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The British Empire in World War Two (lecture)

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The lecture discusses the role of the British Empire during World War Two, emphasizing Winston Churchill's perspective on empire and its perceived importance for Britain's power and authority. Despite temporary triumphs during the war, the text highlights the eventual realities facing the empire post-war, including rising independence movements and changing priorities within Britain itself.

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Winston Churchill, who had become British Prime Minister only the previous month, made his famous ‘finest hour’ speech to the House of Commons on 18 J une 1940. It was made in the aftermath of the German defeat of the French and British armies in Northern Europe - at a time when whatever war plans the British had had just been destroyed. Britain seemed destined to be the Third Reich’s next victim. Victory seemed remote to the point of impossibility, and there were not a few in the United Kingdom who argued that we must negotiate with Hitler in order to save what power and independence we still had. Churchill was having none of that, and in a series of great speeches he argued that such was the nature of the Nazi threat that no accommodation with it was possible, that this was a struggle for the very existence of Christian civilisation and - institutions he held coterminous with that - for the survival of the British constitution and the British Empire.
Winston Churchill, who had become British Prime Minister only the previous month, made his famous ‘finest hour’ speech to the House of Commons on 18 J une 1940. It was made in the aftermath of the German defeat of the French and British armies in Northern Europe - at a time when whatever war plans the British had had just been destroyed. Britain seemed destined to be the Third Reich’s next victim. Victory seemed remote to the point of impossibility, and there were not a few in the United Kingdom who argued that we must negotiate with Hitler in order to save what power and independence we still had. Churchill was having none of that, and in a series of great speeches he argued that such was the nature of the Nazi threat that no accommodation with it was possible, that this was a struggle for the very existence of Christian civilisation and - institutions he held coterminous with that - for the survival of the British constitution and the British Empire.
For it was not simply Hitler who threatened Britain and the Empire. Indeed, he was not even the most direct threat to Britain, although he was undoubtedly the most serious. After all, before 1940 Hitler’s ambitions seemed to lie in Eastern Europe, and he even offered to save the British Empire if Britain stopped fighting against him. Italy and Japan, on the other hand, had ambitions that clashed directly with British Imperial interests. M ussolini wanted to make Italy a great world power and the dominant force in the M editerranean, which was at that time in effect a British lake and the main imperial route to the oil fields of the Middle East, to India and to the Far East. Japan, also, wanted to build a fascist-style autarkic empire in China and South East Asia and again, this could only be done by dispossessing the British of their territories in the region and by neutralising British forces there. What Chamberlain and his government were attempting to do in the years leading up to 1939 was to prevent these three Great Power ‘wannabees’ from combining together against Britain and the Empire, for Britain, even with the Empire, could not hope to marshal sufficient resources to take them all on at once.
For it was not simply Hitler who threatened Britain and the Empire. Indeed, he was not even the most direct threat to Britain, although he was undoubtedly the most serious. After all, before 1940 Hitler’s ambitions seemed to lie in Eastern Europe, and he even offered to save the British Empire if Britain stopped fighting against him. Italy and Japan, on the other hand, had ambitions that clashed directly with British Imperial interests. M ussolini wanted to make Italy a great world power and the dominant force in the M editerranean, which was at that time in effect a British lake and the main imperial route to the oil fields of the Middle East, to India and to the Far East. Japan, also, wanted to build a fascist-style autarkic empire in China and South East Asia and again, this could only be done by dispossessing the British of their territories in the region and by neutralising British forces there. What Chamberlain and his government were attempting to do in the years leading up to 1939 was to prevent these three Great Power ‘wannabees’ from combining together against Britain and the Empire, for Britain, even with the Empire, could not hope to marshal sufficient resources to take them all on at once.
