Persistence

This paper argues that time is not an external dimension but the structure generated when continuity stabilizes recursive self-change. Memory, anticipation, and temporal flow arise from accumulated effect-traces across layered recursion, while temporal distortions reflect misalignment between recursive layers. The paper distinguishes internal and external time, establishes falsification criteria, and completes the internal temporal mapping of the Codex.

Autonomous intelligence is not a matter of behavioral sophistication but of agency: self-initiated action with goal maintenance across action cycles by the same subject. This paper proves, within a strict scope lock, that autonomy requires persistent identity, and that persistent identity forces deterministic identity governance. The proof chain is eliminative and non-circular: (1) autonomy implies identity comparability under drift across recurrence; (2) identity-scoped recurrence forces a single non-branching identity degree of freedom (an “identity trunk”); (3) identity persistence requires a unique (...) scalar governance functional whose drift is bounded on realized trajectories over unbounded recurrence. Up to affine gauge, the only functional compatible with comparability, non-branching recurrence, and compositional closure is PAS_h = Σ_k (w_k r_k) with fixed positive weights, and identity persists iff PAS_h drift is bounded. From these constraints, probabilistic / sampling-based and identity-acyclic architectures fail structurally: sampling yields ensemble identity rather than a single agent; per-invocation reset eliminates cross-cycle identity carriers; and non-additive composition fractures identity under aggregation. A derived section treats biological systems as existence proofs of recurrent, bounded-drift identity governance. (shrink)

This paper proves a structural necessity result about identity persistence. Under minimal universal axioms required for identity to be meaningful and non-arbitrary (comparability, drift-bounded persistence, compositional closure, and affine gauge invariance), identity-relevant recurrence is forced to reduce to a single compact 1-DOF trunk, classified as S¹. Given S¹, invariant identity content factors through an SO(2)/O(2) harmonic family {r_k, χ_k}. The paper then proves that identity persistence requires scalar governance and that—up to affine gauge—the unique governance functional compatible with the constraints (...) is PAS_h = Σ w_k r_k (w_k>0), with persistence equivalent to bounded PAS_h drift. No empirical or domain instantiation claims are made in the PROVEN tier. (shrink)

Questions of persistence and change are central to metaphysics. There is almost always a role for sortal or essential properties to play in theories of persistence. However, one might reasonably be suspicious of many of the claims about sortal properties and essential properties on which so many accounts of persistence conditions rest. The aim of this paper is to think through what persistence looks like if we don't help ourselves to these assumptions. In so doing, we shall uncover a deep (...) and difficult problem when it comes to identity facts and their relation to qualitative facts. Towards the end of the paper, I sketch a potential line of response that builds upon our seeming awareness of a genuinely persisting self. (shrink)

This paper argues that coherence is a governing invariant of persistence: a system remains identifiable over time if and only if it maintains internal alignment under perturbation, and collapses when drift exceeds recoverable bounds. The claim is not advanced as a competing theory within physics, biology, or psychology, but as a prior condition implicitly assumed by each. Existing paradigms explain behavior given persistence; none defines what makes persistence possible in the first place. -/- By making coherence explicit, identity ceases to (...) be primitive and failure ceases to be domain-specific. The paper shows how diverse forms of collapse—mechanical, biological, cognitive, and social—share a common structural form, and why minimal phase-based structure is required for persistence at all. The treatment is non-technical and orienting; formal definitions and proofs are developed elsewhere. The contribution is conceptual clarification rather than metaphysical expansion. -/- (Note this is an intuitive explainer, see rest of the work for technical details.). (shrink)

Since the early 21st century, processualist approaches have gained prominence in analytic metaphysics and the philosophy of science, prompting diverse responses from advocates of substantialism. However, the polarization of the debate between process and substance metaphysics has often led to oversimplifications that obscure the potential for constructive dialogue. This paper argues that these frameworks should not be treated as monolithic systems, but rather analyzed through the lens of specific metaphysical problems—namely, fundamentality, persistence, and individuation. Focusing primarily on process metaphysics, we (...) examine how different interpretations within both traditions conceptualize these issues. Our analysis reveals areas of compatibility as well as points of divergence, indicating that the divide between processualism and substantialism is more nuanced than commonly assumed. We conclude by advocating for a metaphysical approach that allows for the integration of criteria from both frameworks. (shrink)

