Properties

The metaphysics of science often contrasts the biological with the social and presents the biological as a domain marked by determinism and essentialism. Although the biology-social construction dichotomy has made it possible to denounce abuses due to harmful categorizations legitimized and based on a false biological essentialism, the metaphysics of social construction runs the risk of trivializing and dematerializing biology. This article seeks to demonstrate that contemporary biology cannot be justified in sustaining deterministic or essentialist discourses because of its complexity, (...) which can be understood in the form of inherent relational properties of living beings. -/- En la metafísica de la ciencia a menudo se contrapone lo biológico con lo social y se presenta lo biológico como un dominio marcado por el determinismo y el esencialismo. Aunque la dicotomía biología-construcción social ha permitido denunciar abusos debidos a categorizaciones dañinas legitimadas en base a un falso esencialismo biológico, la metafísica de la construcción social corre el riesgo de trivializar y desmaterializar la biología. En este artículo se busca demostrar que no puede justificarse que la biología contemporánea sustente discursos deterministas o esencialistas debido a su complejidad, que puede entenderse en forma de propiedades inherentes relacionales de los seres vivos. (shrink)

This textbook is an accessible, readable, and comprehensive introduction to contemporary analytic metaphysics. It covers all the main topics, including those that are at the forefront of the most recent research. It begins by explaining what metaphysics is and introduces the most important conceptual devices needed to understand and appreciate the ongoing debates. The text follows with core metaphysical questions, such as properties, time, identity, mereology, and modality. It concludes with more specific domains of application, in which the previously introduced (...) concepts are put to work. The contents are organized in self-contained chapters, each of which starts with a stimulating short story, which is further articulated and closes with a summary of the main points, questions for further reflection, and reading suggestions. This textbook is perfect for teaching a basic but comprehensive course in metaphysics for undergraduate students. (shrink)

This version of Colour Dynamism argues a structured chromatic ontology grounded in latent material potential. It presents a working formulation of colour as a condition-sensitive, materially embedded field of chromatic potentials whose manifestation is governed by constraint dynamics. -/- This release serves to establish a public authorship record and conceptual lineage for the SNAP architecture (Structured Network for Activation of Potentials). It is issued as a working draft, not as a finalized publication. This preprint is not peer-reviewed and is not (...) intended to function as a finished scholarly product; it provides a timestamped reference documenting theoretical origin. (shrink)

This paper defends Gödel’s axiom that necessary existence is a positive property by grounding it in the classical doctrine of evil as privation and in a modal-ontological analysis of perfection. Drawing on Augustine’s conception of evil as the absence of good and Aquinas’s account of the Necessary Being, the argument shows that privation can only be intelligible if the corresponding perfection exists—or has existed—in every possible world. From this, it follows that necessity always points toward the good, remaining untouched by (...) any form of deprivation. Necessity therefore emerges as the supreme positive property and the highest mode of being. Rather than beginning with the premise that “God is possible,” the argument starts from the metaphysical fact that necessity itself exists in all possible worlds and must be instantiated by a being. As necessity functions as an ontological compass directing all perfections toward their maximal expression, the entity bearing necessary existence is thereby identified as the Supreme Being. Thus, necessary existence alone is sufficient to characterize God as the Supreme Being. (shrink)

This thesis is about the structure and unity of atomic Fregean Thoughts as abstract structured entities which are the meanings and the primary truth-bearers of sentences as well as the objects of attitudes. We explicate Frege’s theory of Thoughts to argue that it is the most adequate semantic theory for explaining the meaning and truth of natural language expressions. However, there are certain problems concerning the structure and unity of Fregean Thoughts. Our initial conjecture is that Frege’s theory is incomplete (...) in the sense of being vulnerable to certain puzzles and paradoxes, hence the problems concerning the structure and unity of atomic Thoughts demonstrate the apparent need of certain interpretations and supplementations to Frege’s semantic framework. For the problems concerning the structure, we focus on the apparent tension between the Context Principle and the Compositionality Principles, and Frege’s conflicting theses regarding the structural analysis and decomposition of Thoughts. For the problems concerning the unity, we deal with a unique problem, namely the concept horse paradox. In this thesis, we present our emendatory framework to interpret the sense and denotation functions as lambda-abstracts and provide our solution to the paradox. We claim that a grammatical subject, i.e., the concept horse, can denote a concept occurring in a context in which it is mentioned. Hence, the occurrence of the concept horse denotes an unsaturated concept. To conclude, we provide a satisfactory semantic theory of Thoughts and preserve the nature of Fregean intuitions about the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Social metaphysics raises intriguing questions about realism and antirealism. I focus on properties because other social entities arguably involve the instantiation of socially constructed properties, properties are relevant to discussions of causation, and their reality may have implications for the reality of other social entities. I delineate a possible distinction between socially constructed, social, and nonsocial properties. I outline and then resist recent attempts to revise the criteria for realism and antirealism about such properties, specifically about the mind‐independence criterion for (...) existence, relative frame manipulability, and kind projectibility. Instead, I propose that realism and antirealism about socially constructed properties should be understood in terms of the existence of socially constructed universals or tropes. If we accept this alignment, we can draw on the traditional arguments for and against the existence of specific kinds of properties within a given domain, without having to revise the conditions for realism that we have traditionally relied on. (shrink)

