Powers

Some time ago, Joel Katzav and Brian Ellis debated the compatibility of dispositional essentialism with the principle of least action. Surprisingly, very little has been said on the matter since, even by the most naturalistically inclined metaphysicians. Here, we revisit the Katzav–Ellis arguments of 2004–05. We outline the two problems for the dispositionalist identified Katzav in his 2004 , and claim they are not as problematic for the dispositional essentialist at it first seems – but not for the reasons espoused (...) by Ellis. (shrink)

According to the leading hypothesis in primordial cosmology, the very early universe underwent a rapid phase of accelerated expansion known as cosmological inflation. Inflation ended approximately 10^{-32} s after the expansion began, through a process called reheating, during which the inflaton (the scalar field responsible for this exponential expansion) decayed into the particles of the Standard Model. In this paper, we do not address questions concerning the empirical adequacy of this cosmological scenario. Instead, we focus on two questions: 1. According (...) to inflationary cosmology, can we say that the particles of the Standard Model emerged from the inflaton, and in what sense? 2. If we claim that the interaction carriers of the Standard Model (e.g., gluons) emerged during reheating, does this imply that the corresponding physical interactions (e.g., the strong nuclear force) also emerged at that time? We argue that, when interpreted through a diachronic notion of emergence, current models of reheating already provide a positive answer to the first question. The second, however, depends on the metaphysical account of physical interaction one adopts. We propose that within a powers ontology, physical interactions can be understood as grounded in the causal profiles of fundamental dispositional properties. This framework makes it possible to regard standard interactions as having emerged simultaneously with their physical carriers in the wake of inflation. (shrink)

I argue that a powers-based metaphysics radically reconfigures the existing free will problematic. This is different from claiming that such an approach solves the ill-conceived problems that emerge from Humean-Kantian default commitments.

The phenomenal powers view claims that phenomenal properties metaphysically necessitate their effects in virtue of how they feel, and thereby constitute non-Humean causal powers. For example, pain necessitates that subjects who experience it try to avoid it in virtue of feeling bad. I argue for this view based on the inconceivability of certain phenomenal properties necessitating different effects than their actual ones, their ability to predict their effects without induction, and their ability to explain their effects without appeal to laws (...) or regularities. I also offer a harmony argument according to which the view offers the best explanation for otherwise seemingly fortunate psychophysical regularities. I then outline the view’s main implications for the metaphysics of causation and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

An increasingly popular view amongst metaphysicians holds that causation involves causal powers interacting to bring about a collective result. In a recent paper, however, Baltimore has raised a challenge—the interaction gap—confronting any theory which includes interacting powers. Baltimore considers two approaches to the interaction of powers—contribution combination and mutual manifestation—and argues that only the latter has the resources to answer his challenge. In this paper, I argue that the challenge is bigger than Baltimore realises and cannot be answered by either (...) view. I show that the challenge can be answered by adopting a third view of powers. (shrink)

Michel Ghins's Scientific Realism and Laws of Nature: A Metaphysics of Causal Powers is a commendable exploration of the metaphysical foundations of scientific inquiry. The book, thoughtfully structured into six chapters, boldly advances a comprehensive and unified account of scientific theorizing, natural laws, and the ontology of properties. In an era where philosophical discourse often fragments into narrowly focused projects, Ghins's work offers a welcome counterpoint, providing a systematic and ambitious investigation into these distinctive questions of the metaphysics of science.

The idea that causation involves the production of changes due to the exertion of influence of something on something else—the core idea of causal realism—used to be the default view. Today this idea is at the heart of (i) transmission/causal process accounts, (ii) mechanistic accounts, and (iii) powers-based accounts. However, as I have previously argued (Ingthorsson 2021) the above-mentioned approaches are based—to varying degree—on the very problematic assumption that causal influence is essentially unidirectional; that it passes from whatever is the (...) cause to the effect. As first pointed out be Mario Bunge (1959), the idea that causal influence is unidirectional is incompatible with what is today considered a scientific fact, notably that all interactions are perfectly reciprocal; whenever any object exerts an influence on any other object, the latter simultaneously exerts the same kind of influence, of the same magnitude, on the former. Drawing on Bunge’s result, I have developed a fourth approach to efficient causation that accepts the reciprocity of interactions (Ingthorsson 2002 & 2021). According to this view a cause is not the action of something on something else that receives the influence, but the reciprocal action between powerful particulars which results in a modification of both sides, producing a new state of affairs. In this paper, I present the core ideas of the four different approaches to causal efficacy, what I think is problematic with the first three and finally attempt to compare how well the four approaches fare in explaining two often discussed types of causal interactions: (i) collisions between billiard balls, and (ii) how water dissolves salt. I argue that only reciprocal actions between powerful particulars can plausibly claim to fully account for these phenomena, in a manner compatible with the theories and findings of the natural sciences. (shrink)

