kawanishi E7K (Alf) floatplane
17th Destroyer Division
Hamakaze Beach Wind  Imperial Japanese Navy Kagerō-class destroyer
Isokaze Wind on the Beach  Imperial Japanese Navy Kagerō-class destroyer
Tanikaze Valley Wind  Imperial Japanese Navy Kagerō-class destroyer
Urakaze Wind on the Sea  Imperial Japanese Navy Kagerō-class destroyer
18th Destroyer Division
Arare Hailstone  Imperial Japanese Navy Asashio-class destroyer
Kagerō Heat Haze  Imperial Japanese Navy Kagerō-class destroyer
Kasumi Haze  Imperial Japanese Navy Asashio-class destroyer
Shiranui Phosphorescent Light  Imperial Japanese Navy Kagerō-class destroyer
4th Destroyer Division
Akigumo Autumn Clouds  Imperial Japanese Navy Kagerō-class destroyer

Japanese aircraft

[edit]
1st Air Fleet[75]
Fighter Dive bomber Torpedo bomber Notes
Air attack Group
Akagi
19 Zero 17 Aichi D3A (Val) 18 Nakajima B5N (Kate) 54 aircraft, not all used on raid
Sōryū
20 Zero 18 Aichi D3A (Val) 18 Nakajima B5N (Kate) 56 aircraft, not all used on raid
Hiryū
18 Zero 18 Aichi D3A (Val) 18 Nakajima B5N (Kate) 54 aircraft, not all used on raid
Reserve
Shōkaku
18 Zero 19 Aichi D3A (Val) 19 Nakajima B5N (Kate) 56 aircraft, not used on raid
Zuikaku
18 Zero 19 Aichi D3A (Val) 18 Nakajima B5N (Kate) 55 aircraft, not used on raid
Totals
93 Zero 91 Aichi D3A (Val) 91 Nakajima B5N (Kate) 275, 111 reserves

Ships sunk, 5 April 1942

[edit]
British warships sunk or damaged[76]
Ship Flag Class Notes
Colombo harbour
HMS Hector  Royal Navy Armed merchant cruiser Damaged, settled on bottom
HMS Lucia  Royal Navy submarine depot ship Damaged
HMS Tenedos  Royal Navy S-class destroyer Sunk
At sea
HMS Cornwall  Royal Navy County-class cruiser Sunk
HMS Dorsetshire  Royal Navy County-class cruiser Sunk
Merchant ships sunk or damaged, 5 April 1942[76]
Ship Flag GRT Notes
Colombo harbour
SS Benledi  Merchant Navy 5,943 Damaged
SS Clan Murdoch  Merchant Navy 5,960 Damaged
MV Soli Norway 5,834 Damaged

Ships sunk, 9 April 1942

[edit]
Allied warships sunk or damaged, 9 April 1942[77]
Ship Flag Class Notes
Trincomalee harbour
HMS Erebus  Royal Navy Monitor Damaged, 9† 22 wounded
HNLMS Sumatra  Royal Netherlands Navy Java-class cruiser Damaged
At sea
HMS Hermes  Royal Navy Aircraft carrier Sunk, 7°35′28.39″N, 82°5′55.09″E 307†
HMS Hollyhock  Royal Navy Flower-class corvette Sunk, 07°30′N, 81°57′E, 53†
HMAS Vampire  Royal Navy V-class destroyer Sunk, 8†
HMHS Vita  Royal Navy Hospital ship Rescued 600 survivors, undisturbed by Japanese aircraft
Merchant ships sunk or damaged, 9 April 1942[78]
Ship Year Flag GRT Notes
In harbour
SS Sagaing 1925  Merchant Navy 7,968 Damaged, beached, 2† 136 surv, scuttled 1943
At sea
RFA Athelstane 1918  Merchant Navy 5,571 Tanker, bombed, sunk, 07°30′N, 81°56′E, 0†
SS British Sergeant 1922  Merchant Navy 5,868 Tanker, bombed, sunk, 08°01′N, 81°38′E, 0† 59 surv.
MV Norviken 1925 Norway 2,924 Bombed, ship abandoned, 4† 42 surv

