Determinism

The author mounts a case against the libertarian and hard determinist's thesis that free will is impossible in a deterministic world. He charges incompatibilists with misconstruing ordinary 'free will' talk by overlaying common language with their own metaphysical presuppositions. Through a review of ordinary discourse and recent developments in jurisprudence and the sciences, he draws together the four key factors required for an act to be free. He then puts his 4C theory to work in giving a credible account of (...) how caused human agents 'could have done otherwise'. (shrink)

In his seminal essay, Harry Frankfurt argued that our exercise of free will and allocation of moral responsibility do not depend on us being able to do other than we did. Leslie Allan defends this moral maxim from Frankfurt's attack. Applying his character-based counterfactual conditional analysis of free acts to Frankfurt's counterexamples, Allan unpacks the confusions that lie at the heart of Frankfurt's argument. The author also explores how his 4C compatibilist theory measures up against Frankfurt’s conclusions.

In the course of writing a book on Free Will, I took the opportunity to read a good deal of contemporary literature on the Free Will problem. This paper is a survey and reflection on that reading, responding to the current trends and state of play concerning the existence of free will.

If I take a free decision, how does this express itself physically? If God acts in this world, how does he do so? The answers to those two questions may be different or the same. Here we sketch a typology of possible answers, including Transcendent Compatibility. It turns out that in an open universe, freedom is the timewise mirror image of causality.

The traditional problem of free will and determinism is ostensibly about settling the relationship between free will and determinism. According to the standard narrative, this problem boils down to settling whether free will stands in a compatibility or incompatibility relation with determinism. Similarly, there is traditional debate over whether a compatibility or an incompatibility relationship holds between free will and indeterminism. Since indeterminism is simply the negation of determinism, anyone who holds that human free will is incompatible with both determinism (...) and indeterminism seems to be committed to free-will impossibilism, i.e. the view that free will is metaphysically impossible. We might summarize this constructive dilemma argument as follows: -/- The Standard Dilemma Argument 1. Necessarily, either determinism or its negation, i.e. indeterminism, is true. 2. Necessarily, determinism is incompatible with free will. 3. Necessarily, indeterminism is incompatible with free will. 4. Therefore, free will is metaphysically impossible; impossibilism is true. -/- In this essay, I argue that the term “incompatible” used in this argument is ambiguous. Since there are two fundamentally different ways to disamabiguate the term “incompatible”, there are at least four substantively different ways to disambiguate the Standard Dilemma Argument. Because these four arguments are typically conflated, the philosophically interesting differences between these four instances of the Standard Dilemma Argument are generally ignored. (shrink)

Traditional compatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. Humean-law compatibilism (a.k.a. weak-law compatibilism), is the view that free will is compatible with determinism, where determinism is defined in terms of a broadly Humean view of the laws of nature. A growing number of philosophers hold that Humean-law compatibilists are targeted by and have special resources to resist arguments for traditional incompatibilism, including the Consequence Argument (cf. Beebee and Mele 2002, Perry 2004, Hetherington 2006, Berofsky 2012, Mele (...) 2013). In this paper, I argue that Humean-law compatibilism is not a proper target of the Consequence Argument and that Humean-law compatibilists have no unique resources to show that the Consequence Argument is unsound. Moreover, I attribute the rise of the paradoxical notion of Humean determinism, upon which Humean compatibilism is based, to Peter van Inwagen’s failed attempt to capture the traditional metaphysical doctrine of determinism (as he himself characterizes it) in the impoverished language of symbolic logic. -/- For the most recent version of this manuscript, plz gmail me: kristin.mickelson.42. (shrink)

This paper examines the ontological consequences of the realization of a world and defends the thesis that, once a world occurs, a modal collapse takes place: there are no ontologically available alternatives relative to that world. The realization of a world exhaustively fixes all of its constitutive variables—laws, conditions, relations, and events—not by imposing strong metaphysical necessity, but as a direct consequence of the ontological uniqueness of the realized world. Within this framework, determinism does not arise from necessary laws or (...) from an a priori explanatory closure, but from the absence of ontologically effective alternative worlds. Contingency is thus confined exclusively to the pre-ontological level (prior to realization), while any necessity is relative and internal to the realized world. On this basis, the paper proposes a reinterpretation of causality as an intra-world relation of dependence: causation does not explain why something occurs rather than something else, but how events and states are articulated within an already fixed structure. Finally, it is argued that counterfactuals retain a legitimate epistemic role—in science, history, and deliberation—while lacking ontological commitment, since they do not quantify over real possible worlds. The paper anticipates and addresses standard objections concerning fatalism, the loss of contingency, freedom, and scientific explanation, showing that post-realization modal collapse is compatible with robust explanatory practices without recourse to ontological inflation or modal realism. (shrink)