This book advocates dispositional essentialism, the view that natural properties have dispositional essences.1 So, for example, the essence of the property of being negatively charged is to be disposed to attract positively charged objects. From this fact it follows that it is a law that all negatively charged objects will attract positively 10 charged objects; and indeed that this law is metaphysically necessary. Since the identity of the property of being negatively charged is determined by its being related in a (...) certain way to the property of being positively charged, in any world in which these properties exist they must be related so that all negatively charged objects attract positively charged objects. 15 Bird opposes his dispositional essentialism to the view that properties are categorical in nature, with their identities grounded in quiddities that are not exhausted by their relations to other properties. The main exponents of this view are D.M. Armstrong and David Lewis. They take the laws of nature to be contingent though they entertain very different views about their nature: Armstrong is a necessitarian 20 about laws, taking them to be relations of nomic necessitation between universals, while Lewis is a Humean about laws who takes them to be a special kind of regularity. The book is a sustained defence of the dispositional essentialist conception of properties and laws against the competing conceptions espoused by Armstrong and Lewis. One rough way to characterize the difference between these conceptions is to say that 25 the categoricalist sees properties as passive and inert with the laws of nature being fixed independently of the nature of properties whereas, in contrast, the dispositional essentialist sees properties as active potencies from which the laws of nature automatically spring. A slightly more tendentious way to express the difference is to say, as Bird does, that the categoricalist views embrace the Humean doctrine that there are no 30 necessary connexions in nature, while the dispositional essentialist view, on the other hand, repudiates this doctrine.. (shrink)

According to Russellian panpsychism, the physical is grounded in the mental, or more precisely, the phenomenal. This view has been argued to avoid the main problems of physicalism, according to which the mental is grounded in the physical, dualism, according to which the mental and the physical are co-fundamental, and subjective idealism, according to which only the mental is fundamental and the physical is merely an illusion. But on closer examination, pure panpsychism—according to which the physical is fully grounded in (...) the phenomenal—faces analogues of the main problems of either physicalism and subjective idealism, and impure panpsychism—according to which the physical is merely partially grounded in the phenomenal and partially in non-phenomenal relations or other features—faces analogues of the main problems of dualism. This paper offers a version of Russellian panpsychism, based on combining it with the phenomenal powers view (Mørch 2017, 2018a, 2019b), which avoids or at least significantly diminishes all these analogous problems. (shrink)

This paper is meant to offer a better understanding of the philosophical view called 'powers ontology' and its relevance to science. After briefly discussing on the one hand the intuitive pull of dispositional notions and their application in science (micro-physics in particular), and on the other hand the metaphysical and epistemological issues typically arising from the application of powers in science, we defend a dynamic notion of the dispositional essence, where the individuation of the power does not the depend on (...) the manifestations brought about by a certain activity, nor the stimulus conditions enabling such activity, but on the very activity itself. In the last part of the paper, we discuss two cases of theoretical unification in early 20th century physics: Einstein’s equivalence principle and de Broglie wave-particle duality principle. We show how a powers ontology, intended in the sense described above, would be able to elegantly account for how these unifications were achieved and why they were successful. (shrink)

This paper introduces emergent moral non-naturalism, which holds that moral properties depend on descriptive properties and normative bridge principles for their instantiation, where these principles specify instantiation conditions of moral properties in terms of descriptive properties. Continuous with the non-naturalist tradition in metaethics, this view takes moral properties to be non-causal properties; in accordance with the emergentist tradition in metaphysics, it takes them to confer powers on their bearers. Reconciling these two claims of non-causality and power conferral, emergent moral non-naturalism (...) construes moral properties in terms of their non-causal powers. (shrink)

