Paper 2026/389

Towards Accountability for Anonymous Credentials

Shailesh Mishra, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Martin Burkhart, armasuisse
Abstract

Anonymous Credentials (or ACs) enable users to prove claims with strong privacy guarantees, protecting credential holders from being tracked by issuers and verifiers. However, these privacy guarantees imply that a credential holder cannot be held accountable for misuse (e.g., selling credential checks online for proving 𝑎𝑔𝑒 > 18). The lack of accountability may raise questions about the adoption of ACs into national iden- tity systems (e.g., European EUDI or Swiss e-ID), which might lead to the issuing authorities resorting to credential systems with weaker privacy guarantees (e.g., batch issuance of one-show credentials). This shows that the lack of account- ability can adversely impact the levels of privacy enjoyed by users. Hence, in this paper, we discuss transferability attacks on ACs and introduce a framework for providing accountability in AC systems. In addition to issuers, holders and verifiers, it assumes the existence of: (i) a law enforcement body (the police) and a judicial body (the judge) that work together to find information on credential misuse and; (ii) one or more digital privacy advocates, called the NGO(s), that ensure the system is not used for tracking people. We introduce the cryptographic forensic trail (CFT), which is attached to each credential show. The CFT can be used for obtaining more information about an individual if and only if the police have probable cause and can convince the judge to issue a corresponding search warrant. Then, the police, the judge, and the NGO(s) run a multiparty protocol for decrypting relevant trails only. The protocol mimics checks and balances of a healthy democracy, in which neither law enforcement nor justice can track people as they will. Even if both branches colluded, the NGO(s) can detect the misuse and block further use. In addition to possible extensions, we discuss performance constraints on mobile phones and argue that practical feasi- bility of the CFT is within reach.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
anonymous credentialsprivacyaccountabilityelectronic identity systems
Contact author(s)
shailesh mishra @ epfl ch
martin burkhart @ armasuisse ch
History
2026-02-26: approved
2026-02-25: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/389
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/389,
      author = {Shailesh Mishra and Martin Burkhart},
      title = {Towards Accountability for Anonymous Credentials},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/389},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/389}
}
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