We can define the predicate "___ is a bachelor" (intended to be applied to individuals of homo sapiens) as "___ is an unmarried man". Giving a (nominal) definition means you are making a statement about how you intend to use some word, phrase, or predicate. In this case, you are basically saying: "Every time that I will use the term 'bachelor', I mean 'unmarried man', and you are free to substitute the words 'unmarried man' for every one of my 'bachelor' usages."
Once you have given a (nominal) definition of the above form
The predicate __ is an F is equivalent to __ is a G
you are allowing yourself and others to make that substitution. That is, make a substitution without changing the truth-value of the actual proposition. So, any statement "x is an F" will then be true if and only if "x is a G" is true.
A tautology is a statement that is true by virtue of its logical form. For instance, if p is any proposition (a statement that has a truth-value), then
If p then p
is perhaps the most simple tautology. In this case, it doesn't matter what the content of proposition p is, the conditional "If p then p" will always be true.
Note, that when we say a proposition is true by virtue of its logical form, we mean that it is true by virtue of the accepted rules for the logical connectives and operators in the proposition. In propositional logic these are negation ("it is not so that ..."), and the connectives that join propositions: implication ("if ... then ..."), conjunction ("... and ...") and disjunction ("... or ..."). These rules themselves, if they can be expressed as propositions, will also be tautologies.
Now, once you have defined "bachelor" to have the same meaning as "unmarried man", but only once you have established that definition first, the proposition
A bachelor is an unmarried man
of (equivalently)
All bachelors are unmarried men
is true by virtue of that initial definition (by virtue of the meaning of the words alone). It's called an "analytical truth". This is not strictly speaking identical to a tautology (a purely logical truth) (though according to some it ultimately boils down to the same thing), but it's very similar to a tautological truth in sofar that it is true by virtue of the linguistial form or rather the linguistical conventions that are in play in that statement. This implies that, similar to a tautology, the statement is not informative about the empirical world; it doesn't tell us any new facts about what is the case, it merely exhibits a linguistic rule or convention.
An extremely well-written introduction to the uses of definitions
and their role in debate is found in the first chapters of Arne Naess' Communication and Argument: Elements of Applied Semantics (1966). The book only presumes a high-school level background knowledge. For years, it had to be studied for the examen philosophicum, a preparatory examination compulsory for all students of the University of Oslo, with the exception of those studying dentistry or pharmacy.
In evolutionary theory, the statement that the fittest individuals will survive, means something more or less like "If two individuals differ in 'fitness', the probability that the fitter one will live longer (and have more opportunities to reproduce) is greater." In this case, if the criteria for determining which individuals are "fitter" are independent of the knowledge which individual live (or have lived) longer, the statement is not a tautology and not an analytical truth. Howewer, if "fitter" is initially defined as "will live longer", the statement would be an analytical truth. But, in fact, "__ is fitter" is not simply defined as "lives longer". It's much more complex than that - and even a common-sense notion of "fitter" involves more than the mere notion of "lives longer" (e.g. is not sick, is stronger, smarter, etc.)
Now, there may still be a worry that there is some circularity here. For instance, if "fitness" in practice is operationalized ( measured) in terms of "survival rate", then the statement that the fittest survive would be an analytical truth - true by virtue of the operational definition. But do evolutionary biologists do this? Not really. Fitness does not need to be interpreted as actual reproductive success (the actual outcome of the process), but can be see as the propensity to have more offspring - which is a probability measure depending also on the environment. Fitness is not an intrinsic property of individual organisms but can only be seen in relation to an environment (that may change and is itself changed by those organisms). (See: Susan K. Mills and John H. Beatty, The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness, 1979).
You also have to see that the statement "the fittest survive" is a huge simplification that doesn't do justice to evolutionary theory. It's a caricature. Afterall, sometimes a not-so-fit individual will survive and have offspring; sometimes a very fit individual gets destroyed by a meteor. Evolutionary biology does not deny this.