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Timeline for What are "qualia"?

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Aug 24, 2024 at 22:23 comment added Daniel Asimov A quale (the singular of "qualia") is meant to be a fundamental bit of perception, like the experience of a pure color or of a pure tone or of a pure taste of something.
Aug 12, 2024 at 22:11 answer added Dcleve timeline score: 0
Aug 12, 2024 at 22:05 answer added user67129 timeline score: 1
Aug 12, 2024 at 21:51 answer added John Doe timeline score: 2
Aug 12, 2024 at 12:33 comment added mudskipper @Conifold - Thanks for the link. I'll have a look at that.
Aug 12, 2024 at 7:53 comment added Conifold Psychologists do use "qualia" as a term, see a recent review, but their use does not fully align with philosophical uses. Part of the reason why many philosophers focus on qualia is that some of them assert that qualia are inaccessible to the methods of psychology or of any other empirical science due to their non-shareability. So they, presumably, capture what third-person (in particular, scientific) descriptions cannot in principle for structural reasons.
Aug 12, 2024 at 5:11 comment added J Kusin @mudskipper using qualia usually brings attention to the difficulty of fully articulating experiences to others. I have a feeling those of us who haven’t been to the moon can’t emulate that experience no matter how much the astronauts who have share their experiences. They do share their experiences, but we can’t get the full qualia.
Aug 12, 2024 at 1:21 comment added mudskipper Why talk about "qualia", why not just talk about experiences, perceptions, etc? Does any psychological research use qualia as a technnical term? (I never saw any research that did.) Do qualia explain anything that we cannot explain by psychology?
Aug 11, 2024 at 23:23 comment added user71399 go look at a postbox. that patch of red you see: it is what ppl refer to as "qualia." that may not be a satisfactory answer, but it might help you understand
Aug 11, 2024 at 23:11 comment added Conifold Even if different experiences are induced by different colors a correspondence is not "totally equivalent" to identity. Experiences are plainly distinct from what they are experiences of. Besides, it is easy to imagine the same color (as described by physics and physiology) induce different experiences in the same subject under the same circumstances, and hard to imagine how one subject would transfer their color experience to another, as opposed to letting them see the color itself. Describing it in words is even less revealing, and 'mind sharing', even if possible, may well alter it.
Aug 11, 2024 at 21:16 comment added user22555 I think phenomenal character is meant to convey the qualities you have when experiencing qualia. Human character is made up of qualities such a honesty or selflessness. Sound and taste have qualities that are subjective. I might like marmite or you may not. These qualities do not exist in the external physical world. Sound is in the mind outside the mind"here is only the vibration of the eardrum, the vibration of the air and the source of the vibration. With vision we see the colour red, a photon or wavelength is just a packet of energy and has no colour. That's how I understand qualia.
Aug 11, 2024 at 21:14 comment added J Kusin All mental states with an awareness (e.g. not being under anesthesia, not dreamless sleep) are qualia. We can speak of mental states without awareness, like being in the mental state of sleeping without dreaming, but no so for qualia, they have an awareness, a what it's like. Dreamless sleep has no perceiving entity. Sometimes we don't notice all the aspects of phenomenlogical experience, but we can later introspect on what that experience was like. I remember what it's like to taste mint, so I can correlate it with a future mint tasting. We can't do this for dreamless sleep.
Aug 11, 2024 at 20:43 history asked mudskipper CC BY-SA 4.0