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Questions tagged [reduction]

Reduction is a technique for proving the security of a cryptosystem.

1 vote
0 answers
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$SVP(n^a,p)$ be the problem of approximating $SVP$ in $p$-norm to $n^a$ approximation factor. At $a<1$ there are complexity theoretic hardness results. $a\in[1,2]$ finds cryptographic applications. ...
Turbo's user avatar
  • 1,215
2 votes
2 answers
132 views

I'm reading a paper about reduction. There are some statements like Reductions usually run the original adversary as a subroutine... most reductions even work for inefficient adversaries. ���...
Haotian Yin's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
103 views

Suppose there is a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against some scheme in game $G_1$ with non-negligible winning probability. My goal is to construct a $G_2$ adversary $\mathcal{B}$ using $\mathcal{A}$ as ...
Haotian Yin's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
227 views

I can define LWE with $m$ samples, $n$ dimensions of secret, modulus $q$, secret distribution $\chi_s$ and error distribution $\chi_e$. The LWE problem asks: given a uniformly random matrix $A$ and $b=...
Sam Jaques's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
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Suppose we have a hard problem, and a signature scheme based on that hard problem. Why do we try and bound the advantage of forger for the signature scheme above by the advantage of an adversary ...
MathematicallyUnsound's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
81 views

When analyzing Dilithium's security, JMW24 claims there is a reduction from $\mathsf{PlainSelfTargetMSIS}$ to $\mathsf{SelfTargetMSIS}$ (p. 9): Proof. The probability that a uniformly random $B \gets ...
cryptozoaire's user avatar
5 votes
1 answer
138 views

Suppose I have a cryptographic problem $X$ (e.g.: LWE with a specific noise distribution), and an adversary $A$ against $X$ with non-negligible success probability. Then suppose I have another problem ...
Sam Jaques's user avatar
  • 1,920
4 votes
2 answers
179 views

In ACM CCS 2006, Mihir Bellare and Gregory Neven gave an elegant proof of General Forking Lemma [https://doi.org/10.1145/1180405.1180453]. However, it makes me really confused about steps to prove $\...
Oscar D's user avatar
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2 votes
0 answers
42 views

For a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$ I will use $\mathbf{A}^{-1}_\sigma (\mathbf{v})$ to denote a vector $\mathbf{u}$ sampled from a discrete gaussian over $\mathbb{Z}^m$ with ...
vxek's user avatar
  • 551
3 votes
1 answer
488 views

Suppose you can solve DLOG in arbitrary groups. Then I give you the challenge of solving DLOG$(a,1)$ over the group $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$, where $a$ is some arbitrary integer and $n$ is some integer to be ...
Sam Jaques's user avatar
  • 1,920
1 vote
1 answer
71 views

I was wondering if the following claim is true. Claim. Under decisional ${\sf LWE}_{q,m,n,\chi}$, the Regev PKE scheme $\Pi=(\sf KG,Enc,Dec)$ has pseudorandom ciphertexts. Suppose for contradiction ...
Chris's user avatar
  • 266
3 votes
2 answers
210 views

I am struggling with a specific reduction as a part of a question I am solving and I was wondering if I can get some advice. Assume we have Adversary A that can distinguish with high probability ...
IVRODB's user avatar
  • 111
1 vote
2 answers
170 views

In the following problem: Prove that the following modifications of basic CBC-MAC do not yield a secure MAC (even for fixed-length messages): (b) A random initial block is used each time a message ...
Hesham Abdelgawad's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
41 views

I am reading the construction that we make a SKE scheme $\sf \Pi=(Gen,Enc,Dec)$ from a PRF $F$. In particular, work on the proof there we assume that given a secure PRF, we can construct a CPA-secure ...
Chris's user avatar
  • 266
1 vote
0 answers
164 views

This is probably similar to "What does 'a reduction is tight' mean rigorously?". I am getting into security proofs, and started reading about reduction tightness. If problem P1 reduces to ...
Zahyr's user avatar
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