Nothingness is the most abused word in the human vocabulary. We use it casually, as if nothingness were simply a thin, delicate version of the world. We imagine an empty room, a quiet moment, or a blank canvas. In daily speech, nothingness is just the absence of some particular thing, but the philosophical question of “nothingness” demands something radically different. It demands the absence of all things; all structure, all laws, all time, all possibility, all conditions that could give anything (...) the capacity to exist. True nothingness is not emptiness; it is the collapse of the very framework within which emptiness could be meaningful. Once carried to its proper conclusion, it reveals itself to be an incoherent concept. Something that cannot exist, cannot persist, and cannot even be meaningfully conceived. The task, then, is not to explain why something emerged from nothing, but to understand why nothingness was never a viable alternative in the first place. (shrink)

Alberic of Paris was one of the leading philosophers of the 12th century. He was the main rival to Peter Abelard and, according to John of Salisbury, “a most fierce opponent of the nominalist school.” But although he was an important figure in his time, Alberic is almost completely unknown today. -/- This collection of essays is the first ever dedicated to exploring and contextualizing the views of Alberic and his followers, the Albricani. It discusses topics such as universals, time, (...) mereology, divine foreknowledge, fallacies, and modal logic, and shows that Alberic was an original thinker in a vibrant intellectual milieu. -/- Contributors are Andrew W. Arlig, Enrico Donato, Sten Ebbesen, Charles Girard, Heine Hansen, Peter King, John Marenbon, Sofia Orsino, Boaz Faraday Schuman, Caterina Tarlazzi, Paul Thom, and Wojciech Wciórka. (shrink)

Hylomorphism provides an explanation of material composition: the material parts, the Xs, will compose a whole, a Y, belonging to a given natural kind, when those parts are characterized by a substantial form. While there are a number of those who hold that each human person is identical with a human animal – ‘animalists’ – most of these are not hylomorphists. One could worry that hylomorphism contributes little unique to debates about personal identity, collapsing into either a form of property (...) dualism or substance dualism. What I aim to do is apply a robust and classical hylomorphic account of persons (derived from Thomas Aquinas) to two contemporary problems, illustrating the way in which hylomorphic metaphysics can offer elegant solutions to tricky situations posed against animalists. Specifically, I will propose that hylomorphic animalism can help provide principled resolutions to worries that seem to undermine animalist intuitions which are raised by ‘brain transplant’ or ‘remnant person’ scenarios. Hylomorphism can capture the advantages of ‘hybrid’ animalist responses without the cost of denying a singular, biological criterion of personal identity. Further, hylomorphism provides a distinctive upshot for Christian theologians and the moral positions that they want to affirm by rendering morally anodyne apparent epistemic difficulties in identifying personal identity over time. (shrink)

The present paper presents a new (formal) theory of presence according to which, roughly, to be present at a place is to have a delegate located at that place. One crucial feature of the theory is that something can be present at a place without thereby being located there. The theory is then applied to several central issues in metaphysics, such as persistence through times and worlds, theories of universals, the ontology of social entities, and the nature of God.

Contemporary debates about the metaphysics of material composition occur within the framework set by the Special Composition Question, as proposed famously by Peter van Inwagen. This question asks what one must do, what conditions must be satisfied, for some things to compose one object as proper parts. Hylomorphism is a theory that has regained prominence in contemporary metaphysics, explaining the unity of composite material objects by appealing to a special metaphysical part of those objects: structure or form. My book defends (...) hylomorphism as a meaningful and significant answer to questions about the composition of material objects. Specifically, I propose that, if it is false that substances can have other substances as parts, hylomorphism can be shown not only to be a plausible theory but that all consistent accounts of restricted composition can be shown to be hylomorphist. After introducing and summarizing the trajectory of the book, I turn to reviewing and responding to objections from my interlocutors for this symposium. (shrink)

Guo Xiang 郭象 made an innovative development of the Zhuangzian no-self view. This paper analyzes Guo’s conception of the self through the lens of contemporary metaphysics, arguing that his rejection of the conventional understanding of the self for ordinary people corresponds with presentist four-dimensionalism. By asserting that the previous self is not the present self, Guo rejected the notion of an enduring self across time. This idea corresponds with the four-dimensionalist account of persistence. By claiming that the previous self has (...) already vanished, Guo denied the existence of the past self. This view supports a presentist claim that only present things exist. In the presentist four-dimensionalist framework, we can understand how Guo provided a more radical interpretation of the Zhuangzian no-self view better: the presentist four-dimensionalist conception of the self deconstructs both the enduring self and the past self, thereby expanding the no-self view to include ordinary people. (shrink)

