Paper 2026/398

Orthus: Practical Sublinear Batch-Verification of Lattice Relations from Standard Assumptions

Madalina Bolboceanu, IBM Research - Zurich, University of Potsdam, Germany
Jonathan Bootle, IBM Research - Zurich
Vadim Lyubashevsky, IBM Research - Zurich
Antonio Merino-Gallardo, IBM Research - Zurich, University of Potsdam, Germany
Gregor Seiler, IBM Research - Zurich
Abstract

The past several years have seen a rapid rise in practical lattice-based proof systems with linear-sized zero-knowledge proofs forming the foundation of many of the most efficient quantum-safe privacy protocols, and succinct proofs rapidly catching up and surpassing other quantum-safe alternatives in many metrics. A recent comparison of lattice-based aggregate signatures (Ethereum Foundation, 2025) involving the hash-based aggregate signature scheme Plonky3 and the instantiation of aggregate signatures from Falcon from the LaZer lattice library (Lyubashevsky, Seiler, Steuer, CCS 2024) using LaBRADOR (Beullens, Seiler, Crypto 2023), showed that lattice-based constructions have an advantage in terms of proof size and prover time, but are around an order of magnitude slower with regards to verification time. In general, it appears that slower verification times are the main obstacle to the adoption of succinct lattice-based proof systems. In this work, we introduce and implement Orthus, a proof system with sub-linear verification designed for relations that naturally arise in lattice-based constructions. Asymptotically, the verification time grows with the square root of the witness size, and for a concrete example of aggregating Falcon signatures our implementation reduces the verifier running time by a factor of $9X$ when aggregating $2^{17}$ signatures.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Latticessuccinct proofssuccinct verification
Contact author(s)
madalina bolboceanu @ ibm com
jbt @ zurich ibm com
vad @ zurich ibm com
antonio @ m-g es
gseiler @ posteo net
History
2026-03-01: approved
2026-02-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/398
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/398,
      author = {Madalina Bolboceanu and Jonathan Bootle and Vadim Lyubashevsky and Antonio Merino-Gallardo and Gregor Seiler},
      title = {Orthus: Practical Sublinear Batch-Verification of Lattice Relations from Standard Assumptions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/398},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/398}
}
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