It can be argued that it was the most effective tactic for the situation they found themselves in, and I'll leave that argument to Military History Visualized: Kamikaze Tactics - Insane or Rational?. That didn't make it an effective tactic, and it only made the already unwinnable strategic situation worse.

The strategic impact of kamikazes gets worse once you look at them in context. After Hornet was lost at Santa Cruz in Oct 1942, the damaged USS Enterprise was the only operational US fleet carrier. The naval battles of Guadalcanal were chewing up US cruisers and battleships such that they were running out. Each US vessel damaged or lost during this period could have a large impact on the war.

Conventional vs kamikaze presents a false dichotomy between very hopeless and hopeless. There was one sane option on the table: surrender.

Japan made a number of bad bets about attacking the United States. All of Prime Minister Tojo's offensives in 1944 failed and he was forced to resign. Prior to the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 Japan could have negotiated while they had something to negotiate with. Starting in spring 1945 the Japanese began pressing the "neutral" Soviets to mediate peace talks with the US. The Soviets strung the Japanese along while they planned to invade Manchuria. After Potsdam the Japanese could have simply accepted the terms. Right up until the Emperor made his decision the Supreme War Council was split between accepting unconditional surrender and trying to hold out for some guarantees and concessions.

Even if kamikaze convinced the Allies that invasion was too costly, the Japanese knew the Allies were not going to fight their way across the Pacific and then just walk away. The best outcome they could hope for was blockade, bombardment, bombings, starvation, and revolt.

Why surrender wasn't pursued is a very large topic: the fear of unconditional surrender, the sanctity of the Emperor, military leadership sacrificing their people to stay in power... I just want to remind everyone that when discussing last-ditch WW2 tactics, even if they didn't like the terms, surrender was always an option.

In conclusion, kamikaze tactics only make sense when compared to conventional tactics in an already hopeless situation with surrender taken off the table. That Japan found itself in this situation, lacking experienced pilots and fuel, as in part of its own strategic negligence. Kamikaze drew irreplaceable resources away from the final defense of Japan to inflict replaceable and inconsequential losses on a growing Allied fleet. The Allies repeatedly demonstrated they would not shrink away from taking casualties to end the war. Even if they decided not to invade, what then? The Japanese people suffer bombardment, starvation, and eventually revolt.

It can be argued that it was the most effective tactic for the situation they found themselves in, and I'll leave that argument to Military History Visualized: Kamikaze Tactics - Insane or Rational?. Because it was a more effective tactic didn't make it an effective tactic, as we'll see below. And it doesn't make it an effective strategy, meaning a plan to achieve their goals.

What was Japan's goal? The general argument goes something like this:

• Japan couldn't/wouldn't surrender because the US demanded Unconditional Surrender and the Japanese wouldn't risk it.
• Therefore Japan had no choice but to...
  • Defend the home islands to the last and/or
  • Make the invasion so costly the US will negotiate.

I'm not aware of the US demanding unconditional surrender until the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945, Japan knew the war was lost a year before that. And how are they supposed to use kamikaze to force negotiations if the US won't negotiate?

However, Japan was trying to negotiate an end to the war... in a piecemeal and lackluster fashion. They were also preparing a desperate defense against invasion... while throwing away battleship Yamato to save face and continuing to fight on the mainland (note: I don't have much information about what their thinking was for their mainland army).

If that doesn't strike you has a coherent strategy, it wasn't. Japanese high command could not come to a consensus about how to end the war right up to the end. Were kamikaze pilots [part of] an effective strategy for Japan? Which strategy? Japan was fighting to the last, fighting to negotiate, fighting in China, and willing to accept unconditional surrender all at the same time.

Whichever way you slice it, the kamikaze strategy was supposed to make invasion so costly the US would blink first. From day one Japan made many bad bets on US resolve and always lost. In the end Japan blinked first under the weight of an entirely predictable worsening situation.