In diesem Artikel zeige ich auf, dass das in der aristotelischen Schrift 'De Anima' beschriebene Konzept einer eng mit den Lebensfunktionen von Organismen verbundenen Seele/Psyche auch aus heutiger biowissenschaftlicher Sicht noch Bestand hat. Dies gilt insbesondere auch für die drei Komponenten, in welche die Psyche gemäss Aristoteles unterteilt werden kann: Die ‘Anima rationalis’ repräsentiert die menschliche Fähigkeit zu vernünftigem Denken, die ‘Anima sensitiva’ die Fähigkeit tierischer Lebewesen zu sinnlicher Wahrnehmung und triebgesteuerter Bewegungskontrolle, währenddem die allen Lebewesen zukommenden biologischen Grundfunktionen wie (...) Stoffwechsel, Nahrungsaufnahme, Wachstum und Organbildung dem Bereich der ‘Anima vegetativa’ zugeordnet werden. Ein weiterer zentraler Aspekt der aristotelischen Biopsychologie, welcher erst seit kurzem wieder Einzug in die modernen Biowissenschaften hält, ist das Verständnis lebender Organismen als Akteure, die zu zielgerichteter Tätigkeit befähigt sind. Währenddem Evolutionswissenschaftler dafür den Begriff ‘Agency’ verwenden und analysieren, wie diese Fähigkeit mit der biochemischen Entstehung von Leben und der natürlichen Selektion zusammenhängt, spricht Aristoteles davon, die Psyche sei die Wesenheit (eidos) und der Zweck (telos) eines natürlichen, lebensfähigen Körpers und dieser bloß ihr Werkzeug (organon). Auch wenn sich die aristotelische und die moderne Biologie bezüglich ihres wissenschaftlichen Hintergrundes stark unterscheiden, stimmen beide in ihrer Quintessenz weitgehend überein: Das, was einen biologischen Organismus ausmacht, ist seine Fähigkeit, selbst etwas zu tun zum Zweck seiner Selbsterhaltung, sei es als Individuum, sei es durch Reproduktion als Spezies. Die Seele/Psyche im aristotelischen Sinne erfüllt damit nicht nur irgendeine biologische Funktion, sondern die zentrale Lebensfunktion biologischer Organismen schlechthin. Der vorliegende Artikel versteht sich als einführender Teil einer dreiteiligen Serie im ‘Aphin-Rundbrief’ zur Analyse des aristotelischen Konzepts der Psyche aus dem Blickwinkel der modernen Life Sciences. Im 2026 erscheinenden Folgeartikel wird die Frage vertieft, welches Potenzial dieses zur Überwindung des Leib-Seele-Problems und zur Erklärung von Entstehung und Funktion des Bewusstseins enthält. Im dritten Artikel wird dann gezeigt, dass darauf ein akteurkausales Modell der Willensfreiheit aufgebaut werden kann, welches im Einklang mit einer zeitgenössischen, naturalistischen Erklärung der Handlungsfähigkeit steht. (shrink)

There is a popular view in metaphysics: a mental state exists at a time and depends on a brain state at that time. This is difficult to reconcile with a central claim from special relativity: what exists at a time depends on an arbitrary foliation of spacetime. Together, these seem to suggest that brain states and their accompanying mental states depend on arbitrary foliations of spacetime. I argue that a further implication is that there could be rogue mental states and, (...) worse, rogue persons that overlap with an ordinary person, but that are nonetheless introspectively inaccessible to that person. I go on to argue that functional and intelligibility requirements allow us to privilege a person’s rest foliation. I conclude that most rogue mental states are unintelligible and that rogue persons are exceedingly rare. (shrink)

The Stoics developed a fascinating and interlocking set of doctrines about time, and those doctrines stood in stark contrast to the theory developed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics. Some controversies about Stoic views of time centre on how to unpack their idea that time and the processes of the universe are cyclical. Other controversies concern their views of the nature of time, and its relationship to bodies: how are times divided, is there a present time, and are there any bodies (...) that are found only in the past or only in the future, or are there only present bodies? This chapter will also suggest that some Stoics thought that some bodies are divided into temporal parts. (shrink)

First published in 1995. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book presents a novel metaphysics of concrete entities. The author uses the theory developed to address three major topics in the metaphysics of concreta: fundamentality, persistence over time, and phenomenal consciousness. The book provides a new theory of what "bundles" particular property instances, or tropes, into material property bearers. The theory is based on two new ideas. The first is that the primitive nature of one sui generis monadic property called markedness bears on the bundling of other properties' tropes. (...) The second idea is that the geometric and topological features of a given markedness trope help to determine which tropes it bundles. The author argues that this new markedness bundle theory determines all property co-instantiation at the levels of both type and token, positioning markedness tropes as the fundamental concreta. The theory also explains bundling across time, yielding an advantageous account of material persistence. Finally, markedness tropes operate as de facto panprotopsychist property instances: fundamental non-consciousness tropes that uniquely explain where and why consciousness properties are exemplified. The book solidifies the case for markedness through sustained critical analysis of competing theories of fundamentality and persistence, focusing in part on their inability to account for unending mereological and plural structures. Concrete Particulars will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Adrian Bardon has produced a new version of his historical introduction to the philosophy of time. Originally published in 2013, the second edition of 2024 is partly rewritten and supplemented with a more extensive discussion on our disposition to project the passage of time [...] Although the book’s title emphasizes history, most of the chapters are directed at issues in systematic philosophy of time: the realism/antirealism debate, temporal passage, temporal experience, spacetime, direction, time travel, time and free will, and the (...) temporal boundaries of the universe. (shrink)

