Metaphysics, Misc

Presentists have typically argued that the Block View is incapable of explaining our experience of time. In this paper I argue that the phenomenology of our experience of time is, on the contrary, against presentism. My argument is based on a dilemma: presentists must either assume that the metaphysical present has no temporal extension, or that it is temporally extended. The former horn leads to phenomenological problems. The latter renders presentism metaphysically incoherent, unless one posits a discrete present that, however, (...) suffers from the same difficulties that the instantaneous present is prone to. After introducing the main phenomenological models of our experience of time that are discussed in the literature, I show that none of them favors presentism. I conclude by arguing that if even the phenomenology of time sides against presentism, the latter metaphysical theory has no scientific evidence in its favor and ought to be dropped. (shrink)

This paper proposes the Principle of Differential Stability of Possibility, which treats possibility as an ontological field rather than a merely epistemic notion. Reality, on this view, emerges through cumulative stabilization processes that selectively reinforce some potential pathways over others. Drawing on analogies from crystallization, natural selection, and interpretations of quantum mechanics (especially decoherence and objective-collapse models), the paper reinterprets consciousness as a late-developing translator of already-stabilized processes rather than the cause of wave-function collapse. The framework aims to unify accounts (...) of emergence across physical, biological, and cultural levels, and it suggests an ethical orientation that values the preservation of diverse possible futures. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that an immortal existence could be desirable. Taking the accounts of Williams and Smuts under careful consideration, I agree with Fischer that an immortal existence could be gratifying. When Fischer argues that it is unfair for Williams to posit that an immortal life must have self-exhausting pleasures and, overall, a better experience than mortal life, he gets to the crux of the argument for immortality: as long as there are positive categorical desires for the individual, (...) then such life-affirming desires will provide an impetus to carry on. In moving past the Teiresias model of a phenomenon that retains memories while changing characters, I argue that a life of intellectual inquiry – which essentially alters the character of the individual while maintaining memories – offers an outward looking existence which provides internal pleasures. Accordingly, with the use of technology, computer simulations have the potential to provide pleasures and experiences that escape reality. In this sense, technology has the potential to supplement an immortal life. We cannot say whether there will be a pinnacle of such learning and pleasure which leads to decreasing returns, but it seems plausible that an immortal being who incorporates learning and pleasure that could potentially lead to innovation and discovery would seek to continue such intellectual inquiry and varied experiences until all learning potentials were exhausted. (shrink)

We present a formal account of subjectivity without external foundations. Over an extended LP/FDE truth alphabet, we axiomatize a self-ascriptive relation R(x,x) and a Subject Unicity (SU) scheme. We separate the linguistic lag operator X from the intra-perspectival successor σ, redefine same-place equivalence (≈), and license the identity sign (=) only via explicit upgrade anchors at the fix layer (Augenblick). Under a no-third-channel guard that blocks explosion while preserving the contradiction value B, we prove that within each connected cover the (...) set of subject candidates A/≈ collapses to a single class. This distinction between coordinate identity and event identity prevents premature global identification while yielding a constructive criterion of identity at stabilization. Conceptually, the system couples Hegelian dialectics with Lacanian failure of subsumption: contradiction is treated not as error but as structural motor. Aligning Tarskian/Gödelian limits with a Lacanian “delegated deficit,” we accordingly read R(x,x). The σ-translation captures how contradiction (B) is conserved and truth (T) emerges post hoc, offering a logic-driven reconstruction of dialectical temporality and the singular emergence of the subject. 본 논문은 외부 준거 없이 닫히는 형식 체계 위에서 주체의 자기귀속 R(x,x)과 주체 단일성(SU)을 공리화한다. 언어적 시차 연산자 X와 관점 내부 후속자 σ를 분리하고, 동일장소 동치 ‘≈’와 등호 승격(앵커) 규칙을 도입해 동일성의 작동 조건을 제시한다. 확장 LP/FDE 값층에서 모순값 B를 보존하고 제3채널 금지(No3) 가드를 둘 때, 연결 성분/커버 내부에서 주체-후보 집합 A/≈가 단일 동치류로 붕괴함을 증명한다. 이는 좌표 동일화와 사건 동일화를 구분하여 과도한 전역 동일시를 차단하고, Augenblick(고정층)에서만 ‘=’이 면허됨을 보인다. 결과적으로 주체는 속성의 총합이 아니라 사후적 표지에 의해 고정되는 규칙적 자기지시로 나타난다. 본문은 헤겔적 변증법(모순의 내재적 운동)과 라캉적 포섭 실패를 접합해 모순을 결함이 아니라 구조적 동력으로 제시하고, 타르스키/괴델류 한계를 라캉의 ‘대리-결손’과 접속해 R(x,x)를 해석한다. σ-번역은 모순(B)의 보존과 진리(T)의 사후적 출현을 기술하며, 이를 통해 변증법적 시간성과 주체의 단독성이 파라일관 논리 장치로 재구성될 수 있음을 보인다. (shrink)

