Leading article: Indictment of a leader who rushed into a foolish war

Published: 02 May 2007

The first official verdict on Israel's decision to go to war in Lebanon amounts to a crushing indictment of the Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, his defence minister and his chief of staff. But it is Mr Olmert who bears the brunt of the blame. It is he, as head of the government, the report says, who bore "supreme and comprehensive responsibility" for the actions of his government and the country's army. It says the decision to go to war was taken "rashly" and "hastily" and with "no comprehensive plan". Mr Olmert's lack of military experience was identified as something that need not have been a problem, but became one - because he did not seek the necessary advice.

Nor can Mr Olmert retain much hope that the final report, due in time for the first anniversary of the conflict in July, will be any less scathing in its judgement. This disastrous war, as was rapidly apparent, achieved none of the objectives the Israeli Prime Minister had envisaged. The two soldiers, whose capture by the armed Islamic group, Hizbollah, was the pretext for Israel's military action, were not released - indeed, they are still in captivity. Hizbollah, while suffering large losses, was not destroyed, and may well have attracted more recruits as a result. Israel's own reputation for military prowess was harmed, perhaps irreparably, with implications for its future security.

The interim report deals only with the background to the war and the first five days of conflict, but it leaves Mr Olmert greatly weakened. It also plunges Israeli politics into a new state of flux at a time when the security situation around its borders seems especially unstable. It is not at all clear that Mr Olmert can survive in his job, despite his determination to do so at least until the final report appears. Acknowledging the mistakes made, he insists that he wants to take responsibility for correcting them and that he is the best person to do so.

He appears to believe, and he may not be entirely wrong, that his resignation would create as many problems as it would solve. It is possible that an internal coup in his Kadima party would keep the coalition intact; some are tipping the foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, who emerged relatively unscathed from the report, to take over. But it is equally possible that the party - a creature of the former Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon - would implode, or that the Knesset could pass a vote of no confidence in the government. Israel would then be faced with the prospect of new elections that could well bring a more hawkish government to power.

The rest of this week will be crucial. If Mr Olmert can survive the demonstrations planned for tomorrow to demand his resignation, he may be able to survive until the summer. But he will be a severely weakened leader, and it will be a weakened country he will lead.

In the meantime, there are several aspects of this report that are relevant beyond Israel's borders. The Winograd commission was appointed by the Olmert government, amid suspicions that it would pull its punches. That did not happen. Its interim report is wide-ranging, hits hard and spares no one. It holds the man at the top to account for decisions taken on his watch. And it cites the folly of a war undertaken by a Prime Minister without military experience who fails to solicit adequate advice, fails to check the army's state of preparedness and lacks knowledge of the country in question.

The war in Lebanon was a shameful episode in Israel's recent history; a catastrophic and costly misjudgement. But it is a tribute to Israel's democracy that such a searching report has both been written and seen the light of day.