Paper 2026/031

On Threshold Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Synchronized Decryptors

Abstract

We study t-out-of-n threshold fully homomorphic encryption (ThFHE) in the synchronous setting, i.e., when the set of t decryptors is known at the outset of the decryption protocol. It has been observed in various works that the synchronous setting assumption enables to efficiently circumvent one of the major difficulties of ThFHE, namely hiding noise terms whose gigantic magnitude is incurred by the reconstruction coefficients of Shamir secret sharing. Yet, prior to this work, ThFHE in the synchronous setting had not even been properly defined. As a first contribution, we provide a clear syntax for ThFHE in the synchronous setting, as well as two security models: a weak model in which designating the set of decryptors is only viewed as an enabler of efficient decryption and it is fine for non-designated parties to be able to decrypt as long as there are sufficiently many of them; and a much stronger model where a set of decryptors which does not exactly match the designated set should not learn anything. Then, we show that the main existing schemes (Mouchet et al., Journal of Cryptology, 2023; Mouchet et al., ACM CCS, 2024) are insecure, even in the weak model, by describing efficient key-recovery attacks. Finally, we propose a simple and efficient construction which achieves security in the strong security model, by masking the partial decryption shares with pseudorandom functions.