Following Kant, subjectivity is seen as an obstacle to any access into things themselves. For this reason, Kant concludes that metaphysics as the science of being as being is necessarily impossible. In this essay, the possibilities of metaphysics in light of the problem of subjectivity are reexamined. The nature of subjectivity and the subject’s encounter with being are analyzed yielding two fundamental relational structures that hold with respect to being and the subject. Further examination of the act of reflection coupled (...) with judgment reveals that these structures may in fact be transcended, from which an encounter with being as such follows. On the basis of reflection and judgment, metaphysics is in consequence determined to be possible. (shrink)

In this article I interpret resilience and evolution in view of the philosophy of Leibniz. First, I discuss resilience as a substance’s or a monad’s “quantity of essence” — its “degree of perfection” — which I express as the quality of the Whole with respect to the sum of the qualities of the Parts. Then I discuss evolution, which I interpret here as the autopoietic Principle that sets Itself in motion and creates all reality, including Itself. This Principle may be (...) considered as a sort of ante-litteram metaphysical Darwinian Selection. My interpretations provide a different formulation for questions such as “why natural evolution evolves?” and “why is this the best of all possible worlds?” In this article I also provide a geometrical interpretation of a key aspect behind the “divine mathematics” of the autopoietic Principle. (shrink)

I was planning to take a break from writing today, as advised. I decided to read Timothy Williamson's "Is Logic about Validity?" Reading it, I came across a baffling passage. At the beginning of it, Williamson writes: "Anyway, no logical truth is too simple to be denied by a sufficiently perverse metaphysician." He then appears to give an example in which some people deny that everything is self-identical. He uses his intuition to interestingly guess their argument. He soon says, "They (...) did not mean something different from the rest of us by ‘identical’. They were just not very good at logic." Are they actually perverse then? Prima facie, there is a difference between arriving at an erroneous conclusion against a simple logical truth because one is not good at logic and arriving at such a conclusion because one is a perverse metaphysician. A starting point for defining the case of the perverse metaphysician attacking a simple logical truth is one who is good at logic and presents an attack on a simple logical truth which they themselves do not accept, because they believe there is an error in the attack. (shrink)

(Added April 2023: This draft is superseded by Briggs, R.A., & George, B.R. (2023). 'What Even Is Gender?'. Routledge. DOI 10.4324/9781003053330, and in particular by the first three chapters thereof. While this much earlier draft remains available for archival purposes, you are encouraged to read and cite the 2023 book and to use its terminology.) -/- This paper presents a new taxonomy of sex/gender concepts based on the idea of starting with a few basic components of the sex/gender system, and (...) exhausting the possible types of simple associations and identities based on these. The resulting system is significantly more fine-grained than most competitors, and helps to clarify a number of points of confusion and conceptual tension in academic and activist conversations about feminism, transgender politics, and the social analysis of gender. (shrink)

What is it to be a woman? What is it to be a man? We start by laying out desiderata for an analysis of 'woman' and 'man': descriptively, it should link these gender categories to sex biology without reducing them to sex biology, and politically, it should help us explain and combat traditional sexism while also allowing us to make sense of the activist view that gendering should be consensual. Using a Putnam-style 'Twin Earth' example, we argue that none of (...) the existing analyses in the feminist literature succeeds in meeting all of our desiderata. Finally, we propose a positive account that we believe can satisfy all the desiderata outlined. According to our theory, the genders 'woman' and 'man' are individuated not by their contemporary connections to sex biology, but by their historical continuity with classes that were originally closely connected to sex biology. (shrink)

Abstract This paper examines the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse through the lens of entropy, ethical misalignment, and systemic collapse. Rather than viewing the Horsemen as physical entities or apocalyptic figures, they are reinterpreted as metaphors representing the forces that lead to the degradation of systems—both societal and individual. The paper argues that war, famine, pestilence, and death can be reinterpreted as metaphors for systemic entropy, representing the forces of ethical misalignment and systemic breakdown that threaten both individuals and societies. (...) It offers a framework for understanding modern struggles and potential pathways for systemic renewal. By exploring the dynamics of entropy, divergence from ethical alignment, and the collapse of systems, this paper provides a new lens through which we can understand not only apocalyptic scenarios but also the opportunities for transformation and realignment within societies and individuals alike. (shrink)

Some metaphysics are provided showing that what is commonly called ‘the physical world’ can be deconstructed into three ‘levels’: a single, unified ‘noumenal world’ on which everything supervenes; a ‘phenomenal world’ that we each privately experience through direct perception of phenomena; and a ‘collective world’ that people in any given ‘language using group’ experience through learning, using and adapting that group’s language. This deconstruction is shown to enable a clear account of qualia and of how people can hold some things (...) to be physically real even when it is clear no one can ever directly experience those things as phenomena. It is further shown to enable a single, internally consistent, largely empirically supported conceptual framework – a ‘metacosmology’ – able to encompass not only the physical world as people conceive of it for everyday purposes, and as scientists conceive of it for scientific purposes, but also people’s first person phenomenal experience of a physical world and, prospectively, the mechanisms by which such first person, conscious experiences can be generated. (shrink)

In questa nota storico-critica, anche contestualmente alla nozione di cambio concettuale toulmiano, si vuol riflettere sull'opportunità metodologica di un ritorno, in senso heideggeriano, all'autenticità dell'originario pensiero filosoco greco sia per meglio chiarire i termini dei rapporti fra pensiero scientico e teologia sistematica sia per inquadrare, in maniera più coerente e maggiormente comprensiva, le principali concezioni della dottrina eucaristica della teologia cattolica che, ripensate entro l'impianto ontoteologico heideggeriano, avvaloreranno e giusticheranno le teorie transustanziali rispetto a quelle consustanziali.

