M&E, Misc

In this essay, I argue that an immortal existence could be desirable. Taking the accounts of Williams and Smuts under careful consideration, I agree with Fischer that an immortal existence could be gratifying. When Fischer argues that it is unfair for Williams to posit that an immortal life must have self-exhausting pleasures and, overall, a better experience than mortal life, he gets to the crux of the argument for immortality: as long as there are positive categorical desires for the individual, (...) then such life-affirming desires will provide an impetus to carry on. In moving past the Teiresias model of a phenomenon that retains memories while changing characters, I argue that a life of intellectual inquiry – which essentially alters the character of the individual while maintaining memories – offers an outward looking existence which provides internal pleasures. Accordingly, with the use of technology, computer simulations have the potential to provide pleasures and experiences that escape reality. In this sense, technology has the potential to supplement an immortal life. We cannot say whether there will be a pinnacle of such learning and pleasure which leads to decreasing returns, but it seems plausible that an immortal being who incorporates learning and pleasure that could potentially lead to innovation and discovery would seek to continue such intellectual inquiry and varied experiences until all learning potentials were exhausted. (shrink)

This paper reports (in section 1 “Introduction”) some quotes from Nelson Goodman which clarify that, contrary to a common misunderstanding, Goodman always denied that “grue” requires temporal information and “green” does not require temporal information; and, more in general, that Goodman always denied that grue-like predicates require additional information compared to what green-like predicates require. One of the quotations is the following, taken from the first page of the Foreword to chapter 8 “Induction” of the Goodman’s book “Problems and Projects”: (...) “Nevertheless, we may by now confidently conclude that no general distinction between projectible and non- projectible predicates can be drawn on syntactic or even on semantic grounds. Attempts to distinguish projectible predicates as purely qualitative, or non-projectible ones as time-dependent, for example, have plainly failed”. Barker and Achinstein in their famous paper of 1960 tried to demonstrate that the grue-speaker (named Mr. Grue in their paper) needs temporal information to be able to determine whether an object is grue, but Goodman replied (in “Positionality and Pictures”, contained in his book “Problems and Projects”, chapter 8, section 6b) that they failed to prove that Mr. Grue needs temporal information to determine whether an object is grue. According to Goodman, since the predicates “blue” and “green” are interdefinable with the predicates “grue” and “bleen”, “if we can tell which objects are blue and which objects are green, we can tell which ones are grue and which ones are bleen” [pages 12-13 of “Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences”]. But this paper points out that an example of interdefinability is also that one about the predicate “gruet”, which is a predicate that applies to an object if the object either is green and examined before time t, or is non-green and not examined before time t. The three predicates “green”, “gruet”, “examined before time t” are interdefinable: and even though the predicates “green” and “examined before time t” are interdefinable, being able to tell if an object is green does not imply being able to tell if an object is examined before time t (the interdefinability among three elements is a type of interdefinability present, for example, also among the logical connectives). Thus, it is wrong the Goodman’s thesis according to which if it is possible to determine without having temporal information whether the predicate “green” has to be applied to an object, then it is also possible to determine without having temporal information whether a predicate interdefinable with “green” has to be applied to an object. Another example of interdefinability is that one about a decidable predicate PD, which is interdefinable with an undecidable predicate PU: therefore even though we can tell whether an object is PD and whether an object is non-PD, we cannot tell whether an object is PU (since PU is an undecidable predicate) and whether an object is non-PU. Although the predicates PD and PU are interdefinable, the possibility to determine whether an object is PD does not imply the possibility to determine whether an object is PU (since PU is an undecidable predicate). Similarly, although the predicates “green” and “grue” are interdefinable, the possibility to determine whether an object is “green” even in absence of temporal information does not imply the possibility to determine whether an object is “grue” even in absence of temporal information. These and other examples about “grue” and “bleen” point out that even in case two predicates are interdefinable, the possibility to apply a predicate P does not imply the possibility to apply a predicate interdefinable with P. And that the possibility to apply the predicate “green” without having temporal information does not imply the possibility to apply the predicate “grue” without having temporal information. Furthermore, knowing that an object is both green and grue implies temporal information: in fact, we know by definition that a grue object can only be: 1) either green (in case the object is examined before time t); 2) or blue (in case the object is not examined before time t). Thus, knowing that an object is both grue and green, we know that we are faced with case 1, the case of a grue object that is green and examined before time t. Then the paper points out why the Goodman-Kripke paradox is a paradox about meaning that cannot have repercussions on induction. Finally the paper points out why Hume’s problem is a problem different from Goodman’s paradox and requires a specific treatment. (shrink)

This work does not propose a new physical theory, nor does it aim to modify or extend existing formal models. It is a conceptual exercise that explores the logical consequences of two assumptions already present, in different forms, in contemporary physics: the possibility that the fundamental laws of nature are deterministic in principle, and the idea that the universe may be conceived as a complete four-dimensional space-time structure. -/- Taking these assumptions seriously, the analysis examines whether the existence of life—understood (...) as a real physical process operating far from thermodynamic equilibrium and capable of producing persistent macroscopic effects—poses a genuine challenge to the notion of a globally “completed” universe. The central question is whether living systems, despite their local causal efficacy, could in principle access or modify the physical parameters that determine the universe’s overall evolution. -/- By explicitly considering constraints imposed by energy conservation, global entropy increase, and the causal structure of space-time, the work argues that the causal influence of life is intrinsically confined to local domains. While life can significantly affect local configurations and histories, it lacks access to the global quantities that fix the universe’s large-scale fate. -/- The analysis does not aim to deliver definitive answers about the ultimate nature of time, determinism, or cosmology. Rather, it seeks to clarify which questions remain well posed once the possibility of a deterministic and structurally complete universe is fully explored, and what conceptual space remains, within that framework, for notions such as lived time, local freedom, and the meaning of experience. (shrink)