Malaya Unit Striking Force

[edit]
Malaya Force (1–11 April 1942)[79]
Ship (English) Flag Class Notes
Vice-Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa
4th Carrier Squadron
Ryūjō Prancing Dragon  Imperial Japanese Navy Light aircraft carrier
Mikuma Mikuma River  Imperial Japanese Navy Mogami-class cruiser
Mogami Mogami River  Imperial Japanese Navy Mogami-class cruiser
Suzuya Suzuya River  Imperial Japanese Navy Mogami-class cruiser
7th Cruiser Squadron
Chōkai Mount Chōkai  Imperial Japanese Navy Takao-class cruiser
Takao Mount Takao  Imperial Japanese Navy Takao-class cruiser
11th Destroyer Division (to 3–4 April)
Yura Yura River  Imperial Japanese Navy Nagara-class cruiser
Fubuki Blizzard  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer
Shirayuki White Snow  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer
Hatsuyuki First Snow  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer
Murakumo Massed Clouds  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer
20th Destroyer Division (from 3–4 April)
Amagiri Fogged/Clouded Sky  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer
Asagiri Morning Fog  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer
Shirakumo White Cloud  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer
Yūgiri Evening Mist  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer
Submarine Unit C
I-2 1926  Imperial Japanese Navy Type J1 submarine
I-3 1926  Imperial Japanese Navy Type J1 submarine
I-4 1929  Imperial Japanese Navy Type J1 submarine
I-5 1932  Imperial Japanese Navy Junsen I Mod (I-5 class)
I-6 1935  Imperial Japanese Navy Junsen II (I-6 class)
I-7 1937  Imperial Japanese Navy Junsen III (I-7 class)


Guard Unit[79]
Ship (English) Flag Class Notes
Guard Unit
Sendai Blizzard  Imperial Japanese Navy Sendai-class cruiser
Fubuki Blizzard  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer 11th Destroyer Division
Shirayuki White Snow  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer 11th Destroyer Division
Hatsuyuki First Snow  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer 11th Destroyer Division
Murakumo Massed Clouds  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer 11th Destroyer Division
Uranami Shore Wave  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer 11th Destroyer Division
Isonami Shore Wave  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer 11th Destroyer Division

Replenishment ships

[edit]
Supply Unit[75]
Ship Year Flag Class Notes
Supply Unit
MV Nishiei Maru —  Imperial Japanese Navy Tanker
Ayanami Twilled Waves  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer Det. 4th Carrier Division
Shiokaze Sea Breeze  Imperial Japanese Navy Minekaze-class destroyer Det. 4th Carrier Division
1st Supply Division
MV Shunkoku Maru 1940  Imperial Japanese Navy Kawasaki-type oiler
MV Ken'yō Maru 1939  Imperial Japanese Navy Kawasaki-type oiler
MV Nippon Maru 1936  Imperial Japanese Navy Kawasaki-type oiler
MV Tōei Maru 1939  Imperial Japanese Navy Kawasaki-type oiler
2nd Supply Division
MV Nichiro Maru  Imperial Japanese Navy oiler
MV Tōei Maru No. 2 1939  Imperial Japanese Navy Kawasaki-type oiler
MV Hoyo Maru 1939  Imperial Japanese Navy Kawasaki-type oiler

Malaya Force groups

[edit]
Malaya Force (1–11 April 1942)[80]
Ship (English) Flag Class Notes
North Unit
Kumano Kumano River  Imperial Japanese Navy Mogami-class cruiser 7th Cruiser Division
Suzuya Suzuya River  Imperial Japanese Navy Mogami-class cruiser 7th Cruiser Division
Shirakumo White Cloud  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer 20th Destroyer Division
Centre Unit
Ryūjō Prancing Dragon  Imperial Japanese Navy Light aircraft carrier 4th Carrier Division
Chōkai Mount Chōkai  Imperial Japanese Navy Takao-class cruiser
Yura Yura River  Imperial Japanese Navy Nagara-class cruiser
Asagiri Morning Fog  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer 20th destroyer Division
Yūgiri Evening Mist  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer 20th destroyer Division
South Unit
Mikuma Mikuma River  Imperial Japanese Navy Mogami-class cruiser 7th Cruiser Division
Mogami Mogami River  Imperial Japanese Navy Mogami-class cruiser 7th Cruiser Division
Amagiri Fogged/Clouded Sky  Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki-class destroyer 20th Destroyer Division