While the free will debate tends to focus primarily on the implications of determinism for freedom, a long line of philosophers have also argued that free will would not be compatible with indeterminism either. These arguments typically take the form of a so-called Luck Objection: a family of related arguments which all seek to show, roughly, that if an action is not causally pre-determined then it must be a sort of random happening, over which the agent lacks the control required (...) for free will. If successful, these arguments are fatal for libertarian accounts of free will, which are committed to the view that free actions must be both undetermined and under the agent’s control. In this paper, we defend libertarian free will against this challenge from luck. We argue that most formulations of the Luck Objection presuppose a conceptual model of indeterministic decision-making that is not well aligned with recent advances in the natural sciences; specifically, we argue that they make assumptions about the nature of indeterminacy and about the causal structure of decision-making, which libertarians have good empirical reason (from both physics and neuroscience) to reject. We develop a more empirically plausible model of agential decision-making and apply this to the problem of luck. We argue that, under such a model, it is entirely natural to think of an agent’s actions as both ‘undetermined’ (in the sense of being under-determined) and under their own control. We conclude that indeterminism poses no threat to a more naturalistic version of libertarian free will. (shrink)

The theory of determinism and deterministic causation has persuaded many for millennia that unbending laws of physics produce inevitable outcomes from given causes. I argue that claims supporting determinism, both logical and empirical, lack rational and factual foundation. I show that Laplace, often seen as determinism’s foremost proponent, in fact supports my argument; that the claim “everything has a cause” leads to a regress and relies on an unproven assumption about the uniformity of nature that, even if granted, does not (...) support inevitability or necessity; that brain scan studies sometimes cited for determinism are irrelevant; and that deterministic causation at lower levels does not necessarily dictate outcomes at higher levels. Modal logic, which at best establishes only the possibility, not the necessity, of determinism across all possible logical worlds, further undermines its claims. Using a test for knowledge that I recently proposed, which rejects certainty while emphasizing careful analysis of evidence by the most reliable means, I conclude that determinism is mistaken and can be regarded as shown to be false. (shrink)

I present a concise modal argument showing that hard determinism is not necessary, thereby establishing the metaphysical possibility of non-deterministic causation. This argument supports claims in ethics, philosophy of mind and metaphysics that challenge strict determinism. I illustrate the value of the proof by showing how it provides crucial support for Alvin Plantinga’s modal defense of libertarian free will.

The enduring problem of free will has defied resolution across centuries. There is reason to believe that novel factors must be integrated into the analysis to make progress. Within the current physicalist framework, these factors encompass emergence and information theory, in the context of constraints imposed by physical limits on the representation of information. Furthermore the common, but vague, characterization of free will as 'being able to act differently' is rephrased into an explicatum more suitable for formal analysis. It is (...) argued that the mind is an ontologically open system; a causal high-level system, the dynamics of which cannot be reduced to the states of its associated low-level neural systems, not even if it is rendered physically closed. A positive answer to the question of free will for conscious agents is subsequently outlined. (shrink)

The problem of free will has persistently resisted a solution throughout centuries. There is reason to believe that new elements need to be introduced into the analysis in order to make progress. In the present physicalist approach, these elements are emergence and information theory in relation to universal limits set by quantum physics. Furthermore the common, but vague, characterization of free will as "being able to act differently" is, in the spirit of Carnap, rephrased into an explicatum more suitable for (...) formal analysis. It is argued that the mind is an ontologically open system; a causal high-level system, the future of which cannot be reduced to the states of its associated low-level neural systems, not even if it is rendered physically closed. A positive answer to the question of free will is subsequently outlined. (shrink)