It is generally supposed that borderline cases account for the tolerance of vague terms, yet cannot themselves be sharply bounded, leading to infinite levels of higher order vagueness. This higher order vagueness subverts any formal effort to make language precise. However, it is possible to show that tolerance must diminish at higher orders. The attempt to derive it from indiscriminability founders on a simple empirical test, and we learn instead that there is no limit to how small higher order tolerance (...) may become. That means there is no limit to how precisely we may draw the boundaries of borderline cases, thus forestalling any requirement for higher order vagueness. (shrink)

Recently we proposed “quantum language" (or,“the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics"), which was not only characterized as the metaphysical and linguistic turn of quantum mechanics but also the linguistic turn of Descartes=Kant epistemology. Namely, quantum language is the scientific final goal of dualistic idealism. It has a great power to describe classical systems as well as quantum systems. Thus, we believe that quantum language is the language in which science is written. The purpose of this preprint is to examine (...) and assert our belief (i.e.,“proposition in quantum language" ⇔“scientific proposition). We believe that it's one of main themes of scientific philosophy to make such language. (shrink)

This study introduces an agent-based simulation constructed to empirically examine central ontological propositions from The Geometry of the Good—a realist philosophical framework positing that ethical obligation arises from the structure of directed relationality rather than from choice, contract, or cultural consensus. Through the simulation of agents equipped with norm preferences, contradiction debt, trust dynamics, and capabilities for moral repair, this research analyzes how various sociomoral configurations (pluralist, utopian, authoritarian, anomic, and collapsed) influence the emergence and coherence of obligations. Principal findings (...) indicate elevated fulfillment rates and clustering of trust within pluralist and utopian paradigms, significant accumulation of contradiction debt and stagnation under authoritarian models, and systemic ethical breakdown in both anomic and collapsed contexts. These outcomes substantiate the hypothesis that directedness, repair, and diachronic recognition constitute the ontological foundation of normativity, highlighting that ethical structures depend fundamentally on mechanisms such as addressability, acknowledgment, and fidelity. Overall, the findings provide a replicable platform for assessing metaphysical-ethical claims and illustrate the potential of simulations to uncover formal properties of ethical systems that may otherwise elude empirical analysis. (shrink)

This paper argues that Genesis 1–3 should not be read as historical or anthropological narrative but as a metaphysical codex encoding archetypal dynamics. Drawing from philology, symbolic interpretation, and comparative philosophy, I show that God is symbolized as the masculine principle of order and form, while Adam and Eve function as archetypes of masculine and feminine, logic and intuition respectively. The serpent is the ego, which destabilizes balance by corrupting the generative field (feminine) first. Against Anglo-German historicist and gender-hierarchical overlays, (...) I argue that the fall signifies the recursive misalignment of complementary principles, with implications for the psyche, society, and metaphysics. (shrink)

Many in philosophy understand truth in terms of precise semantic values, true propositions. Following Braun and Sider, I say that in this sense almost nothing we say is, literally, true. I take the stand that this account of truth nonetheless constitutes a vitally useful idealization in understanding many features of the structure of language. The Fregean problem discussed by Braun and Sider concerns issues about application of language to the world. In understanding these issues I propose an alternative modeling tool (...) summarized in the idea that inaccuracy of statements can be accommodated by their imprecision. This yields a pragmatist account of truth, but one not subject to the usual counterexamples. The account can also be viewed as an elaborated error theory. The paper addresses some prima facie objections and concludes with implications for how we address certain problems in philosophy. (shrink)

Many ideas from Georg Nortoff’s works (published one paper in 2010, mainly his book in 2011, other papers in 2012, 2103, 2014, especially those related to Kant’s philosophy and the notion of the “observer”, the mind-brain problem, default mode network, the self, the mental states and their “correspondence” to the brain) are surprisingly very similar to my ideas published in my article from 2002, 2005 and my book from 2008. In two papers from 2002 (also my paper from 2005 and (...) my book 2008), following Kant’s philosophy, I introduced the notion of the “observer” for the mind-brain problem. After 2010 (mainly his book 2011 and other papers after this book), Nortoff also uses Kant’s philosophy (even if his knowledge about Kant’s philosophy is very superficial!) and the notion of the “observer” for the mind-brain problem in a methodology very similar to my methodology. Moreover, instead of EDWs, Nortoff uses a kind of “transdisciplinary” view, quite close to parallelism – the closest approach to my EDWs! In his works until 2014, Northoff’s conclusion within the unicorn world was different than my conclusion. However, in his book 2014 (two volumes) using notions like “correlations” and even “correspondences” many times, his conclusion is very closed to my EDWs! This dramatic change of framework in 3 years is quite unbelievable!!! Incredible many ideas from this book are very similar to my ideas from 2005 and 2008! (shrink)

(April 2019) UNBELIEVABLE similarities between some articles from a book edited by Bliss and Priest (2018) and my ideas (2002-208) -/- (2018) Reality and its Structure - Essays in Fundamentality, Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest (eds.), Oxford Univ Press -/- The content of this paper is about the following articles from the above book: -/- Gabriel Oak Rabin (2018) Grounding Orthodoxy and the Layered Conception Daniel Nolan (2018) Cosmic Loops Naomi Thompson (2018) Metaphysical Interdependence, Epistemic Coherentism, and Tuomas E. Tahko (...) (2018) Holistic Explanation Fundamentality and Ontological Minimality Matteo Morganti (2018) The Structure of Physical Reality Beyond Foundationalism Nathan Wildman (2018) On Shaky Ground? Exploring the Contingent Fundamentality Thesis . (shrink)

