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Questions tagged [side-channel]

A side channel attack is an attack that deduces secret information from environmental observations such as timing or power consumption.

2 votes
1 answer
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Background: My expertise is in machine learning/AI, not cryptography, so I apologize if I'm missing fundamental security concepts. I'm trying to build a privacy-preserving AI agent system and want to ...
BBenyani's user avatar
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0 votes
1 answer
100 views

I'm working on a side-channel attack and try to make use of a multiplication result. In the reference C code, it's a multiplication of two values and a follow-up addition on the multiplication result ...
radix's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
621 views

Are data diodes resistant to side-channel attacks? For example, can hackers infer secret data from another computer by analyzing the signal of the data diode?  Assume that a Faraday cage isolates each ...
Scientist NA's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
844 views

About timing my question is: How can attack know the time of which certain instructions are performed by the victim? And about the cache, how can attacker know which cache line is being accessed by ...
allexj's user avatar
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I'd like to test cryptographic implementations in FPGA against power analysis. Not being all that handy with hardware and such, I'm looking for an easy solution. What I've come across thus far: ...
yoyo's user avatar
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1 vote
2 answers
287 views

Section 3.2.3 of the Fetch standard provides some guidance about how servers can/should handle preflight requests. A successful HTTP response, i.e., one where the server developer intends to share it,...
jub0bs's user avatar
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Referring to Introduction to differential power analysis (Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, Benjamin Jun, Pankaj Rohatgi) [...] Because the amount of power used by a device is influenced by the data being ...
smoothware's user avatar
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1 answer
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The question is mainly stated in the title. I was wondering what kind of attacks can be launched on such a setup, where someone has access to a running OS with locked screen (needs password for the ...
tur11ng's user avatar
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I wonder why certification (common criteria and stuff like that) of security critical hardware that is meant to be used in datacenters (e.g. link encryptors) includes some tests related to TEMPEST ...
Adomas Baliuka's user avatar
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1 answer
140 views

Cache side-channel attacks rely on the capability to observe cache hits/misses for a given set. Usually this is done via timing information, e.g. in flush+reload or prime+probe. Why is the performance ...
cryptobeginner's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
289 views

This question is purely theoretical, I have no intention of ever implementing this scheme in practice. I'm familiar with the shortcomings of sleeping as means of mitigating timing attacks. I'm more ...
PhilipRoman's user avatar
17 votes
2 answers
3k views

When you are working with secret keys, if your code branches unequally it could reveal bits of the secret keys via side channels. So for some algorithms it should branch uniformly independently of the ...
Poperton's user avatar
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8 votes
6 answers
3k views

Looking through descriptions of Spectre and Meltdown it seems that speculative execution - the basis for these attacks - occurs only with branched code. Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that ...
postoronnim's user avatar
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0 answers
162 views

I'd like to implement a RESTful API service over HTTP that developers can call from their server side environments. I intend to use a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) ...
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When dealing with cryptographic secrets (private keys, passwords, etc) it is desirable to not run these secrets through functions that do not run in constant time, in order to avoid the potential for ...
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