Paper 2026/142
„One More Time”: Security of One-time Signature Scheme Using Run-length Encoding Under Two-message Attacks
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the One-time signature scheme using run-length encoding, as proposed by Steinwandt et al., under the scenario where an adversary is allowed to obtain signatures on two messages before attempting to forge a signature on a third message. Our analysis follows the line of security discussion presented by Groot Bruinderink et al. in their paper “Oops, I Did It Again – Security of One-Time Signatures under Two-Message Attacks.” By considering various attack models and different strategies, we estimate both the attack complexity and the probability of forging a signature. Our results indicate that the signature scheme performs well under a two-message attack, making it an interesting candidate for a few-time signature scheme. Few-time signature schemes such as HORS are a fundamental building block of stateless hash-based signature schemes.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- hash-based signatureone-time signaturetwo-message attackspost-quantum cryptography
- Contact author(s)
- vvillanyi @ gmail com
- History
- 2026-01-30: approved
- 2026-01-29: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/142
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/142,
author = {Viktória I. Villányi},
title = {„One More Time”: Security of One-time Signature Scheme Using Run-length Encoding Under Two-message Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/142},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/142}
}