My paper discusses the philosophical interrelationship between perfection, truth, and knowledge. The connection that exists between these three concepts underscores the argument of my paper that they are all one and the same thing. -/- The concepts of perfection, truth and knowledge are analysed in that order. I analyse perfection and demonstrate the practicalities of my arguments. Truth is then scrutinized and defined to illustrate its intimate relationship with perfection leading to the conclusion that knowledge being ‘truth that is perfect’. (...) -/- In dealing with the theory of knowledge, I take into account the justification of knowledge and highlighted arguments that I found to be insufficient. I derive a premise to refute and replace both the traditional and contemporary views of knowledge. -/- In the paper presented, I consider views of some prominent philosophers including; Locke, Russell, Plato, Aristotle and Leibniz. (shrink)

Let a Kantian view of empirical truth be any view according to which the truth of empirical claim depends on the truth of non-empirical claims, because subjects (consciously or not) constitute the empirical when applying the non-empirical to experience. Historically the most important such view is Immanuel Kant’s. It is not the only. Rudolf Carnap, Thomas Kuhn, and Donald Davidson held such views. Conversely, Willard van Orman Quine’s view was contrastingly instructive. My aim is to briefly sort all this out (...) in search of lessons about the nature of empirical truth generally. (shrink)

Sometimes, a metaphysical theory has revisionary ethical consequences: for example, some have thought that modal realism entails that there are no moral obligations. In these cases, one may be tempted to reject the metaphysical theory on the grounds that it conflicts with commonsensical ethics. This is an ethics-to-metaphysics inference. My claim is that this inference is in general irrational, and that the fact that a metaphysical theory has highly revisionary ethical consequences is no reason at all to reject the theory. (...) I argue for this claim on the basis of general epistemic principles about the transmission of justification, and what makes for a good argument. Furthermore, I argue that my account can explain why a certain narrow class of ethics-to-metaphysics inferences are rational. (shrink)

Suppose that you're certain that a certain sentence, e.g. "Frida is tall", lacks a determinate truth value. What cognitive attitude should you take towards it—reject it, suspend judgment, or what else? We show that, by adopting a seemingly plausible principle connecting credence in A and Determinately A, we can prove a very implausible answer to this question: i.e., all indeterminate claims should be assigned credence zero. The result is striking similar to so-called triviality results in the literature on modals and (...) conditionals. (shrink)

This book provides an essential, comprehensive discussion on thought experiments and how they have featured throughout the history of the personal identity debate in analytic philosophy. Although many philosophical arguments employ thought experiments as a valuable methodological tool, there is a lack of focused discussion on the significant role these experiments play in the personal identity debate specifically. This book covers a range of central theories and examines how thought experiments have been featured throughout each. The author discusses and responds (...) to pivotal works on personal identity such as John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons, as well as more recent arguments in the discussion. The book also explores how thought experiments are used for related debates in other philosophical traditions. Thought Experiments and Personal Identity will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in contemporary philosophy of mind and metaphysics, as well as those with an interest in philosophical methodology"-- Provided by publisher. (shrink)

I discuss how strong constructivism can treat uncertainty as rooted in the structural features of our world, and how far it can move beyond the classical linking of concepts highlighted by John Dewey: invariance, truth and Being.

The general theme of this thesis is the relation between language and philosophical thinking. More specifically, it explores some ways in which language can impact our philosophical thinking, as well as the mechanisms through which it does so. In the first paper, I focus on the nature of a specific kind of philosophical problem: the paradox. I defend a revisionary analysis of philosophical paradox, which highlights an underlying epistemic structure that is shared by many philosophical research problems. In addition, I (...) argue that by examining this underlying epistemic structure, we gain a better understanding of what a satisfactory solution to a philosophical paradox ought to accomplish. The topic of the second paper is the idea that some expressions in natural language have meaning-constitutive principles: inference rules or sentences that are somehow constitutive of the meanings of those expressions. A challenge for the proponent of meaning-constitutive principles is to articulate what, exactly, the relation between semantically competent speakers and meaning-constitutive principles is. In this paper, I explore how this challenge can be met. The third paper closely connects to the discussion in the second paper. Given that the meanings of expressions can be fixed by meaning-constitutive inference rules, a possibility that seems to arise is that some meanings may be fixed by meaning-constitutive inference rules that fail to be necessarily truth-preserving, and thereby come out as inconsistent. This paper considers some arguments against the possibility of such inconsistent expressions. I conclude that none of the arguments considered succeed in ruling out the possibility of inconsistent expressions in natural languages. In the fourth and final paper, I address the question of whether so-called joint-carving concepts – concepts that track the fundamental structure of reality – are epistemically better than other concepts. Firstly, I explore the proposal that joint-carving thought is intrinsically valuable. Secondly, I discuss various attempts to explain the value of joint-carving by appealing to its instrumental epistemic value. I argue that, contrary to our intuitions, there appear to be no persuasive arguments to the effect that joint-carving concepts are epistemically superior. (shrink)