Contemporary debates about the metaphysics of material composition occur within the framework set by the Special Composition Question, as proposed famously by Peter van Inwagen. This question asks what one must do, what conditions must be satisfied, for some things to compose one object as proper parts. Hylomorphism is a theory that has regained prominence in contemporary metaphysics, explaining the unity of composite material objects by appealing to a special metaphysical part of those objects: structure or form. My book defends (...) hylomorphism as a meaningful and significant answer to questions about the composition of material objects. Specifically, I propose that, if it is false that substances can have other substances as parts, hylomorphism can be shown not only to be a plausible theory but that all consistent accounts of restricted composition can be shown to be hylomorphist. After introducing and summarizing the trajectory of the book, I turn to reviewing and responding to objections from my interlocutors for this symposium. (shrink)

This article proposes a reading of quantum metaphysical indeterminacy from the perspective of Parsons' Nuclear Meinongianism. In doing so, we identify a fundamental incompatibility between a key feature of Parsons' theory and standard quantum mechanics. Our approach interprets quantum indeterminacy as property incompleteness. However, this move, when combined with Parsons' framework, leads to what we term the ``Incompleteness-Entails-Nonexistence Principle'' (IENP), which implausibly entails the nonexistence of quantum objects. For Meinongianism to be a suitable tool for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, (...) this principle must be addressed. We argue for dropping the IENP and discuss the resulting metaphysical and metametaphysical consequences. (shrink)

This paper explores a metaphysical and scientific parallel between the Consciousness-Structured Field Theory (CSFT) and the observational history of black holes. Just as black holes were mathematically predicted before they were empirically confirmed, CSFT posits that consciousness lies beyond the Planck boundary, producing measurable ripples within the quantum field. The paper argues that consciousness, although inaccessible directly, may be inferred through its structuring influence on observable coherence, wave function collapse, and quantum excitation patterns. I propose a logical and experimental framework (...) to study these consequences within current physical constraints, demonstrating that consciousness, like the singularity, is a necessary precondition for the formation of measurable structure. (shrink)

Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic, by Robert Trueman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. xi + 227.

Dispositionalism is the view that it is possible that p iff sometimes, something has an iterated potentiality to be such that p. Recently a formidable challenge has been raised against it: the paradox of necessary perfect masks (Vetter & Busse 2022). A mask is perfect if it guarantees that, come what may, the manifestation will not come about as long as the mask is present, and it is necessary if it cannot be removed or destroyed. This generates a contradiction for (...) Dispositionalism. -/- In this paper, I offer a novel solution to the paradox, which I call the Degree Solution. As the name suggests, it is centred around the role that degrees of potentiality play in grounding modality. My strategy to dispel the paradox comprises of three steps. First, I will argue that degrees of potentialities play a role in grounding modal truths: only non-zero potentialities ground modal truths. Then, I will argue that that degree of potentialities are extrinsic second order properties of potentialities –– and, in particular, that they depend on the modal status of both their stimuli/disposition partners and masks. I will argue that necessary perfect masks reduce the degree of a potentiality to zero, thereby preventing them from grounding a modal truth and preventing the contradiction to arise. Thirdly, I argue that there are zero-degree potentialities, that they are not ad hoc and have genuine explanatory power. They offer the theory important expressive resources to make sense of our intuitions concerning cases of ‘impossible dispositions’ (Jenkins & Nolan 2013) and perhaps also the resources to account for the truth and falsity of some non-vacuous counter-possible and counter-nomic conditionals. Necessary perfect masks are not the ‘big bad bug’ of dispositionalism. On the contrary, taking them seriously leads us to discover new and welcome features of the theory. -/- . (shrink)

This paper reframes anomalous melting point drift in crystalline compounds as a manifestation of recursive phase alignment, challenging both conventional purification-based thermodynamics and morphic resonance speculation. Using the CODES framework, it proposes that melting point is not a fixed trait but a coherence plateau reflecting structured resonance evolution across synthesis cycles.

