TeamPCP hit LiteLLM (~97M downloads/month) because a maintainer ran Trivy during the wrong window. You didn't have to touch Trivy. You just had to depend on something that did. That's the scariest part: you don't get owned by the tool you used. You get owned by the tool your dependency's maintainer used on a Tuesday afternoon. Your attack surface isn't your code. It's every tool, every maintainer, every machine in the whole chain. And no, your SBOM wasn't going to save you. Nobody is reading SBOMs right now. They're rotating creds and praying their EDR caught something. Reid Tatoris and I are breaking down exactly how this played out and what you can actually do about it. Join us: https://lnkd.in/eQynb5xV
This is the part people underweight: your exposure is often decided by the maintainer you never knew you were depending on.
The attack surface is not just what you run, it is everything that touched what you run. SBOMs help with visibility, but they do not address trust in the build and release path, which is where this actually breaks. If those paths are not treated as first class assets with enforced integrity, you are operating on assumptions that no longer hold.
Signed up - this should be a good chat
SBOMs help with visibility, but they do not prevent incidents like this. They are not an active control.
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METRO MARKETS GmbH•375 followers
10hIs there an AI consumable transcript of this :D ?