I must admit that my writing is sometimes a challenge to read. So I asked help from an AI to do this summary expecting that it will give an easily understandable view on Ontology of Knowledge and from this general understanding help the reader to read the original papers. Jean-Louis Boucon's work on the "ontology of knowledge" explores the complex nature of reality, meaning, and the process of knowing. Boucon challenges traditional dichotomies in philosophy and science, presenting a coherent framework (...) where the knowing subject and the world are intertwined aspects of a single dynamic reality. His ideas provide a solid foundation for exploring ontological and epistemological questions, including the interpretation of quantum mechanics as well as the proper integration of the knowing-subject in the block-universe of Relativity. (shrink)

The main lesson from Gettier cases is that while one cannot know a proposition by luck, one can hold a lucky true belief justifiedly. Possibly because the latter is taken for granted, the relationship between epistemic justification and epistemic luck has been less discussed. The paper investigates whether luck can undermine doxastic justification, and if so, how and to what extent. It is argued that, as in the case of knowledge, beliefs can fall short of justification due to luck. Moreover, (...) it is argued that justification-undermining luck is a problem for both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. Accordingly, it is shown that epistemic luck is a more widespread phenomenon than many in epistemology commonly assume. (shrink)

In part, this paper summarizes ideas from my debut book: Critical Introduction. On the Possibility of Metaphysics as a Science from the Perspective of Kantian Critical Philosophy, Crates, 2004 (not yet translated from Romanian into English or any other language). Main thesis: cosmological antinomies are paradoxes (such as the liar paradox, for example), and paradoxes in general are not logical errors, but rather an indestructible epistemological matrix that somehow configures knowledge from within, in all its possible forms. Consequently, metaphysics in (...) Kant's understanding is a science, but not a positive one (of the objects of our sensitive experiences), but an apophatic one (of the limits of both sensitive and theoretical knowledge). Ultimately, I argue, metaphysics is the science of its own possibilities or, in other words, the science of its own epistemological limits. In the meantime, we have published the complete translation of this work here. Search for "Marcel Chelba - Preliminaries for a Pure Epistemological Interpretation of the Antinomy of Pure Reason (I+II)". (shrink)

The concept of location—of something being located at, or occupying, a region or a place—has been an important topic of philosophical investigation over the past fifteen years or so. Yet all the theories of location that have been put forward so far are unsatisfactory, because they fail to have the conceptual resources to describe certain basic locational phenomena. I introduce and partly develop a novel theory of location that does better in this respect than its predecessors. Its most distinctive feature (...) is the way in which it handles so-called cases of multilocation: according to the theory, objects capable of being multilocated occupy regions via proxies, and—in a slogan, and very roughly—to be multilocated is to have several proxies located at different regions. (shrink)

This essay proposes a radical reformulation of the concept of the symbol, displacing it from representational traditions toward a relational materialist ontology, designated as the Ontology of Emerging Complexity (OEC). Through the distinction between trace, mark, and symbol, the text constructs a rigorous terminology that allows inscription to be thought as functional reorganization of matter, without recourse to transcendence or essences. The culmination of this conceptual trajectory takes place in the quantum experiment, taken not as an object of physics, but (...) as a philosophical paradigm of inscription. The wave function, understood as a technical operator that reorganizes probabilities, is interpreted as a symbol in the full sense: not as representation of a hidden state, but as inscription of a material possibility. Quantum reality, with its constitutive indeterminacy and its dependence on observation, reveals itself as the field where symbolic inscription reaches its maximum ontological potency. The symbol ceases to be mediation and becomes operation — there is no essence to unveil, but matter to reorganize. In this sense, the text does not aim to explain quantum physics, but to reinscribe it as a privileged example of an ontology of inscription, where the real is not given but technically produced. The quantum experiment is not an epistemological limit, but an ontological opening: it shows that the symbol is not a reflection, but an event. Thus, quantum physics is invoked not as a science of nature, but as testimony to the symbolic nature of inscription — where the real is always an effect of coupling, reorganization, and complexification. (shrink)

This essay critically examines the enduring foundational logic within Western philosophy, arguing that even its most radical critiques of metaphysics ultimately reinscribe a principle of grounding—whether through presence, absence, event, or structure. From Plato and Aristotle to Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and contemporary thinkers such as Deleuze, Foucault, Badiou, and Butler, the philosophical gesture remains tethered to a demand for origin and legitimacy. The essay proposes a symbolic alternative: the Ontology of Emerging Complexity. Drawing on Simondon’s theory of individuation and Whitehead’s (...) processual metaphysics, it reframes philosophy as a gesture of symbolic reinscription rather than revelation. Thought is no longer the discovery of essence but the operative reorganization of unstable matter. Philosophy becomes a transductive operator, translating empirical flows into symbolic structures without recourse to final principles. In this framework, truth emerges not from correspondence but from symbolic operativity. The essay calls for a non-foundational philosophy that listens to the real rather than seeks to ground it. (shrink)

This text proposes a radical reformulation of contemporary ontology through the concept of inscription as a material and symbolic operation that stabilizes differences under local conditions. Rejecting the classical dualism between matter and thought, as well as the transcendental residues present in various philosophical traditions, the text affirms the Ontology of Emerging Complexity (OEC) as an operative regime of immanent intelligibility. Inscription is presented as an ontogenetic gesture that does not reveal essences, but reorganizes material instabilities into legible marks, implying (...) energetic cost, finitude, and ethical responsibility. Quantum measurement is analysed as an exemplary onto-epistemic paradigm, in which subject-function, object-function, and apparatus are co-produced in the stabilization of traces. Epistemology ceases to be representational and becomes an intervening practice, while truth is reconceptualized as operative consistency. In this horizon, philosophy abandons the contemplation of essences and assumes itself as co-inscription: a situated practice of symbolic reorganization of the real. Finitude emerges as the affirmative condition of inscription, founding an ethics of emergence based on material listening, responsibility for the gesture, and cohabitation with the variability of the real. Inscription is also technogenesis, implying that language, consciousness, and intelligence are material regimes of symbolic differentiation. The chapter culminates in the affirmation of philosophy as an aesthetic and ethical intervention in the regimes of legibility, where to think is to inscribe — and to inscribe is to share the responsibility for the emergence of possible worlds. (shrink)