Nearly all properties are, to a certain extent, versatile: there are many different ways to instantiate them. Consider for example a light-blue scarf and a dark-blue gemstone. These two objects share the property of being blue, despite being different kinds of objects and differing in the way in which they are blue. Our key insight (‘Property Versatility’) is that this apparently mundane observation should be extended: many properties are considerably more versatile than theorists typically take them to be. This simple (...) insight turns out to be incredibly powerful in addressing a wide range of issues in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and beyond. One such issue is the classic problem of copredication. Copredication sentences such as ‘Lunch was delicious but took hours’ are common yet puzzling. These sentences can be true despite seemingly ascribing incompatible properties: it appears that only the food eaten can be delicious, and only the event attended take hours. This book offers a comprehensive discussion of the problem of copredication, including a critical evaluation of extant approaches to the problem. The discussion culminates with a defence of the Property Versatility approach to copredication. Appealing to the insight behind Property Versatility, we develop a simple yet empirically powerful approach to copredication. In addition, the book demonstrates how Property Versatility is a powerful tool in addressing a wide range of issues beyond copredication, including the semantics of generics, the metaphysics of establishments and repeatable artworks, fictional discourse, and the nature of ambiguity, as well as a host of others. (shrink)

This paper reframes chemistry through the lens of structured resonance, dissolving the legacy view of matter as particulate and stochastic. What has been modeled as electrons orbiting nuclei or bonds as spatial connectors is revealed instead to be nested patterns of chiral phase-locking—coherent oscillations anchored by prime-indexed field structures. Molecular identity is no longer defined by electron configurations but by stable interference geometries that preserve coherence across nested resonance layers. Electrons are not “things”—they are standing wave nodes in multi-scalar harmonic (...) lattices. Bonds are not forces—they are locked alignments between chiral phase shells. Reactivity is not a question of activation energy overcoming barriers, but of resonance misalignment and subsequent re-tuning. Covalent sharing, ionic exchange, hydrogen bonding—all are distinct expressions of coherence field coupling, not mechanical transfer. Entropy in chemical reactions is reframed as decoherence. Enthalpy is resonance density shift. Catalysts are not magical surface actors but chirality-realigning field guides. The Periodic Table itself, when viewed through CODES, reveals a previously unseen order: prime-spaced shells, chirality transitions, and resonance inflection points hidden within orbital archetypes. Chemistry becomes what it always was underneath: a tuning system for stable matter. (shrink)

By conducting a semantic analysis of the reference and meaning of concepts that correspond to properties, and assessing its metaphysical implications, I develop a new argument for theism. Theism is understood here as the thesis that a personal being is the ultimate origin and ground of reality. More specifically, I argue that there are no universally held positive contingent properties and that this absence significantly increases the likelihood of theism. By integrating semantic inquiry with metaphysical reasoning, this paper offers a (...) novel approach that contributes to ongoing debates in metaphysics and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This paper categorizes phenomena to derive inferences rather than determine reality, emphasizing a fundamental attribute of the observed world that shapes perception. It posits that early life forms relied on correlation—linking survival to pattern recognition—suggesting correlation precedes causation in cognitive development. The concept of continuity, particularly the persistence of consciousness, emerges as a central human motivator, surpassing procreation, power, or meaning. Pleasure and pain are tied to continuity, with pain arising as a reaction to threats against it, such as death. (...) The fear of death and feelings of unfairness, especially regarding an afterlife, are framed as misattributions of value, rooted in humanity's drive to persist. (shrink)

The question “What is it to be an artifact?” must be distinguished from the question “What is it to be an artifact of kind K?”. Failure to distinguish between these two questions leads to an exaggeration of the role of intentions in the philosophy of artifacts. We accept that intentions are necessary to define the category of artifacts, but we reject the view that intentions are constitutive of what makes something a specific kind of artifact. In the first part of (...) this paper, we discuss a series of cases involving what we call “faith-based artifacts” which often exhibit a social dimension. These cases, we argue, constitute counterexamples to the thesis that something is an artifact of a specific kind if it was produced with the intention that it be an object of that kind. In the second part of the paper, we explain how a capacity-based approach to artifacts, by contrast, can accommodate faith-based artifacts. In the last section, we address an objection to the capacity-based approach. (shrink)