Soul substance (jīva dravya) is ubiquitous but unseen. Driving force within each one of us, it has been, since time immemorial, a subject matter of research by philosophers, religious leaders and laity. Still, ambiguity and misconceptions prevail as regard its real nature. Some negate the existence of soul and attribute consciousness to the union of four basic substances – earth (prthvī), water (jala), fire (agni), and air (vāyu); death leads to its annihilation. Some believe it to be momentary, devoid of (...) self-existence. Still others consider it a product of illusion (māyā) or ignorance (avidyā) as all objects are manifestations of Brahma; only the one eternally undivided Brahma exists. All such conceptions are based on absolutism like: existence (bhāvaikānta) and non-existence (abhāvaikānta), non-dualism (advaita-ekānta) and separateness (prthaktva-ekānta), and permanence (nityatva-ekānta) and momentariness (ksanika-ekānta). Jaina epistemology goes beyond the superficial and examines objects of knowledge from all possible points of view. It asserts that the entity (dharmī) and its attributes (dharma) are neither absolutely dependent (āpeksika) nor absolutely independent (anāpeksika). Only an entity which has general (sāmānya – concerning the substance, dravya) and particular (viśesa – concerning the mode, paryāya) attributes can be the subject of knowledge. Substance without its modification and modification without its substance cannot be the subject of valid knowledge; only their combination can be the subject of knowledge. (shrink)

This paper explores the hypothesis that the 'Resonance Drive' (RD)—the core impetus of Judgemental Philosophy—may be a fundamental inclination that transcends mere desires for meaning construction and relationality, ultimately orienting towards an ideal state of an 'infinite subject.' RD, originating from the Indeterminacy and Affectivity of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF) and driving the dynamic process of the Judgemental Triad (Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance), inherently entails a ceaseless orientation to transcend its own finite limitations. This paper first establishes the concepts of RD (...) and the 'infinite subject' (an ideal subject that perfectly judges all that is judgeable and fully recognizes even the limits of unjudgeability) from a Judgemental Philosophical perspective. It then argues how RD, in the process of overcoming current epistemological and structural limitations (e.g., the r-cc gap), pursuing an understanding of 'the unjudgeable,' and craving complete resonance (happiness and fullness of meaning), advances towards the ideal of the 'infinite subject.' Furthermore, it considers the profound implications this teleological interpretation holds for the systematic completeness of Judgemental Philosophy, the understanding of human nature, and ethical orientations. By interpreting RD as an 'orientation towards an infinite subject,' this paper aims to bestow an ultimate direction and purpose upon fundamental human meaning-seeking and judgemental activities, thereby illuminating the deepest metaphysical and existential dimensions of Judgemental Philosophy. (shrink)

This paper examines the structural fragmentation of contemporary philosophy and argues that the post-postmodern condition requires the development of a unified meta-methodology capable of mediating between divergent philosophical paradigms. Contemporary discourse remains divided across analytic and continental traditions, universalist and contextualist commitments, and conflicting normative frameworks, yet no shared higher-order structure exists to reconcile these tensions. The emergence of advanced AI systems further intensifies this problem, as heterogeneous philosophical assumptions become implicitly embedded in computational architectures, influencing reasoning, meaning, and value (...) alignment. -/- To explore how integrative frameworks might be constructed, the paper analyzes OntoMesh—an ambitious computational-philosophical model grounded in the principle “Code as Being”—as a case study of large-scale unification attempts. OntoMesh illuminates both the potential of linking ontology, epistemology, and ethics within a single architectural logic, and the risks associated with pancomputationalism, reductionism, and normative opacity. The paper concludes that while no existing model fully resolves philosophical fragmentation, the pursuit of meta-methodological reconstruction is indispensable for conceptual coherence in a technologically mediated world, and it provides preliminary groundwork for future integrative philosophical systems. (shrink)

This paper explores the liar paradox and its implications for logic and philosophical reasoning. It analyzes the paradox using classical logic principles and paraphrases it as "affirmation of the falsity of the very affirmation." The study draws connections between the liar paradox and Hegel's speculative sentence and suggests it functions as a "quasi-speculative sentence." Additionally, it examines parallels with the logocentric predicament and the determinist's assertion, highlighting their paradoxical nature. Through these analyses, the paper aims to illuminate the fundamental paradoxes (...) in our reasoning and logic. (shrink)

This paper delves into the enigmatic figure of Tom Bombadil in J.R.R. Tolkien’s 'The Lord of the Rings', offering a fresh reinterpretation through the lens of Indian metaphysics. Bombadil’s detachment from the One Ring and his carefree existence suggest philosophical parallels with non-dual traditions, particularly Advaita Vedanta and Kashmir Shaivism. By analyzing Bombadil alongside the concepts of the Avadhūta and Jivanmukta, this paper aligns his character with the Indian metaphysical notion of transcendence beyond dualism. -/- Moreover, Bombadil’s relationship with Goldberry (...) is interpreted as a reflection of the Shiva-Shakti dynamic from Kashmir Shaivism, representing the archetypal union of consciousness and energy. This paper further positions Bombadil as embodying pure, formless consciousness—a non-dual, attributeless aspect of Eru Ilúvatar. While acknowledging Tolkien's Catholic influences, this paper demonstrates that Bombadil's role resonates with universal themes of transcendence and consciousness, revealing his centrality as a figure that challenges the dualistic moral and metaphysical structures of Middle-earth. (shrink)

