In the standard Keccak hash function, the sponge construction is used with Keccak-f permutation as the internal transformation. Since Keccak-f is efficiently invertible, we can walk back the internal state of the sponge.
While the capacity part of the internal state is never supposed to be exposed, this still sounds like a misuse risk. Is there any reason not to use the non-invertible $F(x) = x \oplus \text{Keccak-f}(x)$ as the internal transformation? What is their design rationale? The non-invertible sponge construction should be exactly as secure in the ideal permutation model because you can recover an oracle for the permutation as $P(x) = x \oplus F(x)$.
I searched around the Internet and find this 2025 paper claiming better generic bounds if feed-forward connections are added. The paper also claims "Avoiding feeding forward seems to be a major goal of the sponge construction." but I found no evidence elsewhere to support it, nor can I understand why it is desirable to avoid feed-forward connections.
I also found this unanswered question speculating about security benefits that seem to be confirmed by the above 2025 paper. That question proposes to use a related non-invertible $F(r\|c) = 0^*\|c \oplus \text{Keccak-f}(r\|c)$ that does not feed-forward the rate component. (Are there any difference in security between their $F$ and my $F$?)