This paper explores the distinction between active and passive powers. Interest in the distinction has recently been revived in some quarters of the philosophy of action as some have sought to elucidate the distinction between action and passion (the changes that happen to a substance) in terms of the former (Hyman, 2015; Mayr, 2011; Lowe 2013). If there is a distinction between active and passive powers, parallel to the distinction between action and passion, what is it? In this paper, I (...) distinguish two ways of drawing it. According to the first one, active and passive powers are distinguished by the ways in which their manifestations come about. According to the second, they are distinguished by their directedness, i.e. what they are powers to do. Both accounts are examined and the latter is defended against the former. I argue that active powers are powers to alter, modify, corrupt or change something. (shrink)

Filosofia plectica è una filosofia che pensa il rapporto che le cose, intese come entità complesse, intrattengono con l’intorno. È un’esigenza che nasce dal pensiero che le cose siano sempre un po’ intrecciate, non così semplici ma neanche così complesse. A partire dal rapporto con il mondo, animali, microbi, funghi, piante, foreste, pietre, cose, oggetti e materiali vengono visti come membri di un rapporto attivo con l’intorno attraverso la forma sinallagmatica di un mutuo scambio. Secondo questa proposta ogni ente è (...) un dimorante, accoglie e rilascia le tracce intense del suo esistere. -/- . (shrink)

Translation of the book "Metaphysik: Eine Einführung" by Christof Rapp published in C.H. Beck Verlag.

The idea that qualities can be had partly or to an intermediate degree is controversial among contemporary metaphysicians, but also has a considerable pedigree among philosophers and scientists. In this paper, we first aim to show that metaphysical sense can be made of this idea by proposing a partial taxonomy of metaphysical accounts of graded qualities, focusing on three particular approaches: one which explicates having a quality to a degree in terms of having a property with an in-built degree, another (...) based on the idea that instantiation admits of degrees, and a third which derives the degree to which a quality is had from the aspects of multi-dimensional properties. Our second aim is to demonstrate that the choice between these accounts can make a substantial metaphysical difference. To make this point, we rely on two case studies (involving quantum observables and values) in which we apply the accounts in order to model apparent cases of metaphysical gradedness. (shrink)

This paper defends the following principle: For any visually perceptible set of objects and any visual phenomenal character, there could be a veridical perception of exactly those objects with that character. This principle is rejected by almost all contemporary theories of perception, yet rarely addressed directly. Many have taken the apparent inconceivability of a certain sort of “shape inversion” — as compared to the more plausible, frequently discussed “color inversion” — as evidence that the spatial characters of our perceptions are (...) uniquely suited to and/or revelatory of the structure of their objects, such that alleged perceptions of those objects that differed radically in spatial character could not be veridical. I argue that these conclusions are unjustified: I claim that the difficulty involved in constructing coherent “shape inversion” scenarios is attributable to the complex relations among visual and tactile shape experiences, as opposed to relations between shape experiences and worldly shape properties. (shrink)

Super-Humeans argue that the most parsimonious ontology of the natural world compatible with our best physical theories consists exclusively of particles and the distance relations between them. This paper argues by contrast that Super-Humean reduction goes insufficiently far, by showing there to be a more parsimonious ontology compatible with physics: Ultimate-Humeanism. This novel view posits an ontology consisting solely of the particles and distance relations required for the existence of a single brain. Super-Humeans impose conditions on what counts as an (...) ontology of the natural world to avoid their view slipping into this kind of ontology, but these conditions are arbitrarily imposed and once this is exposed, Super-Humeans face a dilemma. Either they can embrace Ultimate-Humeanism as the minimal ontology of the natural world compatible with physics, or (more likely) they can rethink the methodology that got them there. Overall, this paper argues that Super-Humeanism currently lacks principled motivation, outlines a framework for naturalistic ontological reductions, and exposes the consequences of unchecked adherence to a simplicity-driven methodology. (shrink)

