Paper 2026/375

Liquid Democracy With Two Opposing Factions

Abstract

Liquid democracy is a transitive vote delegation process. Previously, the advantages of liquid democracy over direct voting have been studied in settings where there is a ground truth “good” voting outcome. In this work, we analyse liquid democracy in a realistic setting with two opposing factions without a ground truth and under uncertainty. Formally, we consider 𝑛 voters who want to decide on some binary issue by voting. Each voter has a preference in {0, 1} that represents the opinion of the voter on these issues. That is, a voter with preference 0 prefers to vote for option 0. We refer to voters with the same preference as being in the same faction. The goal is for voters in the same faction to cooperatively decide on vote delegation strategies that maximise their probability of winning the election. In this setting, we present a practical distributed algorithm under realistic assumptions to decide on an approximately vote delegation strategy that involves minimal interaction and communication, and under incomplete information about the opposing faction. We then provide a complete analytical characterisation of optimal vote delegation strategies under complete information about the opposing faction. Finally, we show that finding optimal delegation strategies in the general setting is PSPACE-complete.