This essay investigates the symbolic formation of the figure of God in Christianity, highlighting the structural continuity with classical Greek metaphysics. Rejecting essentialist or theological explanations, it argues that Plato and Aristotle do not an-ticipate Christian theology, but rather establish ontological functions — order, in-telligibility, orientation — which will later be reinscribed under a new figuration. The Platonic Demiurge and the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover are not theological gods, but conceptual operators that render the world legible and thought orientable. Christian theology (...) repurposes these functions, attributing to them language, will, and agency. Throughout the text, it is shown how the figure of the Christian God results from the synthesis of philosophical principles, mythical narratives, and reli-gious symbolic dispositifs. The aim is not to trace a linear genealogy, but to reveal how the divine function shifts across distinct symbolic regimes, while maintaining a fundamental operative coherence: to ensure that the world is cosmos, not chaos. (shrink)

This paper discusses two views of what makes an action difficult deriving from two very different approaches. On the first view, the difficulty of an action is determined by the (physical) effort involved in performing the action. On the second view, the difficulty of an action is determined by the level of ability required to perform the action. I develop and refine a version of each approach, including an original version of the ability approach drawing on recent work on agentive (...) abilities. Then, I subject each, in turn, to a series of problem cases and consider how each view might be further refined to address these cases. I conclude that the ability approach is more promising than the effort approach because, among other reasons, it more aptly accounts for cases where difficulty seems to arise from factors other than effort (including counterproductive habits, lack of artistic imagination, and presence of pain). (shrink)

Fazang is one of the most celebrated and influential thinkers in the history of Chinese Buddhist philosophy. Metaphors for Interdependence is a rigorous and accessible exploration of Fazang’s metaphysical theories, focusing in particular on his vision of reality as a realm in which everything is interdependent and interpenetrating. Fazang explains this vision with metaphors about Indra’s net, coin counting, and a building. The result is the systematic articulation of metaphysics for the Huayan tradition of Buddhism. This book reconstructs the intellectual (...) background that gives meaning to Fazang’s theories. It provides vivid examples to help readers understand Fazang’s distinctive insights. The book also develops incisive interpretations of Fazang’s metaphors by examining how Buddhist optical theory, breathing meditation, and ancient Chinese architecture inform Fazang’s theorizing. By situating Fazang’s insights within broader traditions of Buddhism, Metaphors for Interdependence challenges facile conceptions of interdependence while inviting readers to reconsider a range of common metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

Platonism in philosophy of mathematics and non-naturalist realism in metanormative theory seem to share key features. This chapter argues that the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument made by Platonists in philosophy of maths can be fruitfully pursued by non-reductive realists in metaethics. Thick evaluative concepts, and their role in scientific theories, play a key role in the normative version of the indispensability argument. The chapter makes the case that this strategy can deliver much of what the robust realist non-naturalist wishes to hold, (...) including the sui generis nature of normative properties. However, the resulting view, like that of Platonists who pursue the analogous strategy, is naturalist rather than non-naturalist. (shrink)

The concept of truth always had a special significance within Donald Davidson’s view of language and thought. For instance, Davidson always maintained that a basic requirement for understanding another individual is finding a great deal of truth in what she says and thinks. This captures his commitment to the principle of charity. What is the relationship between this principle and the constitutive claims about language and the triangulation argument advanced in later work? My primary aim in this paper is not (...) to provide a detailed answer to this question but rather to show that the triangulation argument assigns to the concept of truth, which is at the core of the conception of charity, a new role within the Davidsonian system. While the principle of charity entails that it is in the nature of the thinking mind not only to seek the truth but also to succeed, at least to some extent, in this aspiration, the triangulation argument entails that a concern for what is true is a requirement for being on the path to thought. Only individuals who embody such a concern, that is, only individuals who have an antecedent disposition to seek the truth, can count as speakers and thinkers, for only such individuals can be motivated to engage in the activity of triangulation. A secondary aim of the paper is to show that this expanded Davidsonian conception provides an attractive alternative to a family of views according to which the anchoring of thought and language to the world is to be explained primarily in terms of the distinctive features of one’s natural capacities. (shrink)

An athlete has faith in her unathletic partner to run a marathon, a teacher has faith in her currently poor-performing students to improve in the future, and your friend has faith in you to succeed in the difficult project that you have been pursuing, even, and especially, when your chance of failing is non-trivial. This paper develops and defends a relational view of interpersonal faith by considering four interesting phenomena: first, in virtue of placing faith in someone, we stand in (...) solidarity with that person; second, interpersonal faith is called for during moments of difficulty, but it can seem inappropriate during moments of ease; third, one’s faith in others can feel unwelcomed, and can be rejected; and fourth, when interpersonal faith is frustrated, disappointment, rather than resentment, is warranted. I propose that when the faithor (e.g., your friend) places faith in the faithee (e.g., you) to φ, the faithor does something close to inviting the faithee to (re)commit to φ-ing. This invitation-like move, once properly taken up by the faithee, puts both sides of the faith in a new kind of normative relationship that is in the same broad family as a promissory relationship, albeit with a different normative profile. (shrink)