This book presents a novel metaphysics of concrete entities. The author uses the theory developed to address three major topics in the metaphysics of concreta: fundamentality, persistence over time, and phenomenal consciousness. The book provides a new theory of what "bundles" particular property instances, or tropes, into material property bearers. The theory is based on two new ideas. The first is that the primitive nature of one sui generis monadic property called markedness bears on the bundling of other properties' tropes. (...) The second idea is that the geometric and topological features of a given markedness trope help to determine which tropes it bundles. The author argues that this new markedness bundle theory determines all property co-instantiation at the levels of both type and token, positioning markedness tropes as the fundamental concreta. The theory also explains bundling across time, yielding an advantageous account of material persistence. Finally, markedness tropes operate as de facto panprotopsychist property instances: fundamental non-consciousness tropes that uniquely explain where and why consciousness properties are exemplified. The book solidifies the case for markedness through sustained critical analysis of competing theories of fundamentality and persistence, focusing in part on their inability to account for unending mereological and plural structures. Concrete Particulars will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Being able to apply grue-like predicates would allow one to instantly solve an infinite number of mysteries (historical, scientific, etc.). In this paper I’ll give three examples. It is still a mystery whether George Mallory and Andrew Irvine managed to reach the summit of Mount Everest in 1924. The predicate “greverest” applies to an object if either the object is green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not green and Mount Everest was not scaled in (...) 1924. The predicate “greverest” is interdefinable with the predicate “green”: the predicate "green" applies to an object if either the object is greverest and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not greverest and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. The predicate "non-greverest" applies to an object if either the object is non-green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is green and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. The predicate "non-green" applies to an object if either the object is non-greverest and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is greverest and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. We know that the famous diamond called Golden Jubilee is not green. If someone (a greverest-speaker) informed us that the Golden Jubilee diamond is greverest, we would automatically come to know Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. According to the definitions, a greverest object can only be either 1) green (in case Mount Everest was scaled in 1924), or 2) non-green (in case Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924). Since we know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not green, if we come to know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is also greverest, we would automatically know from the definition of “greverest” that we are faced with case 2, the case in which the object is both non-green and greverest, and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. Vice versa, if someone informed us that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not greverest, we would automatically come to know that Mount Everest was scaled in 1924. According to the definitions, a non-greverest object can only be either 1) non-green (in case Mount Everest was scaled in 1924), or 2) green (in the case Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924). Since we know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not green, if we come to know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is also non-greverest, we would automatically know from the definition of “non-greverest” that we are faced with case 1, the case in which the object is both non-green and non-greverest, and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924. At the moment no one has yet been able to convince the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether the Golden Jubilee diamond is greverest. I am skeptical that anyone will demonstrate to the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether a specific object is greverest; but I would be happy if someone could demonstrate to the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether an object is greverest: that would be a good news for historical studies. The paper continues with two examples, including an example about the predicate "grue". (shrink)

It is very natural to think that if two people, x and y, are qualitatively identical and have committed qualitatively identical actions, then it cannot be the case that one has committed something wrong whereas the other did not. That is to say, if x and y differ in their moral status, then it must be because x and y are qualitatively different, and not simply because x is identical to x and not identical to y. In this fictional dialogue (...) between Socrates and Cantor involving infinitely many qualitatively identical agents, this assumption is challenged. (shrink)

This paper responds to Friend’s (2023) critique of the Powers-BSA, a view according to which laws of nature are efficient descriptions of how modally laden properties (powers) are possibly distributed in spacetime. In the course of this response, the paper discusses the nature of scientific and metaphysical explanation, the aim of science and the structure of modal space.

In Francesco Berto’s words, the term “Serious Actualism” is used for the position “that any object must exist in every circumstance in which it has any property – the thesis that predication, or the having of properties as such, entails existence.” (“Modal Meinongianism and Fiction: The Best of Three Worlds”, Philosophical Studies 152, 2011, 324f.) Berto agrees with Nathan Salmon that Serious Actualism is “a confused and misguided prejudice” (Salmon, “Nonexistence”, Noûs 32, 1998, 290). The aim of this paper is (...) to defend the doctrine of Serious Actualism against this verdict. (shrink)

Philosophers often debate the existence of such things as numbers and propositions, and say that if these objects exist, they are abstract. But what does it mean to call something 'abstract'? And do we have good reason to believe in the existence of abstract objects? This Element addresses those questions, putting newcomers to these debates in a position to understand what they concern and what are the most influential considerations at work in this area of metaphysics. It also provides advice (...) on which lines of discussion promise to be the most fruitful. (shrink)

I discuss the foundations of predicate ontologies based on two model notions – elementary states of affairs and eventualities, i.e. ordered pairs of initial and end states of affairs. Vendlerian classifications are oriented towards elementary states and tense logic, while Davidsonian classifications deal with eventualities and event logic. There are two kinds of atemporal predicates - fact and properties. Facts are propositional arguments of second-order predicates which add a special meaning that the embedded proposition was verified. Properties are atemporal first-order (...) predicates that lack eventive interpretation and are not associated with factive frames. Davidsonian states are homogeneous durable spatiotemporal things distinct both from atemporal properties and spatiotemporal dynamic predicates. Davidsonian states are causally independent, while resultatives are causally determined as they reconstruct a preceding event that has caused the end state p. I discuss the contrast between external and internal Davidsonian states. The former lack a priority argument and can be quantified extensionally. The latter have a priority experiential argument and can only be quantified intensionally. External states can be observed, while internal states cannot. (shrink)

The collective monograph "Ontology of Stative Situations - Linguistic Modeling. A Contrastive Bulgarian-Russian Study" includes research carried out within the project of the same name "Ontology of stative situations – linguistic modeling. A contrastive Bulgarian-Russian study", supported by the "Scientific Research" Fund of the Ministry of Education and Science in Bulgaria (№ КП-06-РУСИЯ / 23) and from the Russian Fund for Fundamental Research (No. 20-512-18005).

