Paper 2025/2003

A Sparse Polynomial Multiplier for HQC Integrating Parallelism and Power-Based Side-Channel Countermeasures

Jaeho Jeon, DGIST
Suseong Lee, DGIST
Myeongjun Kim, DGIST
Eunyoung Seo, DGIST
Myunghyun Cho, Samsung Electronics System LSI Business
Seonggyeom Kim, Samsung Electronics System LSI Business
Bo Gyeong Kang, Samsung Electronics System LSI Business
Young-Sik Kim, DGIST
Abstract

The Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) scheme has recently been standardized as a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), emphasizing the importance of efficient and secure hardware realizations on embedded platforms. However, HQC relies heavily on sparse–dense polynomial multiplications, where conventional shift-and-add architectures remain both performance- and security-critical. In FPGA implementations, these multiplications dominate execution time—occupying 59.5%, 56.1%, and 58.3% of the total latency for KeyGen, Encap, and Decap, respectively—and are further vulnerable to correlation power analysis (CPA) due to deterministic, index-driven memory access patterns. As countermeasures, parallelization improves performance at the cost of additional area. Dummy insertion with random shuffling mitigates leakage but incurs extra cycle overhead. To address this, we propose a co-designed dummy-inserted parallel shift-and-add multiplier for HQC. The design integrates dummy insertion and two-index parallelism in a complementary manner, achieving reduced cycles with area efficiency while providing intrinsic resistance to CPA. Implemented on a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA, the proposed architecture achieves up to a 1.25× speedup over the baseline sequential multiplier while maintaining near–state-of-the-art area–time efficiency—incurring only a 1.16× AT overhead to simultaneously deliver accelerated performance and CPA resistance. Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) measurements and theoretical analysis confirm that the parallel architecture effectively suppresses power-based side-channel leakage and provides inherent resistance against CPA—reducing significant leakage points from 4.29% to 0.09%. This work demonstrates that performance and side-channel resistance can be jointly optimized through synergistic hardware–algorithm co-design, offering a practical and scalable HQC accelerator for post-quantum embedded systems.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
HQCBIKEPQCPost-Quantum CryptographyKEMFPGAside-channel attack
Contact author(s)
dgwogh @ dgist ac kr
mercury @ dgist ac kr
sanmaru98u @ dgist ac kr
eyseo_dgist @ dgist ac kr
mhyun cho @ samsung com
sgyeom kim @ samsung com
bogyeong kang @ samsung com
ysk @ dgist ac kr
History
2025-10-30: approved
2025-10-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/2003
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
CC BY-NC-ND

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/2003,
      author = {Jaeho Jeon and Suseong Lee and Myeongjun Kim and Eunyoung Seo and Myunghyun Cho and Seonggyeom Kim and Bo Gyeong Kang and Young-Sik Kim},
      title = {A Sparse Polynomial Multiplier for {HQC} Integrating Parallelism and Power-Based Side-Channel Countermeasures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/2003},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2003}
}
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