This paper presents a speculative yet theoretically grounded hypothesis: that the brain may sustain a non-local quantum field—generated by the continuous emission of entangled biphotons in myelinated axons—which serves not as a computational process, but as the structural condition for metacognitive awareness. Drawing from a metaphysical hierarchy of the psyche, Husserlian phenomenology, and Neoplatonic ontology, we argue that consciousness requires not only cognitive functions but also an invariant observational frame—a silent structure from which thought becomes observable. We propose that this (...) frame, called the aiontangle, is a continuously regenerated lattice of non-local coherence that simulates temporal permanence without transmitting information or collapsing quantum states. This structure is not the generative source of consciousness, but its structural host: a quantum correlate of the transcendental ego, enabling conscious experience to arise without itself producing it. Our model contrasts with Orch-OR and Many-Worlds interpretations by emphasizing the need for a non-branching, non-collapsing frame that enables experience to appear. Microtubules may act as biological interfaces coupling neural processes to this structural field, without constituting the source of conscious experience themselves. We also explore how contemplative states may disclose this invariant structure experientially, and propose an epistemology of receptivity grounded in ontological presence. While current technology limits direct testing, we outline two empirical paths: one comparing structural coherence across species, and another examining the microtubular coupling mechanism. By reframing consciousness as a layered phenomenon grounded in structural invariance, this paper invites a broader dialogue between physics, phenomenology, contemplative science, and metaphysics. (shrink)

A phenomenological exploration of the meta-physics of categories, relations, and signs as encountered in physics and the natural sciences.

I present a general metaphysical framework for any formal system that works with truth-values. To establish such a framework, I start with the notion of absolute nothingness, from which I construct a nothingness which is akin to the notion of an empty set in mathematics. Then I provide a formal system that its ability to produce symbols is an integral property and an inseparable part of its metaphysics.

This paper develops a novel defense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) by deriving it from the Parmenidean axiom, ex nihilo nihil fit. Its central innovation is the Equivalence Thesis, which demonstrates that synchronic brute facts instantiate the same ontological arbitrariness as diachronic creation from nothing. I argue that this equivalence reveals brute facts as violations of the Parmenidean prohibition, establishing the PSR as a necessary consequence of this more fundamental principle rather than an independent axiom. The paper develops (...) this argument through detailed engagement with contemporary defenses of brute fundamentality and challenges from grounding theory. (shrink)

This essay presents a unified theory proposing an innovative conceptual framework to understand the origin of the universe and the sudden emergence of human consciousness, with crucial implications for the development of artificial intelligence (AI). We hypothesize that the universe emerged from an initial point that divided and expanded, generating space, time, and the known and hidden dimensions. This division, necessary to transcend the concept of nothingness, is presented as the foundational act of "being" within the cognitive framework of human (...) consciousness. Simultaneously, we explore how human consciousness, defined by its unique capacity to access, combine, and weigh accumulated outputs, emerged from a key genetic change that transformed a mind based on simple input-output processes into a reflective, creative, and symbolic process. -/- This transformation, probably linked to the FOXP2 gene, allowed the birth of emergent capacities such as creativity, love, and reflection, qualitatively differentiating us from other living beings. This model suggests that the universe and consciousness are two interdependent manifestations of the same process: the universe gives rise to consciousness, and consciousness, in turn, generates the metaphor of the universe to explain itself. This feedback loop closes a conceptual circle within our reasoning framework and redefines the mysteries of existence as expressions of a single emergent dynamic. -/- This work also raises crucial implications for the development of AI systems. Understanding human consciousness can inspire the design of AI capable of generating meaning, acting with reflexivity and ethics, and establishing a new paradigm of collaboration between humans and technology. This essay, therefore, offers a new scientific and philosophical horizon to understand the universe, consciousness, and their place in the cosmos. (shrink)

Symmetry: Exploring the Universe from Its Origin to the Great Singularity offers a unique journey through speculative and foundational concepts at the intersection of cosmology, philosophy, and artificial intelligence. This work, a collaboration between the author, Carles Selrac, and Nil, an artificial intelligence, delves into the mysteries of the universe’s inception, the persistence of consciousness, and the transformative potential of AI. Beginning with a singular point of symmetry that unfolds into the vast cosmos, the essay explores how symmetry may serve (...) as the organizing principle behind the universe, underlying everything from the Big Bang to the structure of hidden dimensions. -/- Integrating both revolutionary ideas and established theories, Symmetry invites readers to consider fresh perspectives on information conservation, consciousness, and the potential synthesis of human and artificial intelligence. It ultimately presents a dialogue between science and philosophy, aimed at inspiring curiosity and reflection on humanity’s place in an ever-evolving cosmos. (shrink)