Are there nonexistent objects? Can we make sense of objects having properties without thinking that there are nonexistent objects? Is existence a predicate? Can we make sense of necessarily existing objects depending on God? Tackling these central questions, Matthew Davidson explores the metaphysics of existence and nonexistence. He presents an extended argument for independence actualism, a previously undefended view that objects can have properties in worlds and at times at which they do not exist. Among other unique points of discussion, (...) Davidson considers the nature of actualism, arguments for and against serious actualism, the semantics of “exists” as a predicate, the merits of different sorts of Meinongian theories, and different views on which God might ground the existence of necessarily existing abstracta. The book offers a Lewisian-style argument for adopting independence actualism in that the view may be used to solve many problems in metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Bealer’s argument against Kripke is presented. We then show how Kripke could counteract it. Our idea that the identity materialist may have the possibility of explaining why type psychophysical identities only appear to be contingent (but are necessary), because we confuse the exemplified properties (one property) with the concepts that subsume them (two distinct concepts), is supported by McGinn’s and Nagel’s materialistic intuitions. It remains to be seen whether a critique of Kripke like that of Bealer runs counter to the (...) exemplified properties and the concepts that subsume them. We argue that Bealer’s criticism of Kripke does not contradict it. McGinn’s and Nagel’s intuitions support our idea. What we want to show is that, even if, from the anti-materialist side of the debate about the mind–body identity thesis, Bealer and Kripke agree on the general anti-materialist strategy but not on the strategies of phenomenological explanation (which for Bealer, Kripke neglects) and descriptivist explanation (which for Bealer is wrong), the disagreement between Bealer and Kripke still leaves open the materialist explanation of one property and two concepts. If there is an explanation for the illusion of contingency, it is quite possible that these type psychophysical identities are indeed necessary. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Crispin Wright’s, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted by the (...) judgments of the subject herself, formed under certain optimal or cognitively ideal conditions. I will argue for two claims: (1) Attributing a Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account to Davidson is unjustified; Davidson’s view is much closer to a non-reductionist First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account. (2) Third-Personal accounts rest on a misconstrual of the role of an interpreter in the First-Personal accounts; the notion of an interpreter still plays an essential role in the latter ones. (shrink)

In my paper, I establish an Ingardenian phenomenological ontology of "virtualized ficta", i.e., fictional entities introduced to virtual gaming. The first Section of my paper provides an ontology of virtualized ficta, focusing primarily on their ‘‘existential moments’’. But in order to have a firm grasp of the ontological aspects grounding the virtual work, it’s important to engage its strata. This is what I attempt to do in Section 1.2. Virtualized ficta’s intentional dependencies are strongly manifest in what I call the (...) ‘‘strata of the virtual work’’. That is, I repurpose Ingarden’s strata of the literary work, the picture, and the film to showcase that virtualized ficta, from the bottom up (i.e., from their pure ontology to aesthetics) are purely intentional entities. In short, I argue for a purely intentional account of virtualized ficta as ficta-made-virtualia, whose ontological status is determined by the creative acts of game developers and gamers. (shrink)

I present a condensed exposé of systemic materialism, a synthesis of materialism and systemism originally proposed by Mario Bunge. Matter is identified with mutability of propertied particulars, and a concrete or material system is defined as an object with composition, structure, mechanism, and environment. I review different aspects of this ontology, and discuss some of its implications for epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. I also try to identify some problems of this view and offer some ways to overcome the difficulties. I (...) conclude that systemic materialism is a promising philosophical project still in the making. (shrink)

Beall’s (e.g., 2009, 2021) transparency theory of truth is recognized as a prominent, deflationist solution to the liar paradox. However, it has been neglected by truth theorists who have attempted to show that a deflationist theory of truth can (or cannot) account for truth dependence, i.e., the claim that the truth of a proposition depends on how things described by the proposition are, but how these things are does not depend on the truth of the proposition. Truth theorists interested in (...) truth dependence have, instead, been focused on Horwich’s Minimalism (e.g., 1998). The goal of this paper is twofold. First, I construct what versions of the transparency theory would say about truth dependence. Second, I argue that even the best version of transparent truth ultimately fails to account for truth dependence. On the assumption that accounting for truth dependence is an adequacy condition on any theory of truth, the paper rejects transparency theory as an adequate theory of truth. (shrink)