In WW1 of course, the ultimately victorious British Empire had fought the Central Powers alongside powerful allies. What of these this time? Again, the situation had seriously deteriorated since 1914. Then, Italy and Japan had eventually come in on the British side. This time they were hostile. France - Britain's main ally in 1914-18 was, by 1939, seriously and chronically split between Left and Right, while her generals in a classic case of ‘fighting the last war’ had retreated behind the supposedly impregnable M aginot Line, while omitting
In WW1 of course, the ultimately victorious British Empire had fought the Central Powers alongside powerful allies. What of these this time? Again, the situation had seriously deteriorated since 1914. Then, Italy and Japan had eventually come in on the British side. This time they were hostile. France - Britain's main ally in 1914-18 was, by 1939, seriously and chronically split between Left and Right, while her generals in a classic case of ‘fighting the last war’ had retreated behind the supposedly impregnable M aginot Line, while omitting
Even on the home front, and even if he had wanted to, it would have been difficult for Chamberlain to persuade British public opinion - given that the country was only slowly recovering from the worst economic depression since the 1880s - that they should make large sacrifices in blood and treasure for what seemed to many an obscure question of redrawing boundaries in Eastern Europe (in the case of Germany) or of growing Italian powe in Spain or Abyssinia. In fact, although defence expenditure was growing rapidly in the last years before the war - particularly on aircraft - the British Army, at 200,000 men in 1939, was dwarfed by the millions of troops of its potential enemies. Its antiquated army was outgunned by Hitler’s shiny new tanks, and its battleships were to prove no match for the modern fighter bombers of the Japanese carrier fleet.
Even on the home front, and even if he had wanted to, it would have been difficult for Chamberlain to persuade British public opinion - given that the country was only slowly recovering from the worst economic depression since the 1880s - that they should make large sacrifices in blood and treasure for what seemed to many an obscure question of redrawing boundaries in Eastern Europe (in the case of Germany) or of growing Italian powe in Spain or Abyssinia. In fact, although defence expenditure was growing rapidly in the last years before the war - particularly on aircraft - the British Army, at 200,000 men in 1939, was dwarfed by the millions of troops of its potential enemies. Its antiquated army was outgunned by Hitler’s shiny new tanks, and its battleships were to prove no match for the modern fighter bombers of the Japanese carrier fleet.
And so we get back to the war itself, where by the summer of 1940, as France fell, Britain was in a desperate position. With only the Empire on its side, Britain had no hope of defeating Germany, and so her only plausible war aim could be to survive long enough for In 1914 the Empire had more or less automatically gone to war when Britain did. This time it was more complicated. Australian and Canadian public opinion were not happy to fight to save Poland, with the Australians particularly worried that in the event of a European war they would be left at the mercy of the Japanese. To reassure them, in March 1939 Chamberlain promised to send a fleet to Singapore in the event of aggressive moves from Japan. When it came to it, however, in September 1939 both countries, and New Zealand (always the loyalist of the Dominions) promptly joined Britain in the war. South Africa, with its dominant Afrikaner population, many of whom were anti-British and sympathetic to the racial theories of the Nazis, was more reluctant to join, and did so only after its neutralist government narrowly lost a parliamentary vote to stay out and was replaced by a pro-war administration. The newest of the Dominions - Eire (or the Irish Free State), under its ultra- nationalist leader Eamon DeValera, decided to stay neutral (DeValera even sent a telegram of condolence to the German Government when he heard of Hitler’s death in 1945 - though by then 43,000 of his country’s citizens had volunteered to fight in Britain's armed forces). Unlike DeValera, many indigenous colonial leaders also pledged support, though in India the Viceroy declared war without consulting the locals. Gandhi was sympathetic to Britain, but Nehru and the Congress party withheld support, unless Britain gave a commitment to Indian independence.