Ships sunk by Malaya Force

[edit]
Merchant ships attacked[81]
Name Year Flag GRT Notes
SS Harpasa 1934  Merchant Navy 5,082 5 April 1942, carrier aircraft 19°19′N, 85°46′E, 11† 33 surv, sank
SS Dardanus 1923  Merchant Navy 7,726 6 April 1942, gunfire, carrier aircraft
SS Point Clear 1920  United States 4,839
SS Bienville 1921  United States 5,491 6 April 1942, carrier aircraft, 17°48′N, 84°09′W, 24† 17 surv, sank
SS Ganges 1930  Merchant Navy 6,245 6 April 1942, carrier aircraft, sunk, 15†
SS Sinkiang 1915  Merchant Navy 2,646 6 April 1942, carrier aircraft, 17°32′N, 82°50′E, no†
MV Banjoewangi 1939 Netherlands 1,279 6 April 1942, gunfire, sunk, 13†
MV Batavia 1939 Netherlands 1,279
SS Taksang 1935  Merchant Navy 3,471 6 April 1942, gunfire, 17°52′N, 83°40′E, sunk, 15† 107 surv
SS Selma City 1921  United States 5,686 7 April 1942, carrier aircraft, sunk, 0†
MV Van der Capellen 1942 Netherlands 2,073 8 April 1942, carrier aircraft, sunk, 0†
MV Anglo Canadian 1928  Merchant Navy 5,268
SS Gandara 1919  Merchant Navy 5,281 6 April 1942, gunfire, 16°03′N, 82°20′E, sunk, 13† 69 surv
MV Dagfred 1930 Norway 4,434 6 April 1942, gunfire, 16°15′N, 82°09′E, sunk, 0† 40 surv
SS Hermod 1925 Norway 1,515 6 April 1942, gunfire, Bay of Bengal, scuttled, 0†
MV Elsa 1928 Norway 5,381 6 April 1942, gunfire, 35 nmi E. of Cuttack. sunk, 1† 29 surv
SS Malda 1922  Merchant Navy 9,066 6 April 1942, gunfire, 19°45′N, 86°27′E, sunk, 25† 154 surv
SS Autolycus 1922  Merchant Navy 7,718 6 April 1942, gunfire, 19°40′N, 86°50′E, sunk, 18† 82 surv
SS Indora 1938  Merchant Navy 6,622 6 April 1942, gunfire, Bay of Bengal, sunk, 2† 81 surv
Exmoor 1919  United States 4,986 6 March 1942, gunfire, sunk
SS Silksworth 1922  Merchant Navy 4,921 6 April 1942, gunfire off Puri, sunk, 0† 57 surv
SS Shinkuang 1920  Merchant Navy 2,410 6 April 1942, gunfire, off Puri, 3†

British order of battle (Ceylon)

[edit]

Army

[edit]
Ceylon garrison, March 1942[82]
Unit Flag Type Notes
Ceylon Defence Force
Ceylon Light Infantry  British Army Infantry
Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps  British Army Infantry
Colombo Town Guard  British Army Infantry
Ceylon Garrison Artillery  British Army Artillery 6-inch naval, 9.2-inch naval
65th Heavy AA Regt  British Army Anti-Aircraft 40 × 3.7-inch AA,, 4 × 3-inch 20 cwt AA
43rd Light AA Regt  British Army Anti-Aircraft 69 × Bofors 40 mm AA from March 1942[83]
Indian Army
34th Indian Division  British Indian Army Infantry
21st (East Africa) Infantry Brigade  British Army Infantry Attached to 34th Indian Division
Australian Army
6th Australian Division
16th Australian Brigade  Australian Army Infantry
17th Australian Brigade  Australian Army Infanry