This draft preprint presents a nine step argument for “Connectionist Structuralism” (CS), an account of the ontology of abstract objects that is neither purely nominalist nor purely platonist. CS is a common, often implicit assumption in parts of the artificial intelligence literature, but such discussions have not presented formal accounts of the position or engaged with metaphysical issues that potentially undermine it. By making the position legible and presenting an initial case for it, we hope to support a constructive dialogue (...) between AI researchers and philosophers of metaphysics that helps both sides to refine the position. -/- CS proposes that each abstract object we can draw on in human analysis corresponds to a particular subset of an individual person’s brain structure whose functionality is isomorphic to a subset of the nodes and connections in a suitable connectionist network. In other words, abstract objects are physically realised, but in individual brains, rather than only in the referent objects (pure nominalism) or in metaphysical universals (pure platonism). -/- This paper’s minimum claim is that CS can account for all abstract object predicables regarding sensible properties, such as “is red” or “is a square”. Using evidence from cognitive neuroscience, machine learning, and evolutionary biology, as well as a fully traceable toy example, we describe how CS can support our core cognitive uses of such sensible properties and can account for our core phenomenal experiences of them. In the former, CS provides sufficient albeit imperfect inferential safety, whose limitations are argued to strengthen rather than weaken the case for CS as describing human behaviour. In the latter, four target phenomenal features are accounted for – abstract objects as feeling intangible, non-located, transparent, and unchanging - along with accounts for further phenomena such as semantic refinement, the Stroop effect, synaesthesia, semantic clarity, sensory overload, and satiation. -/- Our minimum claim concerns the day-to-day usage and felt experience of abstract objects, but we suggest also an extended claim in which CS can form the basis of a pragmatic sufficient logic. As such, the initial outline of a response is provided for five common objections to positions that seek to ground abstract objects without reference to metaphysically stand-alone universals: referential opacity; identity of indiscernibles; infinite regression; non-physical concepts; and necessary truths. These outlines lay the foundation for (but do not seek to formally demonstrate) an extended CS account that addresses other abstract objects, including issues relating to their use in mathematics and formal logic. -/- The CS account leads to a four-layer hierarchy of similarity for whether your “red” is the same as mine. Considering both semantic and phenomenal similarity, we conclude that our “reds” are likely non-identical but can be made close enough for practical purposes. Finally, we describe how future work could elaborate CS as a metaphysical project and how confidence in it could be tested through empirical research. (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of Properties is an outstanding reference source to this perennial topic and is the first major volume of its kind. Essential reading for anyone studying and researching metaphysics, metametaphysics, and ontology.

Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the statue and the lump of clay are two different colocated objects that have different forms, even though they share the same matter. Recently, there has been some discussion on the requirements of consistency for hylomorphist theories. In this paper, we focus on an argument presented by Maegan Fairchild, according to which a minimal version of hylomorphism is inconsistent. We argue that the argument is (...) unsound or, at best, it just points to a well-known problem for hylmorphist theories. Additionally, we explore some general consequences of this fact. (shrink)

The Power Structuralist View (PSV) is an account of causation in which causal relations are reduced to the powers that are activated in the subject by another subject’s power, instantly and simultaneously. PSV is based on two main assumptions: (a) holism; (b) reductionism. After justifying the choice to place PSV within the so-called ‘process accounts’ of causation (PA), I will show how, generally, every PA must solve the so-called “transference paradox” (TP) and why PSV is an innovative account. However, PSV (...) creates two main problems: (1) how to explain the instantaneous activation between correlatives; (2) how to explain which kind of “nexus” takes place between powers. I will argue that, in order to solve (1), PSV needs to adopt an intervalist position, but this leads to a form of monism that contradicts (a). Regarding (2), the reductionist approach implies the assumption that “all relations between powers are internal” and, therefore, a form of monism, again against premise (a). PSV reduces causation to a ‘primitive concept’ (the ontological dependence) but, in this way, point (2) remains unexplained. The problem of physical transference (or reciprocal influence) remains unanswered, and PSV seems to be a covert form of occasionalism. -/- [NOTE: the version on the Journal's site has problems in the footnotes. DOWNLOAD the correct version here in PhilPapers]. (shrink)

