You ask: > What is a tool? ... If tools are defined by their subordination to future ends, is temporality (instead of utility) the essential feature of tool-iness? **For Aristotle, it was the name of one his works called [*Organon*][1], but you are looking for the essence of tool, to which we can look to both the [philosophy of technology (SEP)][2] and [philosophy of engineering][3] in the natural sciences; to [anthropology][4] or [philosophical anthropology][5] in the social sciences for some insights into ideas about [tools][6].** A conceptual analysis of tool is more challenging than one might presume considering a tool can be something as simple as a rock or stick and can be used by animals. From WP: > A tool is an object that can extend an individual's ability to modify features of the surrounding environment or help them accomplish a particular task, and proto-typically refers to solid hand-operated non-biological objects with a single broad purpose that lack multiple functions, unlike machines or computers. Although human beings are proportionally most active in using and making tools in the animal kingdom, as use of stone tools dates back hundreds of millennia, and also in using tools to make other tools, many animals have demonstrated tool use in both instances. **Under Aristotelian thinking, a tool might be seen as any artifact that is an [efficient cause][7] under his schema of four causes.** This is certainly one of the senses, the verb form included found in the dictionary today. MW's entry on 'tool' (MW) shows a number of different senses, some literal and some figurative, and that suggests especially in the tradition of [frame semantics][8] that we look to [WordNet][9] and summarize with ChatGPT: > From a WordNet perspective, tool spans three major conceptual domains: > >1. Material artifact (hammer, device) >2. Abstract means (method, resource, instrument) >3. Social instrument (person-as-tool) > >This lexical structure mirrors a core philosophical insight: **The concept of a tool is not defined by materiality, but by use, control, and purposive mediation.** **It would seem, then, that tool and its synonym instrument are used figuratively opening the door to further philosophical relevance.** For example, [science uses measurement (SEP)][10] which is critical to science is a specialized use of tools. There's an entire position in the philosophy of science called [Instrumentalism][11]. Pierce and Wittegenstein saw the use of language in social communities as a tool under the philosophical thesis that [meaning is use (SEP)][12]. And rationality itself can be seen as a tool to achieve an end as in the thesis of [instrumental rationality (SEP)][13]. **Other perspectives on tools exist in other philosophical traditions.** The Internet tells me that Heidegger considered tool use in his phenomenology. Karl Marx considers tools within his framework critical of capitalism. In computer science, we talk about [programming tools and tool sets][14]. Andy Clark, a favorite of mine talks, about tools being an extension of human intelligence in his [extended cognition thesis (SEP)][15]. And most philosophers recognize that [pragmatism (SEP)][16] seems to favor the claim that epistemology and its practice is largely a tool without regard to correctness or truth. **Related concepts to tool would include a number of fundamental categories of philosophical interest.** Tools, first and foremost, are used as broad categories of [causes (SEP)][17] since using them reliably creates effects. Classically, tools were composed of [substances that teleological ends (SEP)][18]. Tools are undeniably if not interchangeably [artifacts (SEP)][19]. Tools draw us into consideration of [agency (SEP)][20] and [shared agency (SEP)][21]. And tools enable [action (SEP)][22]. **Therefore, given such a diversity of the use of the term 'tool', instead of there being a tight, cohesive set of [essential properties (SEP)][23] easily conveyed as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, one might see 'tool' as a word somewhat similar to 'game'.** Wittgenstein famously pointed out in his philosophy the idea that some concepts seem to be joined by [family resemblance][24] rather than a narrow definition. Today, some linguists such as Rosch and Lakoff such terms to be [defined prototypically][25] rather through a traditional and simply [comprehension][26]. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organon [2]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/technology/ [3]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_engineering [4]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropology [5]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_anthropology [6]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tool [7]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes#Efficient [8]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frame_semantics_(linguistics) [9]: https://wordnet.princeton.edu/ [10]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/measurement-science/ [11]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumentalism [12]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#MeanUse [13]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-instrumental/ [14]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_tool [15]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/#ExteCogn [16]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/ [17]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/ [18]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#SubsTele [19]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/artifact/ [20]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/agency/ [21]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/shared-agency/ [22]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action/ [23]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/essential-accidental/ [24]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Family_resemblance [25]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prototype_theory [26]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprehension_(logic)