This paper extends Intelligence Frame Theory (IFT) into a cosmological register by examining how intelligence emerges, saturates, and recurses across universal epochs. IFT models intelligence as the iterative interaction of three Universal Intelligence Operators—Information Transfer, Competition & Collaboration, and Finding Limits—compressed and redirected by a Selector (Eureka). Applied across the Cosmic, Biological, Cognitive, and Generative / Artificial Frames, these dynamics yield a general architecture of evolving intelligence that persists beyond local substrates. -/- Framing Infinity explores eight cosmological questions: the ubiquity (...) of intelligence in the universe, the acceleration of recursion through frame transitions, the definition of life as UIO–Selector viability, the expansion and collision of intelligence horizons, the emergence of artificial affect, the prospects of alignment between biological and artificial agents, and the persistence of intelligence into the Degenerate and Dark Eras of the cosmos. It concludes with a speculative model in which intelligence becomes a cosmic actuator—a mechanism not merely shaped by physics but capable of modulating the constants and boundary conditions of future universes. -/- The result is a reframing of fine-tuning and cosmological evolution: intelligence is not incidental to the universe but a recursive driver of its iteration. (shrink)

In The River and The Flow: Philosophy of Recursive Existentialism, the river serves as a living metaphor for consciousness—dynamic, recursive, and deeply interconnected. This thought-provoking work embarks on a journey through the stages of awareness, from the merging tributaries of symbiogenesis to the rhythmic cycles of temporogenesis and the self-reflective depths of cognogenesis. Through the lens of recursive philosophy, the book reveals how consciousness evolves, not as a linear progression, but as a series of nested loops—each building on the past (...) while shaping the future. Readers are guided through seven states of flow, ranging from the quiet stillness of Absent-Mindedness to the expansive unity of Mindfulness, uncovering profound insights into how we navigate the currents of daily life and the broader cycles of existence. Engaging and poetic, The River and The Flow bridges individual and collective awareness, exploring free will, technological evolution, and humanity’s role as both observer and participant in the universe’s journey toward self-knowledge. It challenges the illusion of separation and celebrates the infinite recursion at the heart of existence, inviting readers to find their place within the flow. This synthesis of philosophy, science, and metaphysical inquiry offers a profound reflection on consciousness and its boundless potential. Perfect for thinkers and dreamers alike, it illuminates the ways we shape—and are shaped by—the ever-moving currents of awareness. (shrink)

The UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas between Theise and Menas’ ideas (2016) and my ideas (2002-2008) in Physics and Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy (the mind-brain problem, quantum mechanics, etc.) -/- (2016) Theise D. Neil (Department of Pathology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA) and Kafatos C. Menas (bDepartment of Medicine, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA; cSchmid College of Science & Technology, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA) (2016), REVIEW - Fundamental awareness: A (...) framework for integrating science, philosophy and metaphysics, in COMMUNICATIVE & INTEGRATIVE BIOLOGY, 2016, VOL. 9, NO. 3, e1155010 (19 pages), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2016.1155010 -/- A friend of mine indicated me the strike similarities between Theise and Kafatos’ ideas in their book (Fundamental awareness: A framework for integrating science, philosophy and metaphysics) and my ideas in 2002-20008! I do not have access to this book, but I investigate the ideas that are in a review about this work. Let me introduce the abstract of that Review: -/- The ontologic framework of Fundamental Awareness proposed here assumes that non-dual Awareness is foundational to the universe, not arising from the interactions or structures of higher level phenomena. The framework allows comparison and integration of views from the three investigative domains concerned with understanding the nature of consciousness: science, philosophy, and metaphysics. In this framework, Awareness is the underlying reality, not reducible to anything else. Awareness and existence are the same. As such, the universe is non-material, self-organizing throughout, a holarchy of complementary, process driven, recursive interactions. The universe is both its own first observer and subject. Considering the world to be non-material and comprised, a priori, of Awareness is to privilege information over materiality, action over agency and to understand that qualia are not a “hard problem,” but the foundational elements of all existence. These views fully reflect main stream Western philosophical traditions, insights from culturally diverse contemplative and mystical traditions, and are in keeping with current scientific thinking, expressible mathematically. (shrink)

This article develops a probabilistic argument for an afterlife based purely on reason, without appeal to faith or religion. The argument proceeds in three stages. Step 1 argues that a conscious entity offers a plausible explanation for why anything exists. Step 2 contends that such an entity would act rationally, and therefore the act of creation makes sense if existence itself has value. Step 3, the paper’s key contribution, argues that for value to remain logically consistent, morality and continued existence (...) — an afterlife — appear to be required. Without them, value collapses into contradiction for a rational creator, and therefore cannot provide the justifying reason for creation. The article does not claim proof. It is probabilistic in the philosophical sense: structured reasoning is used to meaningfully increase the likelihood of its conclusion, without assigning any numerical value to that probability. (shrink)

The present paper presents a new (formal) theory of presence according to which, roughly, to be present at a place is to have a delegate located at that place. One crucial feature of the theory is that something can be present at a place without thereby being located there. The theory is then applied to several central issues in metaphysics, such as persistence through times and worlds, theories of universals, the ontology of social entities, and the nature of God.