The functioning of complex natural structures, such as living systems, still lacks a generally accepted theoretical basis with respective empirical experimental verification for decades. We propose a class of experiments to test whether such systems could be subject to an unknown ordering principle that cannot be captured by known physical laws. We hypothesise that the quantum mechanical uncertainty principle enables ordering phenomena in nearly chaotic systems in the sense of a strong emergence principle, which would not be expected when they (...) are modelled conventionally, as several authors have already formulated in various forms. To account for the harsh conditions prevailing in living systems that may preclude fragile macroscopic quantum coherence, our hypothesis does not require such coherence at all, contrary to earlier related proposals. To test this hypothesis, two virtually identical and sufficiently complex experimental setups should be compared. One setup will operate with deterministic pseudo-random number generators at key sensitive points, while the other one will use quantum-based physical random-number generators, the two setups being otherwise identical. Existing artificial neural networks are proposed as possible test objects, and their performance under identical training conditions can be used as a quantitative benchmark. As this working hypothesis extends far beyond artificial networks, a successful outcome of such an experiment could have significant implications for many other branches of science. (shrink)

Perhaps beginning of time is the common end of many causal paths (many effects as causal beginnings) and that temporal phenomena compete for somehow finding their way towards one of the beginning of the casual paths. Each casual path starts from a distinct set of parts but they all converge to the same whole at the end of their path. Such a pre-temporal causation is constitution of a whole by the sets. The temporal is de-constitution, the reverse direction, but implicates (...) a second mechanism of causation which enables a pre-temporal effect to somehow cause its pre-temporal cause. Time moves towards its origin. (shrink)

This paper attempts to explore theoretical plausibility of a deterministic universe capable of accommodating freedom by postulating certain requisite features for the set of initial conditions (without probing into the nature of deterministic laws). In another sense this paper codifies a reaction to McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time.

Joe Campbell has identified an apparent flaw in van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. It apparently derives a metaphysically necessary conclusion from what Campbell argues is a contingent premise: that the past is in some sense necessary. I criticise Campbell’s examples attempting to show that this is not the case (in the requisite sense) and suggest some directions along which an incompatibilist could reconstruct her argument so as to remain immune to Campbell’s worries.

This paper pits Q — an atemporal, hypercomputational, retrocausally omnipotent agent modeled on the entity from Star Trek: The Next Generation — against the Fixed-Point Paradox (FPP). Every conceivable libertarian escape route collapses into outright contradiction or principled unverifiability: primitive haecceitistic choice, Everettian branching, oracle consultation, direct retrocausal editing of the past. The mechanism is mercilessly simple. Infallible epistemic access to a future action E (□ₖE) entails its metaphysical necessity (□ₘE) through informational closure, making counterfactual possibility (◇ₘ¬E) logically impossible: □ₖE (...) ∧ ◇ₘ¬E ⊢ ⊥. No hypercomputer, no non-computable primitive, no acausal device escapes this constraint. Probabilistic retreat merely trades logical incoherence for permanent epistemic opacity, rendering counterfactual freedom (CFF) permanently unverifiable. The result is definitive: libertarian free will is not empirically elusive or metaphysically controversial but logically impossible. Hard determinism survives the FPP's logical test but only barely — as a position that accepts the same causal structure as compatibilism while denying its implications. The deeper truth emerges from recognizing where agency actually lives: not in ontic indeterminism (quantum randomness, branching worlds) but in epistemic indeterminism — the structural opacity of the future as viewed from the present. Physical determinism can coexist with genuine agency because chronological protection (the impossibility of closed timelike curves, retrocausal signaling, and asymmetric temporal epistemic access) safeguards deliberation by preventing the toxic god's-eye view. Omniscience doesn't reveal freedom's absence; it causes freedom's destruction. Opacity is precondition, not defect. Among post-FPP survivors, compatibilism emerges as the unique framework that is both logically coherent and descriptively non-trivial, grounding agency in the measurable, cultivable capacity of reason-responsiveness. Hard determinism, by contrast, survives logic only to fail explanatory adequacy: it rests on modal and epistemic fallacies, denies the functional reality of choice while attempting to ground morality (incoherent), and ultimately amounts to denying the existence of consciousness as a causally efficacious phenomenon. The full demolition of hard determinism through empirical adequacy conditions is presented in the companion paper "On the Freedom of the Will: A Post-Paradox Reconstruction." Being epistemically vacuous, empirically unfalsifiable, and logically incoherent, counterfactual freedom belongs in the graveyard of failed theories. For the complete eliminative argument beginning with the Fixed-Point Paradox's formalization of Aristotle's Problem of Future Contingents, extending through this omnipotence proof and the empirical demolition of hard determinism via five Minimal Empirical Adequacy Conditions, concluding with the ρ-metric framework for measuring and cultivating agency, see "The Free Will Solution: A Formal Resolution to Two and a Half Millennia of Philosophical Struggle" (Golden Physics Project Press, 2025), accessible via the external link provided. (shrink)