Royal Air Force, Fleet Air Arm

[edit]
222 Group RAF[84]
Flag Type Base Notes
RAF
Colombo
11 Squadron  Royal Air Force Bomber Racecourse 14 Blenheim Mk IV
30 Squadron  Royal Air Force Fighter RAF Ratmalana 22 Hurricane Mk IIb, 8 shot down
258 Squadron  Royal Air Force Fighter Racecourse 9 Hurricane Mk IIb, 5 Mk Ib, 8 shot down
Galle
202 Squadron  Royal Air Force Flying boat RAF Koggala 1 Catalina
205 Squadron  Royal Air Force Flying boat RAF Koggala Catalina FV-R
413 Squadron  Royal Canadian Air Force Flying boat RAF Koggala 3 Catalina
Netherlands Naval Aviation Service
Groep Vliegtuig-2  Marineluchtvaartdienst Flying boat RAF Koggala (Aircraft Group-2 [GVT-2]) Catalina Y-64
Groep Vliegtuig-16  Marineluchtvaartdienst Flying boat RAF Koggala (GVT-16) Catalinas Y-55, Y-56 and Y-57
Trincomalee
261 Squadron  Royal Air Force Fighter RAF China Bay 1 Hurricane Mk I, 17 Mk IIb
273 Squadron  Royal Air Force Fighter RAF China Bay 16 Fulmar Mk I, Mk II
788 Naval Air Squadron  Fleet Air Arm Torpedo-bomber RAF China Bay 6 Swordfish, Albacore, 6 Swordfish shot down
803 Naval Air Squadron  Fleet Air Arm Carrier fighter RAF China Bay 12 Fulmar Mk II
806 Naval Air Squadron  Fleet Air Arm Carrier fighter RAF China Bay 12 Fulmar Mk II
814 Naval Air Squadron  Fleet Air Arm Torpedo-bomber RAF China Bay 10 Swordfish ashore from HMS Hermes
HMS Indomitable  Fleet Air Arm Fighter RAF China Bay 2 Martlet ashore from Indomitable

Eastern Fleet

[edit]
Eastern Fleet[85]
Ship Flag Class Notes
Admiral James Somerville
Force A
HMS Formidable  Royal Navy Illustrious-class aircraft carrier
HMS Indomitable  Royal Navy Illustrious-class aircraft carrier
HMS Warspite  Royal Navy Queen Elizabeth-class battleship Flag
Heavy cruisers
HMS Cornwall  Royal Navy County-class cruiser
HMS Dorsetshire  Royal Navy County-class cruiser
Light cruisers
HMS Emerald  Royal Navy Emerald-class cruiser
HMS Enterprise  Royal Navy Emerald-class cruiser
Destroyers
HMS Foxhound  Royal Navy F-class destroyer
HMS Hotspur  Royal Navy H-class destroyer
HMS Napier  Royal Navy N-class destroyer
HMAS Nestor  Royal Navy N-class destroyer
HMS Paladin  Royal Navy P-class destroyer
HMS Panther  Royal Navy P-class destroyer
Vice-Admiral Algernon Willis
Force B
HMS Hermes  Royal Navy aircraft carrier 12 Fairey Swordfish, 10 ashore, 2 u/s
HMS Ramillies  Royal Navy Revenge-class battleship
HMS Resolution  Royal Navy Revenge-class battleship
HMS Revenge  Royal Navy Revenge-class battleship
HMS Royal Sovereign  Royal Navy Revenge-class battleship
Light cruisers
HMS Caledon  Royal Navy C-class cruiser
HMS Dragon  Royal Navy Danae-class cruiser
Jacob van Heemskerck  Royal Netherlands Navy Tromp-class cruiser
Destroyers
HMS Arrow  Royal Navy A-class destroyer
HMS Decoy  Royal Navy D-class destroyer
HMS Fortune  Royal Navy F-class destroyer
HMS Griffin  Royal Navy G-class destroyer
HNLMS Isaac Sweers  Royal Netherlands Navy Gerard Callenburgh-class destroyer
HMAS Norman  Royal Navy N-class destroyer
HMS Scout  Royal Navy S-class destroyer
HMAS Vampire  Royal Navy V-class destroyer

Eastern Fleet aircraft

[edit]
 Fleet Air Arm Carrier squadrons[86]
Type Notes
HMS Formidable
888 Naval Air Squadron 12 Martlet Mk II Fighter
818 Naval Air Squadron 9 Fairey Albacore Torpedo-bomber
820 Naval Air Squadron 12 Fairey Albacore Torpedo-bomber
HMS Indomitable
800 Naval Air Squadron 12 Fairey Fulmar Mk II Fighter
880 Naval Air Squadron 9 Sea Hurricane Mk Ib Fighter
827 Naval Air Squadron 12 Fairey Albacore Torpedo-bomber
831 Naval Air Squadron 12 Fairey Albacore Torpedo-bomber
HMS Hermes
814 Naval Air Squadron 12 Fairey Swordfish Mk I 10 Swordfish torpedo-bombers ashore at RAF China Bay, 2 u/s