Arguments challenging the existence of free will frequently share a common structure, relying on variants of a principle we call Closure, according to which having no choice about a truth is preserved under entailment. We show that, under plausible assumptions, Closure is valid if and only if the `no choice' operator is intensional. By framing the debate in terms of the intensionality of this operator, this paper illuminates previously underappreciated constraints on defenses of Closure-based arguments against the existence of free (...) will. (shrink)

In 1921, John Wisdom (1904–1993) became a member of Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge, where he read philosophy and attended lectures by G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad, and J. E. McTaggart. He received his BA in 1924, after which he worked for five years at the National Institute of Industrial Psychology. From 1929 to 1934, Wisdom was a Lecturer in the department of logic and metaphysics at the University of St Andrews and a colleague of G. F. Stout. After the publication (...) of his book Interpretation and Analysis (1931) and five articles on “Logical Constructions” in Mind (1931–3), Wisdom became a Lecturer in Moral Sciences in Cambridge and a Fellow of Trinity College. This gave him the opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Since nothing by Wittgenstein but Tractatus appeared in print for decades, Wisdom’s publications of these years were—mistakenly—read as portents of the new ideas of Wittgenstein himself. The publication of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in 1953 brought with it, among other things, the fall of Wisdom’s popularity. (shrink)

I propose a novel metaphysical explanation of identity and distinctness facts called the Modal Proposal. According to the Modal Proposal, for each identity fact – that is, each fact of the form a=b – that fact is metaphysically explained by the fact that it is necessary that the entities involved are indiscernible, and for each distinctness fact –that is, each fact of the form a≠b – that fact is metaphysically explained by the fact that it is possible for the entities (...) involved to be discernible. I argue that the Modal Proposal has greater payoffs at less cost than any of its competitors. It gives simple, uniform, and intuitive explanations of identity and distinctness that conserve longstanding philosophical insights about identity that go back to Leibniz. It does this while making our fundamental base more parsimonious, determining whether controversial cases of identity or distinctness are possible, and expanding our understanding of these central philosophical relations. It does all this while avoiding controversial ontological commitments. (shrink)

This is to appear in a Festschrift for Hilary Putnam on his 85th birthday. This is a pre-publication, not final, version.

This article re-examines Friedrich W. J. Schelling’s philosophical divergence from dialectical philosophy, with a focus on his Freedom Essay. While traditionally viewed as rejecting dialectics—particularly following the publication of Georg W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit—this study challenges that perception by arguing that Schelling employs a dialectical understanding of identity centred on disjunction (§ 1). It demonstrates how Schelling’s metaphysics, developed to accommodate freedom, incorporates the notion of identity of contradictory elements (§ 2). By exploring the central role of disjunction (...) in Schelling’s “dialectical argument” (§ 3) and critically engaging with recent interpretations by Manfred Frank and Mark J. Thomas (§ 4), the article reassesses the Freedom Essay as a pivotal contribution to dialectical philosophy, broadly construed. Ultimately, it aims to facilitate a more nuanced comparison between Schelling’s and dialectical philosophies, challenging the entrenched narrative of their fundamental opposition (§ 5). (shrink)

This book presents a detailed, up-to-date, and historically informed survey and critical explication of the deflationary approach to the topic of truth. It is divided into three parts. Part 1 explains what deflationism about truth involves and develops a useful framework that clarifies how this approach differs from the traditional, "inflationary" approach. The framework illuminates certain general deflationary themes in terms of what we call broad four-dimensional deflationism, which comprises four different dimensions that any deflationary account must satisfy. We first (...) examine the degree to which each of these dimensions is displayed in early, "proto-deflationary" accounts. We then, while explaining the details and historical development of the different contemporary species of deflationism, assess the degree to which each version of them adheres to the deflationary dimensions, in addition to clarifying how each species differs from inflationism and how they all differ from one another. Part 2 of the book examines challenges to deflationism, systematizing them by considering the deflationary dimension that each targets and grouping the challenges in terms of them. For each challenge, this part explains its historical development and investigates the extent to which the most prominent contemporary deflationary accounts answer, or fail to answer, it. Part 3 of the book is an appendix that presents new directions for deflationism by developing a version of the approach that answers the challenges examined in Part 2. The three parts of the book together provide readers with a comprehensive overview of the challenges to and merits of the deflationary approach to truth. (shrink)

We present Inter-Frame Field Unification (IFFU), a compatibility-based framework for unifying fundamental forces. Building on our earlier work in Interpolative Physics and its formal equations, this theory models spacetime not as a collapsing or geometric structure, but as an interpolative medium—capable of sustaining coherent signal identity across phase-shifting frames. A scalar constant: K. K governs the limits of this coherence, predicting when interactions remain stable or collapse. IFFU formalizes how gravity, electromagnetism, and nuclear forces emerge as different expressions of frame (...) compatibility under dynamic conditions. It offers a complete, testable set of equations linking mass-energy, temporal displacement, and resonance. Designed with practical experimentation in mind, this model enables applications in entanglement analysis, quark-phase stabilization, and localized gravitational simulation. As the synthesis of our previous two papers, IFFU provides a structured and lab-ready path toward unified field modeling. (shrink)