An account of what sort of causal integration is necessary for an agent to exercise agency is offered in support of a soft-line response to Derk Pereboom’s four-case argument against source-compatibilism. I argue that, in cases of manipulation, the manipulative activity affects the identity of the causal process of which it is a part. Specifically, I argue that causal processes involving direct manipulation fail to count as exercises of intentional agency because they involve heteromesial causal deviance. In contrast, standard deterministic (...) causal processes do not involve heteromesial causal deviance and are agency-preserving. The upshot is that there is a relevant difference between a causal process involving direct manipulation by another agent and a deterministic causal process that involves no such intervention. If this is right, then Pereboom’s four-case argument does not pose a threat to source-compatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility. (shrink)

While Aristotle counts many things as members of the category of substances that seem intuitively to be substances, one wonders whether Aristotle is right not to include social entities like families, city-states, or mobs, in any of his explications of substances. According to Aristotle, the persons who are in a social entity bear active powers, but he is silent on whether the social entity itself can. In this paper, I examine whether Aristotle rightly and intentionally does not include social entities (...) in his list of things that are substances and can thus have active powers. I argue that either communities are substances in virtue of their status as bearers of powers or Aristotle is wrong that only substances are the bearers of powers. To make this argument, I begin with a primer on Aristotle’s discussion of active powers, followed by an account of how Aristotle regards social entities in the Politics. Next, I discuss one contemporary view on the ontology of social entities with an eye for how this account shapes our understanding of the actions and powers of social entities. Putting these pieces together, the paper will articulate Aristotle’s plural power problem, which will require defenders of Aristotle to pick a horn of the dilemma to make Aristotle’s views compatible with a more accurate understanding of social entities. (shrink)

If Pascal is essentially present in common representations and in the studies devoted to him as a spiritual and religious author, rarely has a thinker given force such a place in his reading of reality. In his view, it is the ‘queen of the world’, and even the queen of queens, since it governs the formidable powers of custom and imagination. We show here that Pascal’s analyses of force go far beyond the political framework in which they are generally confined. (...) Indeed, Pascal’s reign of force seems to constitute a philosophical – as well as a scientific – thesis on the nature of reality: we live in a physical world, in a world of bodies entirely governed by force and, although we find it hard to recognise, along with concupiscence it constitutes ‘the source of all our actions’. This study thus sets out to highlight what makes Pascal a great thinker on force, one who will inspire the most daring philosophers in their speculations. (shrink)

Power metaphysicians are concerned with, well, powers. Theists claim interest in the most powerful entity there is, God. As such, recent work on the ontology of powers may well have much to offer theists when thinking about God’s power. In this paper I start to provide a metaphysics of God’s ‘power’, something many definitions of omnipotence make reference to. In particular I will be interested in explicating how a power ontology can account for the strength and range of God’s power, (...) as well as showing how this account of divine power can fit with a timeless conception of God. (shrink)

This book provides an exhaustive overview of the ontology of relations. Moreover, it offers a detailed defense of the existence of irreducible relations in the universe and shows that entities such as powers should be better thought of as relations. At first, the author discusses many classical arguments for and against the existence of relations and draws preliminary distinctions between internal and external relations and symmetrical and non-symmetrical relations. He defends the existence of irreducible relations against several objections, most notably (...) three Bradleyan regresses. In response to these objections, the author argues that both internal and external relations should be thought of as relational modes and that intentional, temporal and spatial relations are external. He also presents several problems that are typically taken to affect non-symmetrical relations and introduces one new version of a theory to deal with them-the O-role theory. Finally, the author explores essential dependence relations and causal dependence relations and defends the view that power are relational modes. The Ontology of Relations will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and history of philosophy. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian views of goodness hold that the goodness of something is strictly connected with its goal(s). In this article, I shall present a power-based, Neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. I shall claim that there are certain powers (i.e., Goodness-Conferring Powers, or GC-powers in short) that confer goodness upon their bearers and upon the resulting actions. And I shall suggest that GC-powers are strongly teleological tendencies. In Section 1, I shall present the kernel of Neo-Aristotelian conceptions of goodness. In Section 2, I (...) shall introduce strongly teleological powers and tendencies. In Section 3, GC-powers will be characterized. I shall also examine a number of options with regard to their number and features and how to single out their goodness value. In Section 4, I shall focus on good agents and on three distinct ways in which they may be good: tendential goodness, actual goodness, and purely actual goodness. Relatedly, among the actions connected with a certain GC-power, I shall also distinguish between primary and secondary actions and between pure and impure actions. In Section 5, good actions will be examined. Actions may be good in three distinct ways. Indeed, actions may be endowed with primary goodness, secondary goodness and preventative goodness. In Section 6, I shall face the remaining problems. (shrink)