Footnotes

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c Roskill 1956, p. 29.
  2. ^ Churchill 1950, pp. 138, 172–178.
  3. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 364.
  4. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 366, 381.
  5. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 373, 367.
  6. ^ a b c Tully & Yu 2015, p. 5.
  7. ^ a b c Boyd 2017, p. 381.
  8. ^ a b Boyd 2017, pp. 369–370.
  9. ^ Shores, Cull & Izawa 1993, pp. 393, 408–411.
  10. ^ MOD 1995, p. 128.
  11. ^ a b Warner et al. 1976, p. 154.
  12. ^ MOD 1995, pp. 128−129.
  13. ^ Black 2009, p. 135.
  14. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 356.
  15. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 365, 370.
  16. ^ Somerville, Sir James. Report of Proceedings (ROP) Of Eastern Fleet – 1942 Archived 28 February 2018 at the Wayback Machine
  17. ^ Roskill 1956, p. 23.
  18. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 365.
  19. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 366, 370.
  20. ^ Stuart 2014, pp. 33, 35, 44.
  21. ^ a b c d Roskill 1956, p. 26.
  22. ^ Stuart 2014, pp. 33, 44, 37.
  23. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 367–368, 36.
  24. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 368, 370.
  25. ^ Stuart 2014, p. 36.
  26. ^ a b Stuart 2014, p. 37.
  27. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 368, 375.
  28. ^ Stuart 2014, pp. 37–38, 42.
  29. ^ Roskill 1956, pp. 26–27.
  30. ^ a b Boyd 2017, p. 369.
  31. ^ Stuart 2006, p. 69.
  32. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 372.
  33. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 371.
  34. ^ Stuart 2014, pp. 33, 38–43, 47.
  35. ^ a b Boyd 2017, pp. 371–373.
  36. ^ a b c d Roskill 1956, p. 27.
  37. ^ a b Boyd 2017, pp. 373, 372, 374.
  38. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 371–374; Roskill 1956, p. 27.
  39. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 374.
  40. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 374, 377.
  41. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 377.
  42. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 379.
  43. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 376, 378–379.
  44. ^ Tully & Yu 2015, pp. 5–6.
  45. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 380, 384.
  46. ^ a b Roskill 1956, pp. 27–28.
  47. ^ Stuart 2006, p. 72.
  48. ^ a b Roskill 1956, p. 28.
  49. ^ Stuart 2006, pp. 72, 42–43.
  50. ^ Jordan 2006, pp. 144, 509.
  51. ^ Stuart 2006, pp. 72, 42, 73.
  52. ^ a b Stuart 2006, p. 73.
  53. ^ a b c Parshall & Tully 2005, p. 145.
  54. ^ Shores, Cull & Izawa 1993, pp. 426–427.
  55. ^ Shores, Cull & Izawa 1993, p. 426.
  56. ^ Stuart 2006, pp. 72−73.
  57. ^ Hobbs 2013, p. 103.
  58. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 384.
  59. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 384–385.
  60. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 388.
  61. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 385.
  62. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 389.
  63. ^ Boyd 2017, pp. 392, 391, 393, 395.
  64. ^ Parshall & Tully 2005, ch. 1, dh 5.
  65. ^ Perrett 2014, p. 114.
  66. ^ Parshall & Tully 2005, ch. 1.
  67. ^ a b Boyd 2017, p. 395.
  68. ^ Boyd & Yoshida 2013, pp. 90, 89.
  69. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 392.
  70. ^ Kowner 2017, p. 249.
  71. ^ Tully & Yu 2015, pp. 4–8.
  72. ^ a b Boyd 2017, p. 383.
  73. ^ Boyd 2017, p. 382.
  74. ^ Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 154; MOD 1995, p. 247; Stille 2023, p. 28.
  75. ^ a b Stille 2023, p. 28.
  76. ^ a b Stille 2023, pp. 45–46.
  77. ^ Stille 2023, pp. 7, 63.
  78. ^ MOD 1995, p. 127; Jordan 2006, pp. 104, 144, 197, 342, 486, 490, 509.
  79. ^ a b Stille 2023, p. 73; Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 155.
  80. ^ Stille 2023, pp. 28–29.
  81. ^ Stille 2023, pp. 78–82; Jordan 2006, pp. 100, 101, 115, 139, 142, 147, 148, 152, 156, 166, 182, 201, 262, 299, 301, 330, 381, 397, 434, 424, 485, 486, 494, 497, 498, 500, 503, 511, 513, 540, 559, 560, 579, 581, 587; Allen 2017.
  82. ^ Jackson 2006, p. 317; Stille 2023, p. 29.
  83. ^ Joslen 1960, p. 523.
  84. ^ Woodburn Kirby 2004, p. 447; Roskill 1956, p. 25; Stille 2023, p. 29.
  85. ^ Stille 2023, p. 29; Woodburn Kirby 2004, pp. 448−449.
  86. ^ Stille 2023, p. 29.

