Paper 2025/2073

Recursion Enabled: Improved Cryptanalysis of the Permuted Kernel Problem

Alessandro Budroni, Technology Innovation Institute
Marco Defranceschi, Technology Innovation Institute
Federico Pintore, University of Trento
Abstract

The Permuted Kernel Problem (PKP) is a computational problem for linear codes over finite fields that has emerged as a promising hard problem for constructing post-quantum cryptographic schemes, with its main application found in the digital signature scheme PERK, submitted to the NIST standardization process for quantum-secure additional signatures. Upon reviewing the first version of PERK, NIST recommended further research on the concrete complexity of PKP. In this work, we follow this recommendation and investigate algorithmic improvements to the known methods for solving PKP. Specifically, we build upon the state-of-the-art work of Santini, Baldi, and Chiaraluce (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 2024), and introduce a new algorithm that outperforms it over a wide range of parameters, yielding double-digit bit reductions in estimated complexity on representative instances. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that these improvements do not affect the parameter-set choices in PERK, thereby reinforcing confidence in its security.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Permuted Kernel ProblemCode-based CryptographyPost-quantum CryptographyPERK
Contact author(s)
budroni alessandro @ gmail com
marco defranceschi00 @ gmail com
federico pintore @ unitn it
History
2026-02-10: revised
2025-11-10: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/2073
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
CC BY-NC

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/2073,
      author = {Alessandro Budroni and Marco Defranceschi and Federico Pintore},
      title = {Recursion Enabled: Improved Cryptanalysis of the Permuted Kernel Problem},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/2073},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2073}
}
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