We show that the motion of particles may be essentially discontinuous and random.

I offer a new argument for the compatibility of free will and determinism. The argument rests on three premises, which are plausible and intuitive, or so I argue. Given that acceptance of the premises commits one to a metaphysics that combines a causal powers ontology with a Humean conception of the laws of nature, I propose calling the resulting account of free will “semi-Humean compatibilism”.

P.F. Strawson’s emphasis on our responsibility practices in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ has been thought to favor compatibilism, but this idea has come under attack. ‘Strawsonian incompatibilists’ agree with Strawson that holding responsible may be unavoidable and a good thing overall, while claiming that this does not entail that we are responsible if determinism is true. My aim is to explain how a Strawsonian emphasis on responsibility practices favors compatibilism. I rely on two key ideas. First, compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree about (...) the meaning of responsibility. Second, we can shed light upon the meaning of responsibility in an indirect way, by starting from the idea that our practices and concept of responsibility have a point. Combining these key ideas, we can ask whether compatibilist or incompatibilist analyses of the meaning of responsibility come out best in the light of Strawson’s hypothesis about the point of having the concept and practices of responsibility, which is roughly that they manifest a basic human demand for good will. Strawsonian incompatibilists are challenged to make sense of the connection between (1) the meaning of responsibility and (2) the point of having the concept of responsibility and the practices structured by it. (shrink)

Since the rise of the theory of determinism, philosophers have argued and declared that we are diminished by it. Bishop Bramhall against Thomas Hobbes in the 17th Century, Kant against Hume in the 18th, F. H. Bradley against John Stuart Mill in the 19th, Robert Kane and Robert Nozick against such as me in the 20th Century. There must be something in this relentless tradition. It cannot, it seems to me, be the falsehood of determinism. Is it, so to speak, (...) a larger fact than either determinism or free will? Is it consciousness? The new paper below, a draft to be thought more about for the 2nd edition of Kane's summative Oxford Handbook of Free Will, comes to that conclusion by way of a look at the principal parts of the problem of determinism, one being what is called probabilistic causation. (shrink)

Any person truly considering belief in a scientific world view has to confront the question of whether and in what sense, if she views herself as a natural system in a world governed by natural laws, she can continue to regard herself as free. The prima facie clash is usually expressed in terms of a conflict between freedom and determinism, captured in an argument known as the Consequence Argument. If the natural laws are deterministic, our behavior must be deducible by (...) them from the initial conditions of the universe, and we are wrong to think that we exercise regulative control over action. The most common tactic for those who defend the compatibility of freedom and determinism is to deny that regulative control is a requirement of freedom. I will argue that, whether or not regulative control is a requirement of freedom, it is – surprisingly! - compatible with determinism. The discussion here replays themes of the first essay. Personal freedom is a complex concept, embedded in a tangle of criss-crossing personal, social, theological, psychological, and metaphysical debates, each placing its own requirement on the concept, and I make no attempt to address the general question of whether we are free. It is only the specific challenge presented by the Consequence Argument that I address, and that challenge is a clearly defined dynamical issue about the possibility of regulative control over action in a world governed by deterministic laws. (shrink)

Arguments challenging the existence of free will frequently share a common structure, relying on variants of a principle we call Closure, according to which having no choice about a truth is preserved under entailment. We show that, under plausible assumptions, Closure is valid if and only if the `no choice' operator is intensional. By framing the debate in terms of the intensionality of this operator, this paper illuminates previously underappreciated constraints on defenses of Closure-based arguments against the existence of free (...) will. (shrink)