[4th SBFA Prize 2025 Winning Essay] In this paper I present an argument for causal necessity. Firstly, I introduce the theoretical background about necessary connections and discuss some of the senses of necessitation that can be found in the literature. After inconsistencies are detected in each of them, I develop an additional sense from one of the previous contributions: causal necessity is to be explained by causal production and simultaneous causality. Secondly, I present the contemporary conception of causality in metaphysics, (...) which I call the received view. The received view has as two of its tenets an event ontology and a sequential approach to the structure of causality. Sequential causality is submitted to a recently developed counterargument to stress its untenability. Thirdly, I explore an alternative to sequential causality: simultaneous causality. I expand the argument against sequential causality and show how simultaneous causality entails causal necessity. Fourthly, I consider some potential replies to the argumented presented. Finally, some further considerations are drawn. (shrink)

Although Wittgenstein did not concern himself much with politics his work is useful in getting clearer about the notion of power in a number of ways. In the first place, although Wittgenstein did not have much to say about power he did have quite a lot to say about ways of getting clearer about concepts and he made clarity or understanding a central aim in his philosophy. One of the ways in which he helped us to get clearer about concepts (...) was to guide us away from the assumption that all of the items subsumed under a term must have something in common. Wittgenstein highlighted that some terms, such as 'game' and 'number' were family resemblance terms and it is plausible that many terms used in discussing political matters are family resemblance terms. He also reminded us of the diversity of ways in which we use language and of the fact that speech takes place within a rich weave of activities. He called these different uses of language 'language games'. In analysing power it is useful to remember that discussions of power take place in many different spheres, in religion, in politics, in meteorology, chemistry, etc., and that we speak about power in many different language games. Moreover, Wittgenstein warned us against thinking that the methods of the natural sciences can be transferred straightforwardly to the social sciences and to philosophy. One of the problems with studies of power conducted in the past is that they have tried to be 'scientific' by focussing on observable instances of the exercise of power. Finally, this paper will briefly look at remarks from Culture & Value where Wittgenstein does talk about power: where he distinguishes power from its bases and brings our attention to the fact that human powers are two-way powers. (shrink)

Privacy: Totally Non-Existent; Control: Totally Non-Existent; What Your Intuition is Telling You is The Truth: We’re in Deep Trouble.

The view that to act is to cause change and that to be an agent is to be the causer of an action’s result has gained traction in the past twenty years or so. This view seems to have two significant corollaries. First, there is no distinction between doing an action and causing its result. Second, any two actions that have the same result will turn out to be identical. Ruben (2018) has recently used the first corollary to challenge the (...) view, and the second corollary raises further problems for the view. This article aims to refine this view and defend it against the challenges that arise out of its two corollaries. It is argued that being the cause of an action’s result is not the same as being its causer and that doing an action is not just causing its result but causing it in a specific way. (shrink)

This paper explores the distinction between active and passive powers. Interest in the distinction has recently been revived in some quarters of the philosophy of action as some have sought to elucidate the distinction between action and passion (the changes that happen to a substance) in terms of the former (Hyman, 2015; Mayr, 2011; Lowe 2013). If there is a distinction between active and passive powers, parallel to the distinction between action and passion, what is it? In this paper, I (...) distinguish two ways of drawing it. According to the first one, active and passive powers are distinguished by the ways in which their manifestations come about. According to the second, they are distinguished by their directedness, i.e. what they are powers to do. Both accounts are examined and the latter is defended against the former. I argue that active powers are powers to alter, modify, corrupt or change something. (shrink)