What is time? Does it pass? Is the future open? Why do we care? Philosophy of Time: The Basics doesn’t answer these questions. It does give you an opinionated introduction to thinking a bit more deeply about them. Written in a way that assumes no philosophical background from its readers, this book looks at central topics in philosophy of time and shows how they relate to other time-related topics – from theoretical physics (without the maths!) to your own mortality. Additional (...) questions include: -/- In what way is time different to space? How long is the present? Does the Theory of Relativity show time doesn’t pass? What makes time have a direction or ‘arrow’? Can you be harmed by your own death? -/- Allowing the reader to think more deeply about time, this book begins to untangle some of the most difficult knots in all of philosophy. It also provides practical advice to prospective time-travelers. (shrink)

Boethius, like his Neoplatonic predecessors, poses a challenge to contemporary readers of the Consolation seeking to understand the world he thinks we occupy. That world involves a timeless, simple, but all- knowing creator god and a time-bound, infinite creation that is patterned from the ideas in the divine mind. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a modest illumination into the world as it is conceived in the Consolation by examining two fundamental Boethian categories and their relationship: the eternal (...) and the temporal. The chapter examines the extent to which we should see these categories providing guidance as to the nature of beings rather than expressing the epistemic perspectives those beings have. By noting the limits, we will draw conclusions about the persistence of temporal beings; the ontological status possessed by future, present, and past states of affairs; and what characterizes eternal existence. (shrink)

David Hume’s philosophical work presents the reader with a perplexing mix of constructive accounts of empirically guided belief and destructive sceptical arguments against all belief. This book reconciles this conflict by showing that Hume intended his scepticism to be remedial. It immunizes us against the influence of “unphilosophical” causes of belief, determining us to proportion our beliefs to the evidence. In making this case, this book develops Humean positions on topics Hume did not discuss in detail but that are of (...) interest to contemporary philosophers: consciousness and the unity of consciousness, temporal experience, visual spatial perception, the experience of colour and other qualia, objective experience, and spatially extended minds. It also challenges currently accepted interpretations of Hume’s views on the finite divisibility of space and time, vacuum, the duration of unchanging objects, and identity over time. It deals with criticisms of Hume that were raised by his contemporaries, notably by Thomas Reid, draws attention to earlier seventeenth‑ and eighteenth‑century work that has bearing on the interpretation of Hume’s thought, and compares Hume’s achievements with those of later nineteenth‑century psychologists and philosophers. (shrink)

Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality are tensed, and most of them seem to think that those tensed facts are to be understood as fixing the way things are, absolutely speaking, or simpliciter. But there is a simple yet powerful argument, the argument from atemporality, to the effect that realists should reject the absolutist conception of reality’s constitution by facts because, despite appearances to the contrary, that conception is in (...) fact inconsistent with realism about tense. After presenting the argument, I investigate why the relevant inconsistency has not been recognised so far and point to one possible explanation. (shrink)

McTaggart's argument that time is unreal was agreed by few philosophers, but it opened up a great split among twentieth‐century philosophers of time over the question of whether time must form an A‐series (“A‐theory”) or whether a B‐series suffices for the reality of time (“B‐theory”). This chapter discusses the most prominent twentieth‐century arguments in favor of the negative responses to questions that were seen to be especially important in deciding this matter. It begins with the puzzle of change because if (...) one accepts that temporal predicates indeed any predicates that can report change are in fact relations, then the appeal of the four pillars of the B‐theory becomes apparent. The pillars of B‐theory are (i) any conception of temporal passage as the gain and loss of non‐relational, tensed properties is incoherent; (ii) the underlying, logical structure of tensed language is tenseless; (iii) eternalism; and (iv) temporal experience is explainable B‐theoretically. (shrink)