This paper examines the roles that self-knowledge and reflection play in Schopenhauer’s view of agency. Focusing in particular on the discussion of the acquired character, his cognitive theory of motivation, and the idea of intellectual freedom, I argue that we find two conceptions of rational agency in Schopenhauer. The ‘minimal’ conception sees rational agency primarily as a kind of reflective motivation, whereas the ‘maximal’ or ‘robust’ conception sees rational agency as involving a kind of reflective self-organization. Furthermore, I argue that (...) rational self-organization and acquired character go hand-in-hand: it is only in virtue of achieving the latter that one achieves the former. Although some worry that the discussion of acquired character does not sit well with Schopenhauer’s broader determinist theory of action, the reading offered here aims to demonstrate that the two are reconcilable. (shrink)

Experimental work on free will typically relies on deterministic stimuli to elicit judgments of free will. We call this the Vignette-Judgment model. We outline a problem with research based on this model. It seems that people either fail to respond to the deterministic aspects of vignettes when making judgments or that their understanding of determinism differs from researcher expectations. We provide some empirical evidence for this claim. In the end, we argue that people seem to lack facility with the concept (...) of determinism, which calls into question the validity of experimental work operating under the Vignette-Judgment model. We also argue that alternative experimental paradigms are unlikely to elicit judgments that are philosophically relevant to questions about the metaphysics of free will. (shrink)

Theodicies aim at explaining why an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God might enable the existence of evil and the suffering it causes. I draw on an idea from 18th-century Italian Jewish philosopher and kabbalist Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto to develop a “world-building theodicy”. The main idea is that God wanted his creatures to participate in the creation of the world and manifest themselves as godlike mini creators. Therefore, God created an unfinished world full of natural dangers and evil-doing people, (...) leaving creatures to develop the world into a utopia through their own hard work. This theodicy is designed to account for all types of worldly evil and any finite amount, all without controversial doctrines about free will. (shrink)

This paper examines Susan Wolf's account of "the Reason View" of moral responsibility as articulated and defended in 'Freedom Within Reason' (OUP 1990). The discussion turns on two questions about the Reason View: -/- (1) Does the Reason View aim to satisfy what Bernard Williams describes as “morality” and its (“peculiar”) conception of responsibility and blame? -/- (2) If it does, how successful is the Reason View judged in these terms? -/- It is argued that if the Reason View aims (...) to satisfy “morality” in respect of its understanding of deserved blame -- as it seems to -- then it fails for reasons similar to those that apply to R. J. Wallace’s 'rational self-control' model. On the other hand, if Wolf’s Reason View does not aim to satisfy “morality” in this respect then it might well rest satisfied with the more limited conditions of Wallace’s Reflective Self-Control model, which in contrast with the Reason View, does not appeal to the (problematic) apparatus of asymmetry and PAP. The paper concludes by drawing a contrast between the Reason View and a more "realistic" conception of responsibility, as suggested by the critique of “the morality system” and the more radical "recasting" of our ethical concepts that it proposes. -/- . (shrink)

Compatibilism is the view that determinism is true, but agents nevertheless possess free will as long as they act from a compatibilist friendly agential structure (i.e., agents want to perform their actions, agents identify with the actions they perform, agents would be responsive to reasons against performing those actions, etc.). The most powerful contemporary objection to compatibilism is the manipulation argument, according to which agents determined to act as they do by the prodding of manipulative neuroscientists are not considered free, (...) so agents determined to act by physical processes operating from the remote past should not be considered free either. One compatibilist response to the manipulation argument is the so-called hard-line reply, according to which compatibilists argue that agents determined by physical processes operating from the remote past are free, so agents determined by manipulative neuroscientists are free as well. In this paper I demonstrate that leading hard-line replies fail, while also introducing a novel argument against the hard-line reply. (shrink)

This article proposes a minimalist concept of autonomy that is consistent with determinism, but negates fatalism. Drawing on Nicolai Hartmann’s stratified ontology, it argues that autonomy is achieved not by suspending physical laws, but by introducing new, higher-level determinations unique to individual entities. The tension between general laws and individual autonomy is resolved by emphasizing the unique properties and individual laws that apply to each entity. The article also explains how this minimal autonomy makes sense of setting goals and attempting (...) to achieve them, demonstrating that even within a deterministic framework, individuals can have meaningful influence over their actions and outcomes. (shrink)