And so we get back to the war itself, where by the summer of 1940, as France fell, Britain was in a desperate position. With only the Empire on its side, Britain had no hope of defeating Germany, and so her only plausible war aim could be to survive long enough for In 1914 the Empire had more or less automatically gone to war when Britain did. This time it was more complicated. Australian and Canadian public opinion were not happy to fight to save Poland, with the Australians particularly worried that in the event of a European war they would be left at the mercy of the Japanese. To reassure them, in March 1939 Chamberlain promised to send a fleet to Singapore in the event of aggressive moves from Japan. When it came to it, however, in September 1939 both countries, and New Zealand (always the loyalist of the Dominions) promptly joined Britain in the war. South Africa, with its dominant Afrikaner population, many of whom were anti-British and sympathetic to the racial theories of the Nazis, was more reluctant to join, and did so only after its neutralist government narrowly lost a parliamentary vote to stay out and was replaced by a pro-war administration. The newest of the Dominions - Eire (or the Irish Free State), under its ultra- nationalist leader Eamon DeValera, decided to stay neutral (DeValera even sent a telegram of condolence to the German Government when he heard of Hitler’s death in 1945 - though by then 43,000 of his country’s citizens had volunteered to fight in Britain's armed forces). Unlike DeValera, many indigenous colonial leaders also pledged support, though in India the Viceroy declared war without consulting the locals. Gandhi was sympathetic to Britain, but Nehru and the Congress party withheld support, unless Britain gave a commitment to Indian independence.
Britain’s second war aim was to preserve her supremacy in the M editerranean and the Middle East. In part this was because this was the main route to India and the Far East, though once France fell, the M ed was effectively closed to civilian shipping until 1943. More importantly, it was vital to prevent Germany from taking over the Middle East and its oilfields, which were a vital resource for Britain and the Empire. The fall of France did much to undermine this strategy (as it was also to undermine British defences in the Far East), for with the loss of the French Navy in the Med, and of friendly French troops in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon and Syria, Mussolini felt empowered to take on the British by attacking Egypt, British Somaliland, Sudan and Kenya. The Italians, of course, turned out generally to be proverbially bad fighters - and they were soon defeated at sea and on land by British Empire forces. Unfortunately, however, this prompted the Germans to intervene when Hitler sent the Afrika Korps to Libya under Erwin Rommel in Feb, 1941. Initially, they were more than a match for Britain’s 8°” Army and by July 1942 were threatening to throw the British out of Egypt. Fortunately they were held just inside Egypt at El Alamein and finally, in October of that year, in a second battle of El Alamein, the tide was turned and they went into a long and final retreat. Before that, however, in 1941 Britain took action to forestall regimes sympathetic to Germany from taking over in Syria and Iraq by invading those countries herself. Iran was similarly dominated in a joint action with the Soviet Union. There was little fighting in these instances, but lots of soldiers and support staff were involved - and at its peak the Empire’s M iddle East Command was fighting nine campaigns and had more than 1 million men on its payroll.
Britain’s second war aim was to preserve her supremacy in the M editerranean and the Middle East. In part this was because this was the main route to India and the Far East, though once France fell, the M ed was effectively closed to civilian shipping until 1943. More importantly, it was vital to prevent Germany from taking over the Middle East and its oilfields, which were a vital resource for Britain and the Empire. The fall of France did much to undermine this strategy (as it was also to undermine British defences in the Far East), for with the loss of the French Navy in the Med, and of friendly French troops in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon and Syria, Mussolini felt empowered to take on the British by attacking Egypt, British Somaliland, Sudan and Kenya. The Italians, of course, turned out generally to be proverbially bad fighters - and they were soon defeated at sea and on land by British Empire forces. Unfortunately, however, this prompted the Germans to intervene when Hitler sent the Afrika Korps to Libya under Erwin Rommel in Feb, 1941. Initially, they were more than a match for Britain’s 8°” Army and by July 1942 were threatening to throw the British out of Egypt. Fortunately they were held just inside Egypt at El Alamein and finally, in October of that year, in a second battle of El Alamein, the tide was turned and they went into a long and final retreat. Before that, however, in 1941 Britain took action to forestall regimes sympathetic to Germany from taking over in Syria and Iraq by invading those countries herself. Iran was similarly dominated in a joint action with the Soviet Union. There was little fighting in these instances, but lots of soldiers and support staff were involved - and at its peak the Empire’s M iddle East Command was fighting nine campaigns and had more than 1 million men on its payroll.