Taking steps from Wilson’s distinction between strong and weak emergence, in this paper I cast doubts on the prospect of weak emergence. After discussing the relationship between properties set at different levels and supporting different counterfactuals and laws, I discuss one crucial condition for a property to be weakly emergent, one that is usually taken as the primary motivation for emergence, that of being “realization indifferent”. I set an argument aimed at showing that this realization indifference does not accord with (...) systematic relations holding between properties set at the mental level vis-a-vis their realizers. Since it is not possible to have mental properties which are not systematic, mental properties cannot be weakly emergent properties. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider recent attempts to metaphysically explain agentive modality in terms of conditionals. We suggest that the best recent accounts face counterexamples, and more worryingly, they take some agentive modality for granted. In particular, the ability to perform basic actions features as a primitive in these theories. While it is perfectly acceptable for a semantics of agentive modal claims to take some modality for granted in getting the extension of action claims correct, a metaphysical explanation of agentive (...) modality cannot, at least not in the way that conditional approaches to agentive modality do. We argue that this problem was present even in the classical conditional analysis. By a pessimistic induction, we suggest that, probably, no conditional approach to agentive modality will succeed. (shrink)

I wish to prove in this article that Thomas Aquinas was a metaontological pluralist, i.e., that he held that there are many, non-equivalent and irreducible dependence relations in the universe. In this respect, I shall focus on Aquinas' doctrine of the four causes and on the dependence relationships between matter and form in material substances. Subsequently, I shall also reconstruct Aquinas' doctrines by explicitly appealing to metaontological pluralism. I shall explore two routes towards Aquinas' metaontological pluralism: one based on cases (...) of apparent mutual dependence and the other based on the asymmetry of natural priority. Finally, I shall provide two original interpretations of the doctrine of the four causes and of the dependence relationships between matter and form. Such interpretations will be based on the metaphysics of powers. In Section 1 I shall introduce metaontological pluralism and the two routes. In Section 2 I shall examine Aquinas' doctrine of the four causes. In Section 3 I shall provide an interpretation of that doctrine based on powers. In Section 4 I shall consider the dependence relationships between matter and form in material substances. In Section 5 I shall provide an interpretation of such relationships based on powers. (shrink)

To solve this problem , they usually use an intermediate layer of retarding materials such as Ta, w or Mo as a penetration barrier to improve the thermal stability of the Si/Cu layer . In the characterization of Si/Ta/Cu nanoparticles and multilayer systems, there is an effect of negative bias voltage on the improvement of the electrical and structural properties of the permeation barrier of the Ta sputtering layer in the Si/Ta system. Surface processes of the Si layer, including burning, (...) are carried out by plasma and ion beam technology. This kind of integrated circuits with their unique characteristics in the nanometer scale have various applications of mesoscopic systems. (shrink)

Nanowires are less than 100 nm in diameter and can be as small as 3 nm. Typically, nanowires are more than 1000 times larger than their diameter. This huge difference in length-to-diameter ratio compared to nanowires is often referred to as 1D materials. This leads to unique properties not seen in bulk materials, The minute size of nanowires means that the quantum mechanical effects of are of great importance. "Quantum Wires" They use quantum mechanics to produce wires with a wide (...) range of unique electrical properties. These features include quantum tunneling, which allows wires made of carbon nanotubes to conduct very high with electrons passing through the wire in a ballistic manner. > In the immersion method, nanowires have enough time to transfer from the particles of nanowires to the holes ; The step of forming uniform nanoparticles is done slowly and finally uniform nanowires are formed. (shrink)

