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In another comment, it was mentioned that we could also consider"

the specific offence of possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life

That is certainly true. While this is more straightforward than the issues the OP referred to in the question (ie on the foreseeability of indirect harm and the possibility of damage for pure psychiatric harm), a complete answer should also mention this.

This statutory offence can be found in s16 of the Firearms Act 1968, and reads:

It is an offence for a person to have in his possession any firearm or ammunition with intent by means thereof to endanger life ... whether any injury ... has been caused or not

The application of this to the facts is straightforward. The offender clearly has the actus reus of being in possession of a firearm or ammunition (satisfying both). Similarly, they also have the mens rea by the fact that they clearly intended to endanger life. In fact, they would still incur liability under s16 if they had not killed or injured anybody.

In another comment, it was mentioned that we could also consider"

the specific offence of possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life

That is certainly true. While this is more straightforward than the issues the OP referred to in the question (ie on the foreseeability of indirect harm and the possibility of damage for pure psychiatric harm), a complete answer should also mention this.

This statutory offence can be found in s16 of the Firearms Act 1968, and reads:

It is an offence for a person to have in his possession any firearm or ammunition with intent by means thereof to endanger life ... whether any injury ... has been caused or not

The application of this to the facts is straightforward. The offender clearly has the actus reus of being in possession of a firearm or ammunition (satisfying both). Similarly, they also have the mens rea by the fact that they clearly intended to endanger life. In fact, they would still incur liability under s16 if they had not killed or injured anybody.

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Finally, you ask in a comment:

What about the emotional suffering that affects nearly everyone in the crowd?

This concerns the issue of pure psychiatric harm. In general, all claims for psychiatric harm must be a medically recognised psychiatric illness or a shock-induced physical condition.

The above requirements are necessary, but are not sufficient. After this, the law on negligence makes an important distinction between primary and secondary victims. A primary victim is someone in the actual area of danger; or who reasonably believed that they were in danger. A secondary victim is someone who experiences emotional suffering after witnessing injury to someone else; or fearing for the safety of another person (eg a family member).

The requirements for a duty of care to be owed to a primary victim are that there must have also been a foreseeable risk of physical injury which never manifested. However, the risk of psychiatric harm does not need to have been foreseeable.

On the other hand, the law is much harsher on secondary victims. They must satisfy the control mechanisms under the Alcock test (Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police). This requires the claimant to establish:

  1. Foreseeability of psychiatric harm for a person of normal fortitude in the claimant’s position
  2. The claimant must have a close relationship of love and affection with the person who is endangered
  3. The claimant must be present at the accident or its immediate aftermath.
  4. The claimant must see or hear the accident, or its immediate aftermath, with their own senses.

If all four requirements are met, the secondary victim will also have a course of action. These requirements are not always straightforward to establish, and there is a lot of case law addressing each of these requirements in more depth.

Finally, you ask in a comment:

What about the emotional suffering that affects nearly everyone in the crowd?

This concerns the issue of pure psychiatric harm. In general, all claims for psychiatric harm must be a medically recognised psychiatric illness or a shock-induced physical condition.

The above requirements are necessary, but are not sufficient. After this, the law on negligence makes an important distinction between primary and secondary victims. A primary victim is someone in the actual area of danger; or who reasonably believed that they were in danger. A secondary victim is someone who experiences emotional suffering after witnessing injury to someone else; or fearing for the safety of another person (eg a family member).

The requirements for a duty of care to be owed to a primary victim are that there must have also been a foreseeable risk of physical injury which never manifested. However, the risk of psychiatric harm does not need to have been foreseeable.

On the other hand, the law is much harsher on secondary victims. They must satisfy the control mechanisms under the Alcock test (Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police). This requires the claimant to establish:

  1. Foreseeability of psychiatric harm for a person of normal fortitude in the claimant’s position
  2. The claimant must have a close relationship of love and affection with the person who is endangered
  3. The claimant must be present at the accident or its immediate aftermath.
  4. The claimant must see or hear the accident, or its immediate aftermath, with their own senses.

If all four requirements are met, the secondary victim will also have a course of action. These requirements are not always straightforward to establish, and there is a lot of case law addressing each of these requirements in more depth.

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First your ask:

But what about other people? About 400 people were injured as a result of the panic that ensued -- a reasonable person can anticipate this, so it seems like there could be charges for recklessness. Would it be a count for each injured person?

A defendant can be liable for panic-induced injuries to bystanders if those injuries result from a reasonably foreseeable escape attempt triggered by the defendant’s conduct. For example:

In R v Roberts, the victim jumped out of a moving car following unwanted sexual advances. The defendant was held liable for assault occasioning actual bodily harm despite the direct harm being caused by the victim's actions.

Therefore, if people are trampled or hurt while fleeing, and that panic was a natural and foreseeable reaction to indiscriminate gunfire, the shooter could, in principle, face one count per injured person, assuming sufficient causal connection.

This won't apply in every case. Lord Justice Stephenson (in the judgement of the aforementioned case) stated that if the victim’s act was sufficiently unreasonable, then it would be considered to be an independent voluntary act. Therefore, each case would require individual analysis.

Ultimately, in the same way that property damage is probably not worth considering in a case like this, the same principle likely applies here. There are far easier and more severe charges that can be established.

You also ask:

On top of criminal charges, could there also be a lawsuit for pain and suffering by the attendees (maybe a class action to simplify the proceedings)?

Each injured person has a separate course of action and these will not be aggregated automatically (although they can be). Given the indirect nature of the injuries in question, we look to the principles governing the tort of negligence. This requires us to establish that the defendant breached a legal duty of care, which caused the ensuing harm.

Again, on a case-by-case basis, this would require looking into the foreseeability of the harm and whether the shooter legally caused the harm to that individual (legal causation is not the same as factual causation). An individual who was trampled in the panic, would likely have a strong case. On the other hand, if several people were run over by a driver trying to escape by driving through the crowd, they would have a weaker case against the shooter and may want to consider proceedings against the driver instead.