Compatibilist libertarianism proposes a new solution to the problem of an apparent incompatibility of free will and determinism. It drives a wedge between ontological levels and claims that free will is possible as a higher-level phenomenon even if the fundamental physical level is governed by determinism. After highlighting an inconsistency in the current version of compatibilist libertarianism, we discuss how one of its essential metaphysical assumptions (in particular: supervenience) can be modified in order to avoid this problem. Finally, we discuss (...) the pros and cons of pushing the position to the limits in this way. (shrink)

The experimental validity of research in the experimental philosophy of free will has been called into question. Several new, important studies (Murray et al. forthcoming; Nadelhoffer et al., Cognitive Science 44 (8): 1–28, 2020; Nadelhoffer et al., 2021; Rose et al., Cognitive Science 41 (2): 482–502, 2017) are interpreted as showing that the vignette-judgment model is defective because participants only exhibit a surface-level comprehension and not the deeper comprehension the model requires. Participants, it is argued, commit bypassing, intrusion, and fatalism (...) errors. We respond in two ways: (1) we critique and improve existing methods for assessing deeper comprehension and (2) we develop videos to convey deterministic principles of change that succeed in significantly reducing participants’ bypassing, intrusion, and fatalism errors. Consequently, we have the best existing instrument for gauging folk intuitions about the relationship between free will and determinism. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for free will expressivism, the view that the best interpretation of what people are doing when they utter free will sentences is not, as cognitivists maintain, asserting truth apt propositions, but rather, expressing attitudes towards the performance of certain actions. I argue that free will expressivism has several advantages over its cognitivist rivals in making sense of our free will discourse, and that this is good reason to interpret people thusly.

Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity appears to defend a distinctly existentialist, deontologically-constrained version of consequentialism. On that interpretation, her belief that freedom consists in the real possibilities provided by our concrete situation leads her to reject Kantian autonomy to allow for some consequentialist decisions, while her belief that our situation derives its meaning from freely-chosen projects leads her to limit such choices to their consequences for situated freedom rather than general happiness. However, I will argue that Beauvoir’s view is better understood (...) as a non-deontological, internal critique of consequentialism, rooted in Marx’s historical materialism rather than her existentialist commitments. Beauvoir challenges consequentialism’s tendency to evaluate decision-making over actions, and intended or predicted consequences over actual ones, considering consequences during a limited time-frame despite their variable, contingent future value. In other words, consequentialism is insufficiently consequentialist, a view rooted in historical materialism in two ways. First, her materialist understanding of freedom as situated possibility requires an ethics that prioritizes real rather than projected consequences. Materialist consequentialism acknowledges outcomes are never final and so refuses to assign unambiguous moral value. A decision’s ethical value is preserved only to the degree that the value of its real consequences for existing individuals’ projects is maintained into the indefinite future. Second, her view that value is historical, a human creation based in our actual situation’s contingent utility to our individually chosen projects, denies that any consequence has a fixed value independent of the historical development of humanity as realized through individual choices. Historical-materialist consequentialism demands moral agents retroactively reassess the moral status of every action in order to repair consequences that have, because of changing human purposes, become obstacles to freedom. Together, these historical materialist constraints ground Beauvoir’s demand for an ethics that is ambiguous in principle as well as practice: no decision, action, or consequence has a fixed moral value because consequences are always incomplete and, even when they do not change, the projects that give them value change. While compatible with existentialist conceptions of freedom, responsibility, and authenticity, her ethics does not require such commitments, making it more Marxist than existentialist in character. (shrink)

Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that the same agential states can cause different possible actions. Nonreductive physicalism is, roughly, the view that mental states cause actions to occur, while these actions also have sufficient physical causes. Though libertarian free will and nonreductive physicalism have overlapping subject matter, and while libertarian free will is currently trending at the same time as nonreductive physicalism is a dominant metaphysical posture, there are few sustained expositions of a nonreductive physicalist model of libertarian (...) free will – indeed some tell against such an admixture. This paper concocts such a blend by articulating and defending, with some caveats, a nonreductive physicalist model of libertarian free will. (shrink)