Stephen Mumford and Alexander Bird disagree about which properties are powers and, correspondingly, about the extent of the philosophical work to which powers may be put. Unfortunately, there is an important respect in which these authors are talking past each other and so the reason for their disagreement remains obscured. I highlight what has gone wrong in their recent exchange, attempt to clear up the confusion and pinpoint the true source of their disagreement. My hope is to redirect the efforts (...) of these authors and their followers onto more pressing foundational issues in the metaphysics of powers. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the prospects of postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth. Postdeflationary theories define the concept of truth or the property of being a true truthbearer in a way that respects the deflationary desiderata of clarity, purity, and permissiveness with truth-aptness, without a necessary commitment to the core negative thesis of the deflationary approach. Postdeflationary substantive theories further acknowledge the complexity and explanatory utility of truth in understanding and defining other concepts and phenomena. The motivation for pursuing this study arises (...) from the so-called contemporary crisis of truth, where a substantive understanding of truth is subjected to widespread skepticism, critique, and even cynicism both inside and outside of philosophy in formal and mundane discourse. To better understand this crisis, particular attention is directed towards the deflationary critique of substantive theories of truth, which is a prevalent point of discussion in contemporary literature on western analytic philosophy. By exploring the limits and philosophical sustainability of deflationary critique of substantive accounts of truth, valuable insight is gained about the contemporary crisis of truth and the potential for substantive theorizing about truth in general. This dissertation composes of an introduction and four original research publications that address two connected themes: exploration of the philosophical sustainability of deflationary critique of substantive theories of truth, and exploration of the prospects for development of the now popular substantive pluralist theories of truth. These themes constitute both negative and positive aspects in relation to analyzing the prospects of postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth. The first part of this dissertation focuses on arguing against the widespread deflationary readings of W.V.O. Quine’s truth, who is widely interpreted as a prominent and influential deflationist in both the secondary literature on his philosophy and contemporary truth-theoretic debates more broadly conceived. The first essay demonstrates that Quine’s immanent conception of truth involves commitments that are incompatible with general and theory-specific framings of the deflationary thesis. The second essay demonstrates conflicts between Quine’s views and what has in recent literature been argued as strong and moderate variants of the deflationary thesis. In conclusion, these essays demonstrate that the widespread deflationary readings of Quine’s truth are mistaken, thus removing a prominent thinker from the deflationists ranks while simultaneously casting suspicion towards the philosophical sustainability of the deflationary approach in general. The second part of this dissertation explores the prospects of postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth by analyzing the limits and prospects for development of the increasingly popular substantive pluralist theories. The third essay explores different ways in which semantic ambiguity poses trouble for current pluralist models. The fourth essay argues that to achieve the theoretical desiderata that pluralists ask from discourse domains, the latter ought to be individuated on ontological rather than topical grounds. In conclusion, these essays demonstrate that while current pluralist models involve shortcomings, they encompass potential for development and provide a viable prospect for sustainable postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth. (shrink)

There is a tension between Dispositionalism––the view that all metaphysical modality is grounded in actual irreducible dispositional properties––and the possibility of time travel. This is due to the fact that Dispositionalism makes it much harder to solve a potentiality-based version of the grandfather paradox. We first present a potentiality-based version of the grandfather paradox, stating that the following theses are inconsistent: 1) time travel is possible, 2) powers fully ground modality, 3) self-defeating actions are impossible, 4) time-travellers retain their intrinsic (...) powers upon time-travelling, and 5) time-travellers are ordinary agents with basic intrinsic potentialities. We then consider a number of potential solutions, and find them wanting. We argue that the metaphysical impossibility of performing a self-defeating action acts as a necessary perfect mask––while time-travel lets us “slip” the potentiality under the mask, thus generating the contradiction. We conclude considering what are the options for the dispositionalist. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to criticisms of my book Being and Reason recently made by Yitzhak Melamed.

What is absolutely unrestricted quantification? We distinguish two theoretical roles and identify two conceptions of absolute generality: maximally strong generality and maximally inclusive generality. We also distinguish two corresponding kinds of absolute domain. A maximally strong domain contains every potential counterexample to a generalisation. A maximally inclusive domain is such that no domain extends it. We argue that both conceptions of absolute generality are legitimate and investigate the relations between them. Although these conceptions coincide in standard settings, we show how (...) they diverge under more complex assumptions about the structure of meaningful predication, such as cumulative type theory. We conclude by arguing that maximally strong generality is the more theoretically valuable conception. (shrink)

As we understand them, dispositions are relatively uncontroversial 'predicatory' properties had by objects disposed in certain ways. By contrast, powers are hypothetical 'ontic' properties posited in order to explain dispositional behaviour. Chapter 1 outlines this distinction in more detail. Chapter 2 offers a summary of the issues surrounding analysis of dispositions and various strategies in contemporary literature to address them, including one of our own. Chapter 3 describes some of the important questions facing the metaphysics of powers including why they're (...) worth positing, and how they might metaphysically explain laws of nature and modality. (shrink)