摘要：本文系统阐述静动哲学体系下的因果理论，核心论题为：在有情众生（性物一 元）的存在境域内，并行且绝不混淆地运行着两条因果律——精神感应因果律（形而 上）与客观理则因果律（形而下）。前者以“有感必应，定向不虚”为法则，其机制是自 性意向直接感召相应的精神境界与未来缘起；后者以“条件满足，结果必然”为法则，其 机制是客观规律决定事件序列。本文首次明确提出，二律之间并非能量转化关系，而 是通过感应的交互影响发生联系：形而上之善念能感召吉祥缘起（包括未来际遇善 人），形而下之明智行动能助益心性回归；反之亦然。通过对“农夫与蛇”案例的精微分 析，本文揭示人生困境多源于对二律的混淆或片面运用。进一步，本文以“双重感应场” 模型创新性地统摄了儒家“天人感应”、佛教“业感缘起”、道家“同气相求”等观念，并回 应了西方哲学中的自由意志难题。最终，论证人作为“因果能动者”，其自由与智慧在于 自觉运用“主敬以感通，格物以明理”的实践法则，在双重因果的辩证互动中，实现生命 的超越与创造。.

The deterministic or probabilistic laws of our representations and our science do not link what “is” to what “will be” but what “I know” to what “I could know”. Consistency is not a predicate on the physical laws of the world but on the logical laws of Meaning. If you cannot convince yourself of that. If you want to believe that the Softmatter of the Meaning cannot be more consistent than the Hardmatter of the physical world. Think again......and try to (...) answer this question : Why would it be less unlikely for a physical world to evolve from the big bang to individuated knowing persons than for an amorphous interdependence to assemble (logically) individuated representations of the world? (shrink)

Knowledge of the subject only ever speaks to the subject himself and of nothing more than the subject himself. And yet, when due to their mode of emergence, objects of this knowledge seem to occupy part of a space (whatever it may be) which would contain them, it is tempting for the subject to give this space the name of Reality. The conventional western philosophies (and science) gave in to this temptation. They came to distinguish the Subject {place-of-the-mind} from the (...) Reality {place-of-the-objects} whereas Reality is only the "objectified" or rather "objectivized" aspect of knowledge of the subject. From this artificial distinction followed a great confusion, a dispute that lasted for centuries, and still does, between different -isms with infinitesimal differences, from which the most influential parties emerge victorious each at his turn. In reaction to this confusion a "pivotal" re-orientation is suggested, considering the way objects of knowledge emerge and are organized, not in correlation with objects of Reality but with the subject for himself and knowledge for itself. For this re-orientation the OK proposes to transcend the subject's mind to reveal its logical principles. That's the specific subject I would like to delve into here : the transcendence of meaning. This is necessary for understanding the OK and could be beneficial to “mental health counseling”. (shrink)

Polish education is on a precipice of change. This is associated great hopes and great concerns. For too long the school system has condemned to indifference of politics and the public opinion was led also to similar believes. The school must change but not superficially, it must change for the inside. But in which direction should the changes be guided? The author of the this article proposes a thorough transformation of the polish school paradigm to increase the autonomy of educational (...) institutions, teachers and most importantly, students. This is the basis to build up through education an adequate attitude needed for the future world, which as never before will be in the need for informed, competent and free people, who understand the value of choice. To clarify a holistic need for abovementioned changes the author will invoke a cognitive tool in the form of metaphorology to outline an analogy between the condition of the modern student and mythical Icarus, for whom freedom and fulfillment of potential, were more important than obedience and safety, on which contemporary kids and youth also cannot count. (shrink)

According to one view of alethic modality, alethic modality is deontic modality with respect to thoughts or language. To say that something is necessary is to prescribe norms on how we must think or use language. This view has been argued to have many philosophical advantages over the traditional view that takes alethic modality to describe things in the world. In this article, I argue that the deontic view also enjoys a wide range of empirical support from linguistics and psychology.

प्रस्तावित शोध-पत्र सत् या निरपेक्ष तथा आभास या जगत संबंधित अवधारणा की शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले के परिप्रेक्ष्य में दार्शनिक विवेचना है। इस शोध-पत्र का प्रमुख उद्देश्य भारतीय एवं पाश्चात्य दार्शनिक जगत के प्रख्यात विद्वानों विशेषतः शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले के सत् एवं आभास संबंधी विचारों में समाविष्ट समानताओं एवं विषमताओं का व्यापक रूप से विश्लेषण प्रस्तुत करना है। इस कारण शोध-पत्र के अंतर्गत सर्वप्रथम, यह प्रदर्शित किया गया है कि क्यों उक्त दोनों दार्शनिकों के संदर्भ में ही सत् एवं आभास की (...) अवधारणा का विवेचन किया गया है। द्वितीयतः, शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले दोनों के सत् या निरपेक्ष संबंधी विचारों की गवेषणा की गई है। तृतीयतः, उक्त दोनों दार्शनिकों के दर्शन में व्याप्त सत् एवं आभास के स्वरूप को विवेचित करते हुए समीक्षात्मक अध्ययन किया गया है और तदुपरांत, अंत में उपर्युक्त सभी पक्षों का गहन मूल्यांकन करते हुए निष्कर्ष को प्रस्तुत करने का प्रयत्न किया गया है।. (shrink)