Key Statements -/- A new definition of consciousness. Consciousness is the minimal capacity to detect = feel (a) difference(s), whether in environmental conditions or internal states. -/- Reality is posited as an infinite, one-dimensional sequence of informational states, fraying into fractal complexity. This continuum has no origin in time, no final endpoint, and no external boundary. -/- Localized “Islands of Meaning”: Not all configurations appear comprehensible to us. Certain stable pockets yield phenomena that we interpret as consistent physical laws, living (...) organisms, or advanced technologies; we inhabit one of these pockets. -/- Consciousness as a Lens: Though the cosmic code is static in total, consciousness imposes a reading order that births our sense of time and development. Consciousness does not create the code but highlights specific strings as “our reality.” -> Creation of time. -/- Near Kinship of Natural and Artificial Intelligence: Both spring from the same portion of the universal code where symbol manipulation can yield adaptive, learning-based behavior. The difference is one of substrate and historical path, not fundamental principle. -/- Tree of known Intelligences: Biology, memetics, and AI form layered ‘software’ with shared roots on a unified information island, all existing within a vast sea of interconnected data flows and influences. -/- Life - a Servant of Entropy: In our pocket of informational infinity, higher-order information systems, e.g., life — as defined above — can be described as catalysts toward a state of increased entropy. Higher-order information processes, such as (biological and so-called artificial or synthetic) life and other software agents, are governed by the natural law of generating as many microstates — the amount of uncertainty or information in a system — as possible. -/- Determinism Amid Perceived Freedom: All is predetermined at the highest level, yet locally, we experience genuine choice because we lack full knowledge of how the program extends. Moral and ethical considerations remain relevant to navigate these local experiences. (shrink)

Some free-will defenses appeal to the intuition that the love of creatures who God causally determined to love him is less valuable than the love of creatures who chose to love God freely, in the libertarian sense. I challenge that intuition directly. I attempt to discredit the intuition in question by demonstrating that no analogies regarding human-related cases can support it. In each case I treat, I argue either that the case is disanalogous to God’s case, or that granting the (...) lover libertarian free will wouldn’t make the love in question more valuable. (shrink)

This article examines the question of divine freedom in a little-known text by Suárez printed among his 'Opuscula theologica' (1599): 'De libertate divinae voluntatis'. The article then compares this brief work with two other publications by Suárez in which he also addresses the freedom of God: first, an earlier work, the 'Disputationes metaphysicae', and then his commentary on the first part of the 'Summa theologiae', published somewhat later. Examining the question of divine freedom provides us with an opportunity to consider (...) Suárez's conception of free will from a more formal point of view. (shrink)

Let us assume that human behavior is subject to laws of nature. These are either deterministic or indeterministic. Prima facie in both cases our behavior appears to be excused. For it seems as if, in the case of deterministic laws, we cannot behave differently than we actually do. In the case of indeterministic laws, it seems as if we are not the originators of this behavior, because how we behave depends on chance. There is a tension between the scientific characterization (...) of the world on the one hand and the characterization of people who are responsible for their behaviour on the other. The book examines how the answer to the question of whether people are responsible for their behavior depends on what is meant by determinism, causality, laws of nature and (perhaps somewhat surprisingly) reduction. (shrink)

A strongly deterministic theory of physics is one that permits exactly one possible history of the universe. In the words of Penrose (1989), "it is not just a matter of the future being determined by the past; the entire history of the universe is fixed, according to some precise mathematical scheme, for all time.” Such an extraordinary feature may appear unattainable in a world like ours. In this paper, I show that it can be achieved in a simple way and (...) discuss its implications for metaphysics and philosophy of science, including natural properties, free will, explanation, and modality. First, I propose a precise definition of strong determinism. Next, I discuss its philosophical ramifications and a toy example. Finally, I provide a realistic example of a strongly deterministic (and simple) physical theory---the Everettian Wentaculus. A surprising consequence is that whether or not our world is strongly deterministic may be empirically underdetermined. (shrink)

El determinismo de Spinoza es frecuentemente considerado como uno que no considera la responsabilidad moral. Este articulo se enfoca en establecer ese sentimiento como incorrecto. El determinismo de Spinoza es derivado de su concepto de Dios, y este concepto no niega la responsabilidad. En establecer la responsabilidad moral considerando el determinismo, este articulo usara lo que John Fischer nombra el ‘control de la orientación.’ Este control, el que se supone que Spinoza estaría de acuerdo, establece la responsabilidad moral.

