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  • Thanks for the reply! So there is a distinction between physical propositional knowledge and subjective knowledge, and Jackson argues that the existence of subjective knowledge is enough to disprove physicalism. What is it about subjectivity that is a problem for physicalism? Is it too far of a stretch to acknowledge that it's possible for subjective experience to be the result of physical interaction between the brain, body, and environment? Commented Oct 19, 2014 at 6:05
  • there is another distinction, between physicalism and believing qualia arises as a natural phenomena in the brain; these are entirely different things! there are vaious kinds of non-physicalists, but some of them (like myself) believe that qualia is a natural phenomena produced by the brain by some process that we do not understand; I recommend that you dive into the links, if you are interested in the subject. Commented Oct 19, 2014 at 7:22
  • @nir Qualia as defined can not be produced by any physical process whether we understand it or not. There might be a process in the brain that runs parallel to experiencing of qualia, but that process is not qualia even if it provides complete relational knowledge of them. Isn't that the point of Mary's room? Commented Oct 20, 2014 at 20:21
  • @Conifold, I said it is a natural phenomena which is produced in the brain, which is a different thing, since the world is not a physical process; physics is just our partial and approximate description of it. Commented Oct 20, 2014 at 20:28
  • @nir Then what exactly is the meaning of "natural" as opposed to ideal or mental? Commented Oct 20, 2014 at 20:48