This piece is a contribution to a book symposium on Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz's _Nothing to Come: A Defense of the Growing Block Theory of Time_. I start by considering one of the main objections that has been raised against the Growing Block Theory, namely, the Epistemic Objection, together with Correia and Rosenkranz's response to that objection. This leads to a question about whether Correia and Rosenkranz’s view is a Four-Dimensionalist version of the Growing Block Theory or a Three-Dimensionalist (...) version of the theory. I argue that there are three possible ways Correia and Rosenkranz might respond to this question, and I raise several worries for each of those ways. Then I offer some free advice about how I think Correia and Rosenkranz ought to respond to the question. (shrink)

The quantum symmetrization procedure that is used to handle systems of identical quantum particles brings into question whether the elementary constituents of matter, such as electrons, have the fundamental characteristics of persistence and reidentifiability that are attributed to classical particles. However, we presently lack a coherent conception of matter composed of entities that do not possess one or both of these fundamental characteristics. We also lack a clear a priori understanding of why systems of identical particles (as opposed to non-identical (...) particles) require special mathematical treatment, and this only in the quantum mechanical (as opposed to classical mechanical) setting. -/- Here, on the basis of a conceptual analysis of a recent mathematical reconstruction of the quantum symmetrization procedure, we argue that the need for the symmetrization procedure originates in the confluence of identicality and the active nature of the quantum measurement process. We propose a conception in which detection-events are ontologically primary, while the notion of individually persistent object is relegated to merely one way of bringing order to these events. On this basis, we outline a new interpretation of the symmetrization procedure which gives a new physical interpretation to the indices in symmetrized states and to non-symmetric measurement operators. (shrink)

McTaggart’s paradox and his A-theory and B-theory are basic notions in the contemporary philosophy of time. It is well known that the paradox was introduced by McTaggart’s paper called “The Unreality of Time” published in 1908, so that it has a one-hundred-year history. As for A-theory and B-theory, in contrast, McTaggart himself didn’t consider both of them at all. The notions of A-theory and B-theory came much later, 60 years after the paradox. Moreover, they had not been as popularized as (...) they are today until quite recently, at least after the 1990s. This paper aims to trace the origin of the notions of A-theory and B-theory and show how the debates behind them, especially objections to “spatialising time,” form the notions. (shrink)

This book critically assesses arguments for the existence of the God of classical theism, develops an innovative account of objects’ persistence, and defends new arguments against classical theism. The authors engage the following classical theistic proofs: Aquinas’s First Way, Aquinas’s De Ente argument, and Feser’s Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, Augustinian, Thomistic, and Rationalist proofs. The authors also provide the first systematic treatment of the ‘existential inertia thesis’. By connecting the thesis to relativity theory and recent developments in the philosophy of physics, and (...) by developing a variety of novel existential-inertia-friendly explanations of persistence, they mount a formidable new case against classical theistic proofs. Finally, they defend new arguments against classical theism based on abstract objects and changing divine knowledge. The text appeals to students, researchers, and others interested in classical theistic proofs, the existence and nature of God, and the ultimate explanations of persistence, change, and contingency. (shrink)

John Steele interviewed Paul Davies on the subject of time. In that interview Davies stated that time is not a flow, which is correct. His reasoning for that conclusion, however, was flawed, based on a confused version of the flowing river analogy with time. A correct version of the analogy is presented, followed by an analysis of Davies’ argument. A detailed explanation is presented of the intrinsic nature of the type of change that time is. Transdisciplinary methodology based on isomorphies (...) is used to bring forth the nature of temporal change, and reveal why time is not a flow. (shrink)

Any effort to specify identity conditions for corporations faces significant challenges. Corporations are amorphous. Nature draws no hard lines defining where they start or stop, whether in space or time. Corporations are also frustratingly dynamic. They often change the most basic aspects of their composition by exchanging parts, splitting and merging, changing ownership, and reworking fundamental internal operations. -/- Even so, we apply corporate identity conditions all the time. Both law and common intuition recognize that corporations do things—like pollute environments (...) or mislabel addictive medications—that call for judgment. Imposing judgment on corporations presupposes some implicit view of corporate identity that allows us to say, “This corporation that we now judge is the same one that misbehaved.” -/- This chapter draws on evidence from court decisions and experimental philosophy to unpack the fundamentally different visions of corporate identity implicitly encoded in law and in common intuition. The discrepancies suggest important lessons for lawmakers and corporate managers. (shrink)

The phenomenon of weakness of will – not doing what we perceive as the best action – is not recognized by neoclassical economics due to the axiomatic assumptions of the revealed preference theory (RPT) that people do what is best for them. However, present bias shows that people have different preferences over time. As they cannot be compared by the utility measurements, economists need to normatively decide between selves (short- versus long-term preferences). A problem is that neoclassical economists perceive RPT (...) as value-free and incorporate present bias within the economic framework. The axiomatic assumption that people do what is best for them leads to theoretical and practical dilemmas. This work examines weakness of will to resolve some shortcomings of RPT. The concept of intention is used to provide multiple self conception with the framework to decide between selves, which had not been done before. The paper concludes that individuals should not always follow their revealed preferences (desires) but the intentions (reason) because the latter indicates what people really want. (shrink)