Laplacean Determinism (his so-called demon argument) is the thesis that every event that transpires in a closed universe is a physical event caused (i.e., determined) in full by some earlier event in accord with laws that govern their behavior. On this view, it is possible, in principle, to make perfect predictions of the state of the universe at any time Tn on the basis of complete knowledge of the state of the universe at time T1. Thus, if identity theory, epiphenomenalism (...) or any other instantiation of Laplacean Determinism is correct, mental events such as free will, intention and other forms of mental agency are tricks of the mind, misleading us into believing our volitional concerns have traction in a world ruled entirely by physical circumstance. Not surprisingly, advocates of free will and related acts of human volition have engaged in spirited debate with adherents to Laplacean orthodoxy, the results of which have been far from conclusive. Rather than join these deliberations, I wholly embrace the demon argument and then ask “what are the consequences of this allegiance?” As I hope to show, acceptance of this argument commits one to a belief in the existence of human precognition. This, I suggest, is a consequence that does not fit comfortably within a contemporary scientific worldview. (shrink)

Michael S. Moore defends the ideas of free will and responsibility, especially in relation to criminal law, against several challenges from neuroscience. I agree with Moore that morality and the law presuppose a commonsense understanding of humans as rational agents, who make choices and act for reasons, and that to defend moral and legal responsibility, we must show that this commonsense understanding remains viable. Unlike Moore, however, I do not think that classical compatibilism, which is based on a conditional understanding (...) of the ability to do otherwise, provides a sufficiently robust account of free will, even when it is amended as Moore suggests. I argue that free will and responsibility can be defended more robustly by observing that, at the level of agency, there can be alternative possibilities and mental causation in a stronger sense than recognized by classical compatibilism, even if physical determinism is true. Moore’s arguments could thus be strengthened by embracing this compatibilist libertarian position. At the same time, I note that, although the idea of responsibility is robustly defensible, there are independent reasons for rejecting a retributivist approach to punishment. (shrink)

An influential version of the Consequence argument, the most famous argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism, goes as follows: For an agent to be able to do otherwise, there has to be a possible world with the same laws and the same past as her actual world in which she does otherwise. However, if the actual world is deterministic, there is no such world. Hence, no agent in a deterministic world can ever do otherwise. In this paper, (...) I discuss a recent version of this argument due to Christopher Franklin: the ‘No Opportunity argument’. I argue that the No Opportunity argument overgeneralizes. If its premises were true, things would be obstacles to doing otherwise that have nothing to do with determinism and that intuitively are not obstacles. (shrink)

En el núcleo de nuestra imagen de sentido común se encuentra la idea de que los seres humanos somos agentes, es decir, orientamos nuestras acciones a partir de pensamientos, intenciones y deseos. En este texto, Norman Malcolm examina si disponer de una teoría neurofisiológica completa podría llevarnos a abandonar esta suposición. Malcolm argumenta que nuestras explicaciones cotidianas del comportamiento humano dependen de principios a priori que conectan a lo mental con la acción. Puesto que las explicaciones proporcionadas por una teoría (...) neurofisiológica completa dependerían de leyes contingentes, no de verdades conceptuales, tales explicaciones estarían en competencia con las explicaciones psicológicas. Para respaldar esta afirmación, Malcolm introduce un supuesto que se ha vuelto extremadamente influyente en el debate sobre la causación mental: el ‘principio de exclusión causal’. Si las leyes neurofisiológicas fuesen suficientes para explicar la acción, entonces podría prescindirse por completo de las explicaciones psicológicas. La incompatibilidad entre explicaciones psicológicas y explicaciones neurofisiológicas sumada a que las primeras involucran verdades conceptuales parecería conducir a una refutación a priori de la posibilidad de una teoría neurofisiológica completa. Pero la conclusión de Malcolm es más moderada. Él afirma que tal teoría es inconcebible; aun así, sigue siendo una posibilidad lógica. (shrink)