If Annette Baier is right that ‘some degree of trust is … the very basis of morality” (Baier 2004, 180), it is surprising that a philosopher so interested in moral psychology and interpersonal relationships such as Iris Murdoch does not explicitly discuss trust in her work. However, on closer inspection, Murdoch’s proposal of an ethics focused on realism, unselfing and attention crucially depends upon the possibility of trust – trust in reality, and in one’s own capacity for moral vision. Connecting (...) Murdoch's project with feminist philosophy and especially feminist epistemology, and drawing on the philosophy of trust developed by C. Thi Nguyen and Karen Jones, this chapter argues for a vision of 'trust in the world' implicit in Murdoch's work, where trust emerges not in the domain of personal relationships, but in our attitude towards reality, including moral reality, that is not perceived by us as merely something inert. (shrink)

It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterises the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, broadly construed, doesn’t make (...) phenomenological predictions of the required sort. So, as a result, opponents must resign themselves to attacking specific incarnations of naïve realism, or approach matters quite differently. (shrink)

Historical contingency is commonly associated with unpredictability and outcome variability. As such, it can be seen as an undesirable aspect of experimental investigations. Many might agree that experimental methodologies that include enough control help to by-pass this problem and thereby make for more secure knowledge. Against this received view, we argue that, for at least some historically contingent processes, an over-emphasis on control might mislead by obscuring the very object of investigation or by preventing fruitful discoveries. In discussing cases from (...) evolutionary biology, developmental biology, and geochemistry/astrophysics, we show how investigating through approaches that don’t prioritize environmental control, while allowing for greater variability of outcomes, better respects the object/environment entanglement of these systems. Finally, we defend the idea that, despite the lower level of control, these types of experiments do not have a lower epistemic value than more highly controlled experiments. (shrink)

In recent work, Amie Thomasson has defended what she calls normativism about metaphysical modality. She claims that discourse about metaphysical modality primarily serves a non-descriptive function, and builds a theory of such discourse around this claim. In this text, I critically discuss Thomasson’s view. Chief among the problems I go on to discuss is that Thomasson’s account of the meanings of modal expressions does not solve the problems she intends it to solve (among them solving the Frege-Geach problem), that there (...) is no significant ordinary practice of making metaphysically modal claims in the first place, and that the general problem she identifies and seeks to solve goes beyond discourse about metaphysical modality so a theory focused on metaphysical modal discourse is not general enough to deal with the problem. (shrink)

The book consists of 11 chapters which are grouped into three parts: I. Trans Inclusion; II. Trans Rights; III. Media Complicity in Trans Exclusion. I will discuss the chapters in parts I and II in detail. Part III might be of interest to students of media, but the papers are not directly relevant for policy decisions about trans inclusion.

According to an influential view, when it comes to representing reality, some words are better suited for the job than others. This is elitism. There is reason to believe that the set of the best, or elite, words should not be redundant or arbitrary. However, we are often forced to choose between these two theoretical vices, especially in cases involving theories that seem to be mere notational variants. This is the riddle of redundancy: both redundancy and arbitrariness are vicious, but (...) there are cases in which one must be picked. Logical realists admit that there are some logical constants among the elite words. This leads to awkward questions, such as which among conjunction and disjunction is elite. In this paper, I show how the riddle of redundancy arises for logical realists, and offer a solution. This approach requires us to change how we represent negation. Instead of using some particular symbol, we represent negation by flipping formulae over the horizontal axis. (shrink)

This book focuses on how we should treat philosophy’s theoretical representations. It argues in favor of an instrumentalist attitude towards pivotal cases of theoretical representation in philosophy that are commonly regarded under a realist attitude. -/- Philosophy is awash with theoretical representations, which raises the question of how we should regard them. This book argues that representations in philosophy should not be regarded under a realist attitude by default as individually disclosing the nature of what they represent. Ori Simchen introduces (...) the reader to the general theme of representations in philosophy and our attitudes towards them via case studies: numbers, modality, and belief. He offers a framework for deciding when a realist attitude towards a theoretical representation is warranted and concludes that the representations deployed in the case studies fail the proposed test. The next part of the book illustrates the attractiveness of attitudinal instrumentalism towards representations in semantics, in the philosophy of mind, and within the problematics of rule-following. -/- Philosophical Representation will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophical methodology. (shrink)

