
Leading article: Missile defence and a relationship that is no longer quite so special
Once again, the United States has plans to site missile silos in Europe. Once again, a British Prime Minister is all in favour
Published: 24 February 2007
Suddenly, it is as though we have gone back more than 20 years. Where the controversy then was about intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the subject now is missile defence. But the issues are identical. Once again, the United States has plans to site silos for missiles - missile interceptors this time - in Europe. Once again, a British Prime Minister is all in favour, while the British public - in so far as it has been trusted with any information - is likely to be fiercely opposed. And once again, the Russians, concerned that US missiles are to be stationed near their western border, feel their dignity, and their security, threatened.
The arguments on either side are also uncannily familiar. The US insists that there are hostile governments, rogue states and terrorists out there who potentially threaten its own, and its allies', security. President Bush, like President Reagan before him, appears confident that an impervious missile shield can be developed. To that end, radar and other facilities are being installed and upgraded in Alaska and California, at Fylingdales in the north of England, and in Japan.
The next stage is to choose a site in Europe for a dozen or so missile interceptors. The Czech Republic and Poland were known to be competing for that dubious privilege, and their motivation was hardly a secret. The US installations would constitute a new token of their acceptance in Nato, as well as an added defence against their overbearing neighbour, Russia.
The arguments of opponents of the scheme also echo, point for point, those of the Eighties' peace movement. US installations would become natural targets for the enemy - so impairing, rather than improving, the security of the countries where they were sited. New US missiles in Europe would also encourage an arms build-up in Russia, when precisely the opposite was desirable. With missile defence, there has always been the additional question of technology. Even now, the US has so far been unable to fire a missile to shoot down another missile with any degree of reliability - and without reliability, no "shield" can be credible.
Yet there are crucial differences between then and now. The case for stationing US missiles within range of Russia when the Cold War was at its height was both practical and political. So long as the "star wars" technology is unproven, however, it is hard to see the rationale for installing US missile interceptors in Europe. It is easy to appreciate, too, how Russia might interpret US plans for missile silos so close to its Western borders as a provocation, however much Washington belatedly insists that it has other countries - perhaps Iran, North Korea or China - in its sights. And while there is much about Vladimir Putin's Russia that warrants Western condemnation, the emphasis, especially given Europe's thirst for energy, must be on fostering trust, not needlessly exacerbating Russia's sense of insecurity.
It would be consoling to believe that Tony Blair's bid, revealed yesterday, to have the US missile interceptors sited in Britain was an attempt to give the US another, less diplomatically inflammatory option. The suspicion must be, though - as with the undiscussed decision to renew Trident - that the Prime Minister was trying to lock this country into an old-style Atlantic alliance and tie his successor to the deal.
Which underlines perhaps the greatest difference between then and now. In the Eighties, the Reagan-Thatcher relationship was built on mutual respect. A generation on, Washington is saying "Thanks, but no thanks", and dismissing Mr Blair's offer as a self-interested last resort. This is surely not the reward the Prime Minister envisaged when he followed President Bush into Iraq.