Questions tagged [pseudo-random-function]
A pseudo-random function (PRF) is a family of deterministic functions indexed by a parameter, such that a randomly selected instance is computationally indistinguishable from a uniformly random function with the same input and output spaces.
456 questions
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Does the PRG definition hold for multiple evaluations
Lindell and Katz define a PRG $G:\{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$ along the lines of the following definition
$$
\forall \mathcal{D} \in \textrm{PPT } \exists \epsilon(n) \in \textrm{Negl}(n) \textrm{ such ...
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Is this PRF + nullifier + signature construction secure for one-time tokens in a non-currency setting?
I am designing a non-currency protocol that enforces one anonymous action per legitimate purchase (in my case: one review per purchase). I would like to sanity-check the following construction built ...
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Does this key-derivation construction achieve context-isolated leakage resilience, and is passphrase rotation secure?
I would like to ask for a technical review of a key-derivation construction
that we developed while designing a multi-chain wallet and an E2EE identity
layer.
This construction is part of a broader ...
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Clarify whether a Beaver Triple is essentially a form of Functional Secret Sharing (FSS)?
Could you please clarify whether a Beaver Triple is essentially a form of Functional Secret Sharing (FSS)?
I feel that a Beaver Triple might be the key for the share of the multiplication function. If ...
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Boyle's Functional Secret Sharing: The Use of Correction Words in DPF
In DPF, correction words eliminate the differences in node values caused by different seeds and force the node values of both parties to be consistent.
My question is: under what circumstances will ...
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Why Hull-Dobell choose 4?
In the Hull-Dobell theorem for Linear Congruential Generators (LCGs), the third condition states that if 4 divides m (i.e., $ 4 \mid m $), then 4 must divide $ a-1 $ (i.e., $ 4 \mid (a-1) $).
Why is ...
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Programmable PRF that can be evaluated before reprogrammation
Let $f:\mathcal{X}\to\mathcal{Y}$ be an efficiently computable pseudorandom function. Knowing $f$, is there any known method to build a function $f_{x,y}:\mathcal{X}\to\mathcal{Y}$, for any $x,y$, ...
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Why do the authors state "an arbitrary circuit can be transformed into a layered monotonic circuit of polynomially related size."
I have recently been reading "Constrained Pseudorandom Functions" by Boneh and Waters, and "Constrained Verifiable Random Functions" by Fuchsbauer. One of the claimed results is ...
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Building symmteric-key encryption from a weak PRF
I encountered the following question:
Prove that given a weak PRF $F:\{0,1\}^*\times\{0,1\}^*\mapsto\{0,1\}^*$ that doubles the length of each input (that is, if ...
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Why is naive hash based Private Set Intersection insecure?
I know that when the domain of the set is very small, we can enumerate the elements in the set, and in that case, a simple hash-based method is not secure. However, when the domain is very large, such ...
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Are algorithms like Ascon-PRFshort collision resistant?
I'd like to double check my understanding of the collision resistance of a single unkeyed/public permutation call. I'll use two algorithms as examples, namely Ascon-PRFshort and HChaCha20.
Ascon-...
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PRF security of HMAC 256
What is the effective PRF security level of HMAC 256? I would assume that it provides 256 bit PRF security but I can't find any sources.
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NMAC: k1=k2 security or HMAC: ipad=opad security
HMAC appears to be a variant of NMAC where the two independent keys required by NMAC are derived through the hash function of the HMAC ( since H(k || m) --> H[iv=H(k)] (m) )
Why is it so important ...
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Clarification in TLS 1.2 key derivation process
Using
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 in tls 1.2 handshake.
Reference to TLS 1.2 standard documentation regarding the key generation. And the question 50815
(Clarification needed in TLS 1.2 key ...
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Properties of a distribution sampler when the sampler randomness is generated by a pseudo-random function
Let $D$ be a distribution such that there exists $c$ in the range of $D$ and for all $z\sim D$, $|z| < c$ with overwhelming probability.
Let $\mathsf{Samp}(1^\lambda; r)$ be an efficient sampler ...