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Philosophy

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  • But what about a "weaker" solipsism of the kind that "SOME people have consciousness" ? How can we assert as fact -rationally- that "(ALL) people are conscious"? It is probably ETHICALLY obvious statement, but is it rationally? Commented May 15, 2024 at 17:41
  • I deal with solipsism, not by a strictly rational approach, but an empirical one also. If we define 'consciousness' with an operational definition, then we what we have is not a struggle over a realist's quest to demonstrate that some mystical "mental" essences are met, but rather accept that our position is instrumentalist and that is reasonable to infer that if we impute to ourselves consciousness, then while we have no direct access to others', by virtue of empirical measure, they have it too... Commented May 15, 2024 at 17:55
  • For instance, we can apply various psychometrics in conjunction with a Turing test and NCC's and rule out simulation. If a system can walk into a room, appear to be human, complete an MMPI, have a go at a clever game of word play, and we can measure brain activity with fMRI's consistent with our own, what grounds would we have to suspect they are mental zombies? Commented May 15, 2024 at 17:58
  • @GrigorisL. It seems to me the key is to soften up the categorical distinction between mental and physical by moving from substance dualism to property dualism, so to speak. Commented May 15, 2024 at 17:58