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Questions tagged [repeated-games]

1 vote
0 answers
62 views

In a repeated game with $n \geq 3$ periods and no discounting ($\delta = 1$), Player 1 picks an action $a \in \{G, B\}$ in period 1 that is then fixed for all periods. Player 2 chooses action $L$ or $...
user584534's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
108 views

Suppose player 1 is a producer who can decide the quality of his production at the beginning of each period. So he has two strategies - Good, Bad. Player 2, the buyer decides at the beginning of each ...
user584534's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
69 views

I'm looking for a model of repeated interactions that extends the standard framework of repeated games by introducing fixed groups of agents. We have $n$ agents divided into $\ell$ groups. In each ...
eden hartman's user avatar
0 votes
0 answers
43 views

I am practicing with infinitely repeated games and machines/automata. The question pertains to a $\delta$-discounted prisoner's dilemma with payoffs $(C,C)=(3,3)$, $(C,D)=(0,4)$, $(D,D)=(1,1)$, $(D,C)=...
Zsofía's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
147 views

Consider an infinitely-repeated game with perfect monitoring and pure strategies. The one-shot deviation principle tells us that a strategy profile $\sigma$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if ...
Star's user avatar
  • 378
1 vote
1 answer
63 views

I am reading Mailath and Samuelson (2006), and I struggle to understand the sentence they have at p.191 on infinitely-repeated games: "Repeated games have the additional property that every ...
Star's user avatar
  • 378
1 vote
0 answers
84 views

Consider a standard $n$-players infinitely-repeated game with pure strategies. Let $\sigma_i$ be the strategy of player $i$. In particular, $\sigma_i$ maps each history $h_t$ to a pure action $a_t$ ...
Star's user avatar
  • 378
1 vote
1 answer
99 views

In a repeated prisoner's dilemma with some probability δ of continuing after each round, a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium may be found which induces cooperation instead of defection in each round. ...
user10478's user avatar
  • 503
0 votes
1 answer
64 views

Let $\mathcal{R}_i$ be a non-empty, finite set and define the reporting correspondence $R_i:S→2^{\mathcal{R}_i}-\{\emptyset\}$ to be a mapping from player i’s type space to the collection of subsets ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
0 votes
1 answer
371 views

Consider the down below which I have trouble with solving. For part 1) I have said that a possible outcome path is to play $(D,D)$ in the first round and for all rounds following until $i \leq 298$. ...
Mathias's user avatar
  • 169
1 vote
1 answer
1k views

Is there a way to characterize the distinction between simultaneous vs sequential games? I'm trying to describe a situation where players can only take actions without knowledge of other players' ...
carlogambino's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
279 views

I'm doing this finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma with switching costs but I have trouble showing the fact that $\varepsilon$ had to be $1 < \varepsilon < 2$. I do see why and that it is a ...
Justin Malik's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
204 views

We have two players playing a repeated game. At every period, each player decides to stay or to quit. If both decide to stay, then they both receive 1. If either decides to quit, then the quitter ...
Bunbury's user avatar
  • 119
2 votes
1 answer
199 views

Suppose that two individuals play the prisoner's dilemma (PD) a finite number of times; and assume that they both discount the future at a constant rate. Can cooperation be sustained by a Nash ...
afreelunch's user avatar
0 votes
1 answer
172 views

Could someone help guide me on finding the players with perfect recall, and those without? For those players that do not have perfect recall, what do they forget? Step-by-step guidance would be ...
Mark's user avatar
  • 11

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