Time passes iff: P and then Q, for any tensed P and Q. Mary sits; and then she stands. The view—dynamic succession—accommodates the intuition that time passes when events change their A-characteristics: my next birthday is 11 months future and then 10 months future and so on. The view implies an intimate connection between passage, persistence, and change. Persistence and change both presuppose passage. The view charts a path between A-theories (invoking past, present, future) and B-theories (invoking succession). A-theories of (...) passage fail to uncover what makes the passage process go (i.e., succession). B-theories negate tense and therefore mistakenly treat succession as a static relation. Genuine succession makes it so that what comes after replaces what came before. (shrink)

In the museum context, curators and conservators often play a role in shaping the nature of contemporary artworks. Before, during and after the acquisition of an art object, curators and conservators engage in dialogue with the artist about how the object should be exhibited and conserved. As a part of this dialogue, the artist may express specifications for the display and conservation of the object, thereby fixing characteristics of the artwork that were previously left open. This process can make a (...) significant difference to the visual appearance of the work, the nature of the audience's experience, and how the work should be interpreted. I present several case studies in which the nature of the artwork has been shaped by such dialogues, and discuss principles for resolving cases in which there is a conflict between instructions specified by the artist and those adopted by the museum. (shrink)

Virtually everyone who has advanced an ontology of art has accepted a constraint to the effect that claims about ontology should cohere with the sort of appreciative claims made about artworks within a mature and reflective version of critical practice. I argue that such a constraint, which I agree is appropriate, rules out a one-size-fits-all ontology of contemporary visual art (and thus of visual art in general). Mature critical practice with respect to contemporary art accords artists a significant degree of (...) stipulative authority regarding the features and boundaries of their works. This results in ontological variation among visual artworks. Any claim to the effect that all works belong to the same ontological category will thus come out false or uninformative. Interesting, substantive claims about ontological status can be made only in relation to specific works; that is, we must consider the ontological status of each contemporary artwork individually. The only general ontological claim that can be made about visual artworks (and also about artworks in other forms) is that they belong to the sort of thing that artists create. But this is not a substantive ontological claim. (shrink)

I argue that in Plato’s Parmenides 141a6–c4, things in time come to be simultaneously older and younger than themselves because a thing’s past and present selves are both real. As a result, whatever temporal relation is predicated of any of these past and present selves is true of the thing in question. Unlike other interpretations, this reading neither assumes that things in time have to replace their parts, nor that time is circular. I conclude that the passage is committed to (...) a conception of the ongoing present and a rejection of presentism and endurantism in favour of a growing universe theory and perdurantism. (shrink)

How might we change ourselves without ending our existence? What could we become, if we had access to an advanced form of bioengineering that allowed us dramatically to alter our genome? Could we remain in existence after ceasing to be alive? What is it to be human? Might we still exist after changing ourselves into something that is not human? What is the significance of human extinction? Steven Luper addresses these questions and more in this thought-provoking study. He defends an (...) animalist account, which says that we are organisms, but claims that we are also material objects. His book goes to the heart of the most complex questions about what we are and what we might become. Using case studies from the life sciences as well as thought experiments, Luper develops a new way of thinking about the nature of life and death, and whether and how human extinction matters. (shrink)