Kamikaze strategy only works if you have the resolve to see it through.

Effective Tactic?

The impact of kamikazes gets worse once you look at them in context. After Hornet was lost at Santa Cruz in Oct 1942, the damaged USS Enterprise was the only operational US fleet carrier. The naval battles of Guadalcanal were chewing up US cruisers and battleships such that they were running out. Each US vessel damaged or lost during this period could have a large impact on the war.

"Resorting to an extraordinary measure"

Conventional vs kamikaze presents a false dichotomy between very hopeless and hopeless. There was one sane option on the table: surrender effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure as the Emperor put it.

Japan made a number of bad bets about attacking the United States. All of Prime Minister Tojo's offensives in 1944 failed and he was forced to resign. Prior to the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 Japan could have negotiated while they had something to negotiate with. Starting in spring 1945 the Japanese began pressing the "neutral" Soviets to mediate peace talks with the US. The Soviets strung the Japanese along while they planned to invade Manchuria. At best the Japanese could hope the Soviets waited until their neutrality treaty expired in April 1946. They didn't.

After Potsdam the Japanese could have simply accepted the terms, or just tried to negotiate anyway. They did both. Right up until the Emperor made his decision the Supreme War Council was split between accepting unconditional surrender and trying to hold out for some guarantees and concessions.

Even if kamikaze convinced the Allies that invasion was too costly, the Japanese knew the Allies were not going to fight their way across the Pacific and then just walk away. The best outcome they could hope for was blockade, bombardment, bombings, starvation, revolt, and Soviet invasion.

The issue of Japanese surrender is a very large topic: the fear of unconditional surrender, the sanctity of the Emperor, military leadership sacrificing their people to stay in power... I have my own answer. I just want to remind everyone that when discussing last-ditch WW2 tactics, even if they didn't like the terms, surrender was always an option. And that's the option Japan took after a year of bloodletting.

Why no trained pilots?

Why no fuel?

Conclusion.

In conclusion, kamikaze tactics only make sense when compared to conventional tactics in an already hopeless situation with surrender taken off the table. But surrender was always an option, negotiated or unconditional. That Japan found itself lacking experienced pilots and fuel was in part of its own strategic negligence. Kamikaze drew irreplaceable resources away from the final defense of Japan to inflict replaceable and inconsequential losses on a growing Allied fleet. The Allies repeatedly demonstrated they would not shrink away from taking casualties to end the war. Even if they decided not to invade, what then? The Japanese people suffer bombardment, starvation, and eventually revolt. In the end, it was the Japanese high command who did not see their own strategy through.

Increasing loses of A6Ms due to loss of experienced pilots diverted resources away from developing superior aircraft such as the A7M Reppū and Ki-84 delaying their introduction until it was too late; there wasn't the fuel to use them, nor the experienced pilots to exploit them.

Increasing loses of existing airframes due to loss of experienced pilots diverted resources away from developing superior aircraft such as the N1K and Ki-84 delaying their introduction until it was too late; there wasn't the fuel to use them, nor the experienced pilots to exploit them.

Japan made a number of bad bets about attacking the United States. All of Prime Minister Tojo's offensives in 1944 failed and he was forced to resign. Prior to the Potsdam Declaration of May 1945 Japan could have negotiated while they had something to negotiate with. After Potsdam they could have simply accepted the terms.

Japan made a number of bad bets about attacking the United States. All of Prime Minister Tojo's offensives in 1944 failed and he was forced to resign. Prior to the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 Japan could have negotiated while they had something to negotiate with. Starting in spring 1945 the Japanese began pressing the "neutral" Soviets to mediate peace talks with the US. The Soviets strung the Japanese along while they planned to invade Manchuria. After Potsdam the Japanese could have simply accepted the terms. Right up until the Emperor made his decision the Supreme War Council was split between accepting unconditional surrender and trying to hold out for some guarantees and concessions.