The US finally entered the war in December 1941 after the Japanese attacked Pear Harbor. Hitler then saved Roosevelt the difficulty of persuading the American people that they should fight two wars at once by promptly and foolishly declaring war on the USA. Britain rejoiced, for now the Allies surely could not lose. But yet again, the American medicine that Britain so desperately needed to survive came with a dreadful imperial side- effect, for the very Japanese aggression that ensured American entry to the war also led tc the greatest British military disaster since... Well, perhaps the fall of France the year before But not counting that, since - ironically - the America War of Independence in the 18°" century.
The US finally entered the war in December 1941 after the Japanese attacked Pear Harbor. Hitler then saved Roosevelt the difficulty of persuading the American people that they should fight two wars at once by promptly and foolishly declaring war on the USA. Britain rejoiced, for now the Allies surely could not lose. But yet again, the American medicine that Britain so desperately needed to survive came with a dreadful imperial side- effect, for the very Japanese aggression that ensured American entry to the war also led tc the greatest British military disaster since... Well, perhaps the fall of France the year before But not counting that, since - ironically - the America War of Independence in the 18°" century.
Home Rule for India, of course, and for other British colonies, did not necessarily mean the end of the British Empire. Canada and Australia had had home rule for generations and they had stayed as loyal members of the Empire in peace and war. But for new states in the Empire to do that, the good will towards Britain of their peoples was needed, which meant that it was rather unfortunate that the exigencies of war obliged the British to sometimes act rather brutally towards their colonial subjects during the conflict, and that the costs and strains of war left the authorities far less able to cope with problems such as inflation and food shortages than in peacetime. In India, for example, 2,500 people were killed in riots and 66,000 were imprisoned in the Raj’s effort to suppress Congress's ‘Quit India’ campaign. Even more corrosive to British rule was the Bengal famine of 1943, caused by harvest failure, transport problems and the unavailability of Burmese food imports, which killed over 3 million people. Wartime problems lost Britain friends elsewhere as well. In Palestine, Britain tried to restrict the number of Jewish refugees allowed in so as not to antagonise her Arab subjects, but succeeded instead only in stimulating J ewish rebelliousness, which was to make post-war Palestine completely ungovernable. Similar problems arose in post-war Malaya, when Chinese communists armed by the British to fight the Japanese, turned their guns instead on the British colonial authorities.
Home Rule for India, of course, and for other British colonies, did not necessarily mean the end of the British Empire. Canada and Australia had had home rule for generations and they had stayed as loyal members of the Empire in peace and war. But for new states in the Empire to do that, the good will towards Britain of their peoples was needed, which meant that it was rather unfortunate that the exigencies of war obliged the British to sometimes act rather brutally towards their colonial subjects during the conflict, and that the costs and strains of war left the authorities far less able to cope with problems such as inflation and food shortages than in peacetime. In India, for example, 2,500 people were killed in riots and 66,000 were imprisoned in the Raj’s effort to suppress Congress's ‘Quit India’ campaign. Even more corrosive to British rule was the Bengal famine of 1943, caused by harvest failure, transport problems and the unavailability of Burmese food imports, which killed over 3 million people. Wartime problems lost Britain friends elsewhere as well. In Palestine, Britain tried to restrict the number of Jewish refugees allowed in so as not to antagonise her Arab subjects, but succeeded instead only in stimulating J ewish rebelliousness, which was to make post-war Palestine completely ungovernable. Similar problems arose in post-war Malaya, when Chinese communists armed by the British to fight the Japanese, turned their guns instead on the British colonial authorities.

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About the author
Paul Mulvey
London School of Economics and Political Science, Department Member

I am a historian who specialises in 19th and 20th century British history, the British Empire, and the First World War. I teach at the London School of Economics.

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