The grounding problem is related to the puzzle of numerically distinct spatiotemporally coincident objects. Suppose Lumpl –a lump of clay– and Goliath – the statue – are created and later destroyed, simultaneously. They would share all of their physical and spatiotemporal properties and relations. But, Goliath and Lumpl have different modal and sortal properties, which would suggest they are distinct entities, while at the same time entirely co-located. This issue creates a puzzle and raises the question of how two distinct (...) objects can be entirely colocated. Thus, on the one hand, monists (opponents of coincident objects) argue that even though we have given that thing two different names, we should keep in mind that Lumpl and Goliath, for as long as they exist, are entirely similar in terms of their physical and spatiotemporal structures. On the other hand, however, the lump and the statue have different properties. So, pluralists claim that based on Leibniz‘s law, Lumpl and Goliath would be distinct coincident objects. Monists have challenged the possibility and plausibility of the occurrence of coincident objects by the grounding problem: they think that if we accept pluralism, we have to deal with the thorny problem of what grounds the alleged modal differences between Lumpl and Goliath, given that they are similar in all their physical and spatiotemporal aspects. Some monists suspect that pluralists will not be able to find plausible grounds by means of which to explain Lumpl and Goliath‘s modal (and other) differences, and therefore conclude that the grounding problem is a compelling reason to reject pluralism as an untenable approach towards the puzzle of coincident objects. In this thesis, I attempt to show that the grounding problem, contrary to the false advertisement of some monists, does not seriously threaten the possibility and plausibility of the pluralism concerning the existence of numerically distinct spatiotemporally coincident objects. Underlining the plausibility and possibility of the pluralists‘ position, I specify most parts of this thesis as an investigation into how the grounding problem can be solved in support of pluralism. Various solutions to this problem have been proposed by pluralists from different standpoints. In general, most of these significant solutions, based upon general strategies they follow, can be classified into these two categories: the solutions which appeal to the supervenience relations (supervenience-based solutions), and the solutions which take primitivist approaches (primitivist strategies). My research proposes to take up the validity of the aforementioned strategies, and I assess them in relation to the pluralists‘ ability to solve the grounding problem. I argue that both supervenience-based solutions and the some of primitivist strategies – including the modal plenitude, sortal, and identity-based primitivism – are not winning strategies to settle the grounding problem. Considering the point mentioned, I put forward a new account of the primitivist solution to the grounding problem based on the Aristotelian notion of essence which I call ‗essential primitivism‘. I argue that the primitive essences of coincident objects can properly ground the modal and sortal properties making coincident objects distinct. (shrink)

Cities are mysteriously attractive. The more we get used to being citizens of the world, the more we feel the need to identify ourselves with a city. Moreover, this need seems in no way distressed by the fact that the urban landscape around us changes continuously: new buildings rise, new restaurants open, new stores, new parks, new infrastructures… Cities seem to vindicate Heraclitus’s dictum: you cannot step twice into the same river; you cannot walk twice through the same city. But, (...) as with the river, we want and need to say that it is the same city we are walking through every day. It is always different, but numerically self-identical. How is that possible? What sort of mysterious thing is a city? The answer, I submit, is that cities aren’t things. They are processes. Like rivers, cities unfold in time just as they extend in space, by having different temporal parts for each time at which they exist. And walking though one part and then again through another is, literally, walking through the same whole. (shrink)

As a growing area of research, the philosophy of time is increasingly relevant to different areas of philosophy and even other disciplines. This book describes and evaluates the most important debates in philosophy of time, under several subject areas: metaphysics, epistemology, physics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, rationality, and art. -/- Questions this book investigates include: Can we know what time really is? Is time possible, especially given modern physics? Must there be time because we cannot think (...) without it? What do we experience of time? How might philosophy of time be relevant to understanding the mind-body relationship or evidence in cognitive science? Can the philosophy of time help us understand biases toward the future and the fear of death? How is time relevant to art – and is art relevant to philosophical debates about time? Finally, what exactly could time travel be? And could time travel satisfy emotions such as nostalgia and regret? -/- Through asking such questions, and showing how they might be best answered, the book demonstrates the importance philosophy of time has in contemporary thought. Each of the book’s 10 chapters begins with a helpful introduction and ends with study questions and an annotated list of further readings. This and a comprehensive bibliography at the end of the book prepare the reader to go further in their study of the philosophy of time. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess the analysis of vagueness of objects in terms of the theory of constitution with respect to the notion of vague identity. Some proponents of the constitution theory see it as an advantage of their account that analysing the spatial and temporal vagueness of objects in terms of the relation of vague constitution avoids commitment to vague identity, which is seen as a controversial notion. I argue that even though the constitution theory may plausibly be applied (...) to the phenomenon of vague boundaries, it fails to account fully for other cases of spatial and temporal vagueness. There are what I call ‘mid-extension’ vagueness cases, in which the tools of the constitution theory applied in the analysis of boundary vagueness are insufficient to avoid commitment to vague identity. (shrink)

Prior left us with a problem which he stated in the following way: ‘Very roughly, it would seem that countable “things” are made or grow from bits of stuff, or from other countable “things”, that are already there. The precise logic of this process hasn’t been worked out yet, and until it has been, it seems likely that any tensed predicate logic can only be provisional in character.’ Although I disagree with much of the philosophy of time underlying Priorean tense (...) logic, the problem of presenting a coherent view of ‘countable things’ and ‘bits of stuff’ within a framework accommodating temporal reference and modal expressions along broadly the lines Prior proposed remains an interesting one. The present paper sketches a general framework within which more specific questions raised by this general issue can be addressed, and makes a number of tentative suggestions without, however, proceeding so far as to settle on and develop a definite logical theory. (shrink)

The life-long correspondence of David K. Lewis, one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, reveals the development, breadth, and depth of his philosophy in its historical context. The first of this two volume collection of letters focuses on his contributions to metaphysics, arguably where he made his greatest impact.