Bibliography

[edit]

Books

[edit]
  • Boyd, Andrew (2017). The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters. Barnsley: Seaforth. ISBN 978-1-4738-9248-4.
  • Boyd, Carl & Yoshida, Akihiko (2013). The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-5575-0015-1.
  • Churchill, Winston (1950). The Hinge of Fate. Vol. IV. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. OCLC 874480453 – via Archive Foundation.
  • Defensive Phase. Ministry of Defence (Navy) War with Japan. Vol. II. London: HMSO. 1995. ISBN 978-0-11-772818-9.
  • Hobbs, David (2013). "Chapter 7: Hermes". British Aircraft Carriers. Barnsley: Seaforth. ISBN 978-1-84832-138-0.
  • Jackson, Ashley (2006). "Chapter 11: The Islands of the Indian Ocean". The British Empire and the Second World War. London and New York: Hambledon Continuum. pp. 307−349. ISBN 1-85285-417-0.
  • Jordan, Roger W. (2006) [1999]. The World's Merchant Fleets 1939: The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6,000 Ships (2nd ed.). London: Chatham/Lionel Leventhal. ISBN 978-1-86176-293-1.
  • Joslen, Hubert Frank (1960). Orders of Battle: United Kingdom and Colonial Formations and Units in the Second World War 1939–1945 Based on Official Documents. History of the Second World War. Vol. II. London: HMSO. OCLC 1110934538.
  • Parshall, Jonathan & Tully, Anthony (2005). Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books. ISBN 1-57488-923-0 – via Archive Foundation.
  • Perrett, Bryan (2014). Why the Japanese Lost. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 978-1-78159-198-7.
  • Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN 1-86176-257-7.
  • Roskill, Stephen (1956). War at Sea 1939–1945: The Period of Balance. United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. II. London: HMSO. OCLC 59620954 – via Archive Foundation.
  • Shores, Christopher; Cull, Brian; Izawa, Yasuho (1993). Bloody Shambles: The Defence of Sumatra to the Fall of Burma. Vol. II. London: Grub Street. ISBN 978-0-94-881767-0.
  • Stille, Mark (2023). Japan's Indian Ocean Raid, 1942. Campaign No.396. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-47285-418-6.
  • Warner, Oliver; Bennett, Geoffrey; Macyntire, Donald G. F. W.; Uehling, Franck; Wettern, Desmond; Preston, Antony; Mordal, Jacques (1976). Histoire de la guerre sur mer: des premiers cuirassés aux sous-marins nucléaires [History of Naval Warfare: From the first Battleships to Nuclear Submarines]. Encyclopédie visuelle Elsevier (in French) (French trans. from Eng ed.). Paris Bruxelles: Elsevier Séquoia. ISBN 978-2-8003-0148-8.
  • Woodburn Kirby, Stanley; Addis, C. T.; Meiklejohn, J. F.; Roberts, M. R.; Wards, G. T.; Desoer, N. L. (2004) [1958]. The War against Japan: India's Most Dangerous Hour. History of the Second World War, united Kingdom Military Series (facs. pbk. Naval & Military Press, Uckfield ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 978-1-84-574061-0 – via Archive Foundation.

Journals

[edit]

Websites

[edit]
  • Allen, Tony (6 April 2017). "MV Banjoewangi". wrecksite.eu. Retrieved 29 April 2026.

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
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