Gazali'nin hayatını 1095 yılında geçirdiğini söylediği krize göre üç döneme ayırmamız mümkündür. Kriz öncesi dönem, kriz dönemi (1095) ve kriz sonrası dönem. Bu dönemlerde akla ve felsefeye bakışı değişmiştir dolayısıyla felsefî ilimlerden sayılan matematik ilmine bakışı da değişmiştir. Gazali kriz öncesi ve kriz dönemlerinde aklı eleştirmekle birlikte çok sistematik bir eleştiri yaptığı söylenemez. Gazali bu dönemde felsefe yorumlarında 'felsefi/bilimsel aklı" din açısından zararlı görmemektedir hatta zaman zaman olumlu yanlarından bahsetmektedir. Makasıdu’l Felasife ve Tehafütü’l Felasife ‘de akılla ilgili mevzulara değinmiş, bazı (...) felsefî ilimlerin dinle alakalı olmadığını, din açısından fayda veya zarar vermediğini ifade etmiş ama temelde felsefi aklın “sadece dini (metafizik) konulara” yetmeyeceği kanaatine varmıştır. Fakat bu dönemde o, felsefeyi 'dinileştirme' çabasının bir sonucu olarak akıl eleştirisiyle karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Aklın, felsefenin ve felsefî ilimlerin (mantık, astronomi, fizik… vb.) kökenini Kur’an’a dayandırmış ve filozofların bütün bu ilimlerin ‘tümellerini’ dinden öğrendiklerini iddia etmiştir. Böylece Gazali, akılla bir teoloji kurmanın mümkün olmadığını ispatlayarak yani dini ‘akla uygun hale getirme’ girişimlerinin önüne geçerek ‘aklı ve bütün aklî ilimleri dine uygun hale’ getirmek için vahye ve mistik tecrübeye dayalı yeni bir sistem kurmuştur. Dinî akıl, vahyi anlar ve uygular. Kriz sonrası dönemde bütün felsefî sistemleri dinî ve mistik/gnostik bir düşünce etrafında yorumlayan Gazali'de akıl tamamen dinileşmektedir. Avam ilimleri seviyesine indirdiği felsefî (tıp, astronomi, kimya, biyoloji, mantık, matematik vs.) ve dinî ilimleri (kelam, fıkıh ve tefsir) mistik bir zihniyetle yeniden ele alır. Felsefî ilimlerin esası dinîdir ve insanlar bu ilimleri peygamberlerden öğrenmiştir. Kelam ilmi, aklî bir ilim değil, dini bir ilimdir, kelamı kullanarak akli hükümler vermekten vazgeçip sadece dini ve uhrevi hükümler vermesi sağlanmalıdır. Fıkıh ilmi de aklî bir ilim değil dini bir ilimdir ve fıkıh alimleri sadece ahiretle ilgili hüküm verilmelidir. Bunlardan daha üstün olan ise havas ilimleridir. Havas ilmi Gazali'ye göre gnostik tasavvuf öğretisidir. Dünyevî akıl insanı yanılttığı ve ona güvenilmez olduğu için akıl yerine peygamberin vahyi gelmelidir ve ondan sonra vahye benzerliği dolayısıyla "velinin ilhamı" yer almalıdır. Bu ise ilk başta dini anlaması için gerekli olan ‘dinî akıl” ve daha sonra ruh, aşk ve nur yoluyla elde edilmektedir. (shrink)

In the introduction part of this thesis, which aims to discuss the place and importance of religious experience in Ghazali's system of thought, the place of religious experience in philosophy of religion and the place of Ghazali's religious experience in history are examined. In the first chapter, the concepts of religion, philosophy and experience are explained and their place in the framework of religious experience is explained. The possibility of religious experience, the types of religious experience and especially the concept (...) of intuition have been emphasized and the value of religious experience has been tried to be revealed in terms of being an evidence for the existence of God. In the second chapter, the life of Ghazali, the crisis he experienced in 1095 and the spiritual depression he had as a result of the religious experience that emerged as a result of this were discussed and his experience and thought shaped around it were examined. The mystics who determined the perception of religion, and the mental development theory that Ghazali developed as a result of his experience are explained. This theory is important in terms of forming a basis for his understanding of knowledge based on religious experience. In the third chapter, Ghazali's understanding of religious experience is emphasized. In this section, Ghazali's concept of religious experience and other related concepts are explained. Then, his efforts to ground the revelation and all kinds of knowledge with this religious experience were emphasized, and his 'revival' activity towards religion, philosophy, theology, fiqh, and mysticism was discussed. Ghazali rejects the grounding of knowledge with sense organs and reason and claims that knowledge should be grounded by revelation/inspiration or intuition. This claim has been discussed in various examples, and finally, an evaluation of the understanding of religious experience that is the basis of knowledge has been made and the issue of whether there is evidence for the existence of God or not has been discussed. In the end, religious experience determined his whole thought system from beginning to end. He reinterpreted everything according to religious experience and his revival project greatly influenced the Islamic world and thought after him. Keywords: Philosophy of Religion, Ghazali, Ihya (Revival), Mysticism, religious experience. (shrink)

El concepto de trastorno mental permite justificar intervenciones médicas, psicológicas y judiciales. Además, facilita a la/el consultante acceder a tratamientos mediante reembolsos o programas de salud pública, y por otro lado, podría conllevar estereotipos sociales. No obstante, el significado de dicho concepto no ha dejado de suscitar debate. En el presente artículo argumentaré que los trastornos de personalidad, tal como son definidos en el DSM-5, no cumplen con los criterios de patología de las propuestas principales (i.e. teoría bio-estadística de la (...) salud, disfunción dañina, o entidad patológica) debido a tres razones independientes: (i) no se han propuesto dis/funciones a la base de cada trastorno y, dado el estado del arte de la psicología evolucionista, es poco probable que se pueda llevar a cabo ese programa en el futuro; (ii) el concepto de daño (distrés, perjuicio) aplicable a los trastornos de personalidad es constitutivamente social (aunque no exclusivamente social), por lo que resulta más adecuado hablar de grados de discapacidad que de trastornos del individuo; y (iii) que la ausencia de condiciones patognomónicas para cada trastorno, junto a la elevada comorbilidad y multimorbilidad entre trastornos de personalidad, horada la validez de la nosología actual y de los diagnósticos diferenciales. Propondré como solución la eliminación de los trastornos de personalidad de la nosología psiquiátrica. Eliminar los trastornos de personalidad no equivale a desconocer el sufrimiento de las personas diagnosticadas, ni a ignorar que dicho sufrimiento precede a, –y no acaba con la disolución de– la etiqueta diagnóstica. Por ello, se propondrá una reconceptualización de dicho sufrimiento en términos de discapacidad, entendida desde el modelo social, y que no presupone patología. (shrink)