In 1939, Japan and the Soviet Union fought an undeclared border war in Manchuria, which culminated with the Japanese defeat at Nomonhan in late August.
... the Red Army in a few days enveloped and destroyed the Twenty-third Division of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). The fact that this was a campaign fought over the exact ground and against the very enemy, that the army had spent the last thirty-plus years preparing for, made this an unqualified disaster.
(Schmider, Hitler's Fatal Miscalculation, p. 167; commas as in the original)
This was less than two years before Operation Barbarossa, in the early stages of which the Wehrmacht used similar tactics of envelopment, though on a much larger scale. In 1939, Germany was courting Japan as a potential ally against the Soviet Union, although these efforts were set back at exactly this time by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. There had been a German military mission in China until it was recalled in May 1939.
How did the fact that the Red Army so decisively defeat the IJA influence German planning and thinking between August 1939 and Operation Barbarossa? Was the "Nomonhan incident" discussed by German planners? If so, at what level?
Any references would be much appreciated.