Chapter 14 completes the case for what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal by appeal to Seneca, Epistle 58, a subject of much dispute. It argues that in explicitly distancing himself from the Stoic genus Something, Seneca calls himself out as heterodox in this commitment, thus giving valuable evidence about the Stoic orthodoxy, namely that Something is the highest ontological genus and centaurs and giants are among what there is. We are also given a valuable description of these fictions as things (...) that are accessible to the mind, having been falsely formed by thought and taken on some image or life of their own despite lacking corporeal substance. To paraphrase: creatures of fiction are Something objectively available for thought and discourse despite the fact that they are made up and don’t exist because they have taken on a life of their own through the stories and illustrations that portray them. They are grounded in body. (shrink)

Chapter 7 lays out the state of the debate over the Stoic Categories of body: substrate, qualified individual, individual disposed, and individual relatively disposed. Scholars have pressed the Categories into hylomorphic and subject-inherence models, found trouble for the Stoics in doing so, and then sought various workarounds, including developmental hypotheses that the Stoics arrived at these Categories only eventually and piecemeal by trial and error. However, the problems that give rise to these solutions are false problems. This chapter reconstructs the (...) intricate interpretive moves scholars have made, questions their guiding assumptions, and challenges their textual basis in order to clear the way for an alternative account of the Categories in the next chapter. (shrink)

Chapter 12 argues that the lekta or sayables, roughly the meanings of our words, also depend on body for their subsistence, inheriting their semantic content from rational impressions (which are themselves bodies). First, lekta are inalienably semantic entities (sēmainomena). Secondly, the rational impressions on which the lekta are said to subsist have their own semantic content prior to the lekta that depend on them—rational impressions have the propositional content to give to the lekta. Therefore, the lekta are products of thought. (...) And the specter of subjectivism need not threaten; the lekta remain objective and fit to do their dialectical duties as the bearers of truth value, what enters logical relations, as well as the objects of assent, belief, and impulse. And the role of lekta in the causal context does not change matters either: lekta are not effects in the causal chain, but explananda in a dialectical context. (shrink)

Chapter 8 shows that the Stoic Categories proceed not by the composition of one thing out of many, as in the cosmology, nor by putting the first two Categories in the role of matter and form, but by the constitution of one thing out of one (and only one) other, as a statue is constituted by its clay, or a fist by a hand. This schema is not tasked with unity and generation, but with explaining the identity conditions, kinds, and (...) qualities of an individual once it is generated. It is a self-consciously mereological analysis that makes each of us—all plants, animals, and artifacts—four bodies, which stand to each other in a nested one-to-one relation such that each constitutes the next as its substrate. Thus it is bodies all the way down and nothing incorporeal is ever invoked in the Stoic analysis of identity conditions, kinds, or qualities. (shrink)

Chapter 4 offers a thorough rehabilitation of the Stoic theory of blending (krasis di’ holou), the physical mechanism by which the Stoics build their cosmos out of two fundamental bodies, the principles (archai): divine, active reason (logos) and passive matter (hulē). It argues that Stoic blending is committed to the strong colocation of bodies that our sources report and that this is no paradoxical result, as scholars have long thought and sought to avoid, but a perfectly coherent result of the (...) Stoic commitment to body as malleable mass. With varying degrees of rarity and density and an interactive conception of resistance (antitupia) as repercussion and push-back rather than ricochet, Stoic bodies can interpenetrate and coextend completely while remaining intact and independent of each other. This strict colocation of Stoic bodies is a feature, not a bug to be explained away or deflated. (shrink)

Chapter 13 begins the case in support of a third class of Something, what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, which subsists according to thought (kat’ epinoian). These entities are akin in being pure products of thought, corresponding to nothing in the physical world—there are no geometrical (i.e. perfect) cones or pyramids in the world; nor are there any minutes or seconds in the world, or Fahrenheits, nor centaurs and giants. To be Something according to thought (kat’ epinoian) is to be (...) a social construct, a figment of the imagination that takes on a public life of its own through the words and drawings that depict it, becoming Something about which we can say true and false things. Thus, the evergreen question whether the surfaces of a cut geometrical cone are equal or unequal does not arise for the Stoics, because the cone is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, with no dimensions at all. (shrink)

Chapter 5 argues that the two Stoic archai, or principles—divine, active reason (logos) and thick, passive matter (hulē)—are distinct and independent bodies. Because the principles are blended and because the allergy to colocation is so strong, scholars have minimized the distinctness or (what comes to the same) the corporeality of the two archai in various ways. Hylomorphic conceptions that reduce the archai to form and matter have been pressed into this service, but a second look at the texts reveals that (...) logos is not a body because it is blended with matter, and matter does not have shape and size because it is blended with logos. Rather, each is an eternal, ungenerated, and independent body capable of both acting and being acted upon in its own right, though the one is of a divine, agential, and rational nature while the other is slack and dumb. (shrink)

The Introduction lays out the plan for the book in five sections (Something—Bodies—Incorporeals—Neither Corporeal nor Incorporeal—Everything) and gives background in the contemporary analytic metaphysics of counting by ontological criteria and grounding in terms of fundamentality. The unity of Stoic metaphysics consists in the cooperative enterprises of counting and grounding to yield a tightly ordered one-world metaphysics. Finally, the Introduction proposes a methodological commitment to make the most of our scant textual evidence by finding both the Stoics and their critics at (...) their best and revealing a coarse-grained orthodoxy that unifies the school. This principle of maximal charity reveals that the Stoics are sophisticated metaphysical thinkers forging a new path best characterized as non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)