In this paper, I will argue that we need to consider the ‘change- makers’ if we want to provide a comprehensive theory of persistence. The classical theories of persistence, endurantism and perdurantism in all their flavours, are content with avoiding the looming contradiction in the context of Leibniz’s Law. They do not account for how change is brought about. I argue that this is not sufficient to constitute a theory of persistence and I will introduce produrantism as a new access (...) towards a comprehensive approach. (shrink)

When we think about ethics, we normally focus on a particular sort of agent: the individual person. Some philosophers have argued that we should rethink the limits of what counts as an ethically relevant unit of agency by expanding outward, and claiming that groups of people can have normative reasons for action. In this paper, I explore whether we can go in the other direction. Are there sub‐personal beings who count as agents with their own reasons for action? In particular, (...) might the temporal parts of persons, beings like “me‐in‐my‐twenties,” be thought of as normative agents? This idea, I argue, has deep attractions, and deep, but surmountable, challenges. And if we do accept this idea, I argue, this can indirectly help to support the case for thinking that groups can have reasons for action. (shrink)

This paper develops and defends a new account of B-theoretic endurantism and a new account of the metaphysics of the quantum state, and highlights the parallels between the considerations that motivate them. These new accounts are both fragmentalist, in the sense that they follow Fine (2005) in invoking a symmetric coordination relation between facts, such that facts that are pairwise incompatible (like Hugh's being happy and Hugh's being sad) can both obtain provided that they are not related by this relation. (...) However, while Fine allows that fragments can be logically incoherent— P can obtain in one fragment while not-P obtains in another—the fragmentalist accounts defended here are motivated even if we insist on logical coherence between fragments. (shrink)

Hawley begins by answering the question of why we ought to care about how things persist. We care about the persistence of many things, such as ourselves, our relatives and friends, and our possessions. The inquiry should be metaphysical and not, say, legal, because the law assumes, without inquiry, answers to metaphysical questions. Could one survive entering irreversible coma? Although the law may consider biological facts, the question is about a relation, if any, between those facts and personhood. Impatient people, (...) intuiting that such questions have no answers, insist they must be resolved by convention. But Hawley doubts that a mind possesses magical powers enabling it to create or destroy physical things with words or thoughts. To raise the issue of mind-independent objects is to enter metaphysics. (shrink)

That grass is green, that pigs don’t fly, and that you are now awake are all hard facts. But there is often said to be something soft about matters of identity over time. Is today’s village church the very church that was first built here, despite centuries of repairs and alterations? How many parts of my bicycle do I need to replace before I get a numerically different bike? If a club disbands and years later some of the original members (...) start a similar club with the same name, have we got two clubs, or one club with a discontinuous history? It is tempting to say that there are no hard answers to these questions laid up in heaven. There is no determinate fact of the matter. Those who disagree about such things are arguing about words, not facts. We are free to say what we like. (shrink)

Nel nostro universo, qualunque cosa, dalla più piccola particella alla più smisurata galassia, esiste in un qualche tempo e in un qualche luogo. Ma cosa significa esistere in un qualche tempo? Il fenomeno dell’esistenza temporale gioca un ruolo fondamentale nella comprensione dell’universo e di noi stessi quali creature temporali. Eppure è un fenomeno profondamente misterioso. L’esistenza temporale è da intendersi come una relazione? Che legami ha con l’esistenza dell’ontologia? L’esistenza temporale e la localizzazione spaziale sono due fenomeni essenzialmente differenti o (...) due istanze di un’unica relazione? Tutto ciò che esiste nel tempo esiste nel tempo nello stesso modo? Tutto ciò che è nel tempo è anche nello spazio? (shrink)

Stephen Mumford has argued that dispositionalists ought to be endurantists because perdurantism, by breaking down persisting objects in sequences of static discrete existents, is at odds with a powers metaphysics. This has been contested by Neil Williams who offers his own version of ‘powerful’ perdurance where powers function as links between the temporal parts of persisting objects. Weighing up the arguments given by both sides, I show that the profile of ‘powerful’ persistence crucially depends on how one conceptualises the processes (...) involved in the manifestation of powers. As this turns out not to be determined per se by subscribing to some view labelled ‘powers view’, further discussion is needed as to what processes are and to what kind of process theory a powers metaphysics should commit itself in order to be convincing. I defend the claim that dispositionalism is best combined with a version of process ontology that is indeed incompatible with a perdurantist analysis of persistence. However, I argue that this does not imply that dispositionalists ought to be endurantists. (shrink)