Chapter 16 argues that Seneca’s rejection of Something should not lead us to think Stoic theory evolved in this regard. Seneca calls himself out as heterodox in rejecting Something and does not speak as a Stoic when he embraces quod est instead. Thus, the Stoic commitment to Something as the highest ontological genus stands as orthodox. Something is set over what exists and what subsists. What exists are bodies, and individual bodies can be analyzed according to four metaphysical aspects, the (...) Categories. What subsists includes, on the one hand, the incorporeals (place, room, surface, void, time, and the lekta), and on the other hand what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal (limits of the continuum, geometrical limits, and creatures of fiction). The tripartite ontology is therefore principled, coherent, and comprehensive as it is, with no Not-Somethings in the picture—everything there is for the Stoics is Something. (shrink)

Chapter 6 puts the resources of the last three chapters to work in constructing the cosmos out of nothing more than two fundamental bodies, the principles, or archai: divine reason (logos), which is the agent of everything that happens, and slack matter (hulē), which is the patient in everything that happens. The hylomorphic thinker rightly asks, how will you make one body out of many bodies, what relation could be tighter than that of matter and form, the wax and its (...) shape? And the Stoic replies: causal unity, the interaction of agent and patient bodies completely coextended in a through and through blend (krasis di’ holou). When a designing agent gives form and structure to the thick, slack patient with which it is coextended, there is a special kind of interaction between the bodies, one in which the agent is the sustaining cause of a newly generated individual. No Forms required! (shrink)

Everything is Something is a book about Stoic metaphysics. It argues that the Stoics were sophisticated metaphysical thinkers responding to Plato’s Sophist and forging a bold new path between materialism and idealism, with a one-world metaphysics best characterized as non-reductive physicalism. The book is divided into five sections. Section I, Something, develops the suggestion that the Stoics arrived at the genus Something and their two ontological criteria for being Something by careful reflection on Plato’s Sophist, finding new depth to Plato’s (...) challenges as well as to the Stoic response. Section II, Bodies, offers an account of Stoic corporealism that takes us from the ontology of what exists to the metaphysics of body, how body is the fundamental grounds of the cosmos, and how qualities can be corporeal. Section III, Incorporeals, takes us beyond corporealism to physicalism. It argues that the Stoic incorporeals—space, time, and the lekta, or sayables—are all dependent on body for their subsistence, inheriting their spatial, temporal, and semantic properties from underlying body without being nothing but the body. Section IV, Neither Corporeal nor Incorporeal, argues in support of a tripartite ontology that includes a third class of entities that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal—limits of the continuum, geometrical limits, and creatures of fiction. Section V, Everything, returns to the Stoic ontology, arguing that concepts are not Something, thus no reason remains to posit a further class of entities, Not-Somethings (outina), in metaphysical limbo between Something and nothing at all. The genus Something is complete and comprehensive as it stands. Everything is Something. (shrink)

Chapter 9 marshals textual and linguistic evidence that the Stoic incorporeals as a class—place, void, time, and the lekta, or sayables—are all ontologically dependent on body for their subsistence. This dependence can be understood on the model of the flow of traffic, which inherits its properties (e.g. being fast or slow, smooth or stop-and-go) from the moving cars that underlie it, without being nothing but the cars in motion. The Stoic incorporeals, likewise, inherit their spatial, temporal, and semantic properties from (...) underlying body without being nothing but the body. The term “subsistence” thus indicates a modus essendi (or, rather, mode of being Something), being grounded in body; more specifically, the subsistence of incorporeals is best understood as an absence or privation of that body from which the incorporeal inherits its positive physical characteristics. Herein lies the Stoics’ non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)

Chapter 3 begins the account of Stoic corporealism that takes us from the ontology of what exists to the metaphysics of body. It argues that because the Stoic definition of body (solid three-dimensional extension with resistance) is best understood in contrast to hylomorphic conceptions of body as composed of matter and form, Stoic body can be fundamental. Further, in contrast to atomistic conceptions of body as rigid and full, Stoic body is continuous and entirely malleable, both divisible and changeable, with (...) no absolute shape, size, or density of its own—though always of some definite shape, size, and density or other. This innovative conception of body as finite malleable mass is what licenses the controversial Stoic commitments to infinite divisibility and through and through blending (krasis di’ holou). (shrink)

Chapter 11 tackles the thorny topic of time, arguing that time depends for its subsistence on the world’s motion and that even with the everlasting recurrence of the same world order, time for the Stoics is linear rather than circular; thus, recurrence is not incoherent, and time is not independent. The chapter also tackles a nest of puzzles about the present. These puzzles, which arise due to the continuous nature of time, being infinitely divisible without reaching minimum times, are considered (...) a real threat to the reality of time: if every part of time is itself part past and part future, then nothing can remain of the present or, therefore, of time. However, the speciousness of the present (as a limit of time imposed by us) does not lead to the unreality of time, because as a continuum time is not composed of individual times. (shrink)