Note: The field-effect tunnel transistor nMOS is an experimental type of transistor. Even if its structure is very similar to a metal-oxide semiconductor field-effect transistor nMOS , the basic switching mechanisms in these two transistors differ from each other; nMOS instead of exhibiting thermionic emission modulation, changes through a quantum tunnel modulation 12> They change through a dam. The field-effect tunneling transistor nMOS, as an alternative to conventional CMOS by enabling the voltage supply (VDD) with ultra-low power consumption, enables energy-efficient (...) computing during the sub-threshold slope (SS) range. This type of device has a reverse-bias gate structure, which is usually called a tunnel field-effect transistor nMOS. For low power applications, nMOS is considered. This device has less static leakage current than a MOSFET and is more resistant to SCEs. The most outstanding feature of nMOS is the capacity to produce a reverse subthreshold swing (SS) of less than the 60 mV/decade thermal limit (at 300 K), which is related to common reverse mode nMOSs. A pseudo-thermal SS is achievable because the drain current in nMOSs is generated by source-to-channel carrier injection, which is often under the band tunneling radius. It is placed in the quantum mechanical band (BTBT). Transistor speed nMOS is proportional to the current. The higher the current, the faster the transistor will be able to amplify and charge (the sequential capacitor voltage). For a given transistor speed and maximum acceptable subthreshold leakage, the subthreshold slope thus defines a minimum threshold voltage. Decreasing the threshold voltage is an essential part of the idea to scale the constant amount of nMOS to overcome some challenges associated with the nMOS structure, such as its need for ultra-sharp doping profiles; however, such devices may suffer from gate leakage due to the presence of large vertical fields in the nMOS transistor structure. (shrink)

Micro and nano-electromechanical systems ( MEMS / NEMS ) are devices in which the physical motion of a micro or nano-scale structure is controlled by an electronic circuit or vice versa. MEMS and NEMS can be used to build sensitive sensors and stable timing devices. Nano System is a function at the molecular scale. This includes both current work and more advanced concepts. In its core meaning, nanotechnology refers to the predicted ability to make items from the bottom up, using (...) techniques and tools that are produced to make complete, high-performance products. Nano System Introduced the idea of nano-scale "assembly" that could make its own copy. Other aspects of the desired complexity with atomic control in Nano Systems Nano Systems are very widespread and practical. Nanocomputers and nanoassemblers are also a subset of Nano Systems. Nanoparticles are the main components of all nanosystems. To produce nanoparticles with the help of nanotechnology, changes can be made in atoms by controlling the properties. When materials are studied at the nanoscale, the reactions and behavior of atoms are compared to those at the molecular level. (shrink)

Electron beam lithography provides the possibility of precise control of nanostructure characteristics that form the basis of various nanotechnologies. The nanostructure fabrication and measurement group advances lithography precision at the nanometer scale and creates processes for manufacturing innovative devices and standards in physical fields ranging from photonics to fluids.< /span>Such measurements create a positive feedback loop for the fabrication and measurement of nanostructures.Electron beam lithography is used for pattern standards for atomic force correlation microscopy and ultra-resolution optical microscopy, with highthroughput (...) precision localization and process parameter characterization and optimization. (shrink)

Nano fullerenes with the ability to store electrostatic energy that can be used as nano supercapacitors with very high capacity. Also, with these nanotubes, the nervous network can be repaired. Carbon nano fullerenes are allotropes of carbon such as diamond and graphite. These compounds are made of carbon and take on spherical and elliptical shapes. Those that are spherical are called buckyballs.Fullerenes do not have much chemical activity. The width of the graphite plate is about a few nanometers. The length (...) of the nanotubes ranges from a few micrometers to less than a meter. Their unique molecular structure creates unusual macroscopic properties. Nano supercapacitor can store 100 times more energy than previous devices of its kind. Finally, such devices can store waves of energy from renewable sources such as wind and deliver that energy to the power grid when needed. In general, nanoelectric supercapacitors can store large amounts of energy, but they tend to charge slowly and wear out quickly. Meanwhile, capacitors have a longer life and can be discharged quickly, but store much less total energy. In order to make nano supercapacitors, nanostructured arrays of electrostatic capacitors can be created.Electrostatic nanocapacitors are the simplest type of electronic energy storage device. They store electrical charge on the surface of two metal electrodes separated by an insulating material. The electrical storage capacity of the nano supercapacitor is directly proportional to the surface area of these sandwich-like electrodes. (shrink)

Fullerenes are nanometer-sized molecules that, in their simplest form, form 60 carbon atoms of a graphite layer with a three-dimensional structure. 60 Unlike diamond and graphite, whose molecules are continuous, fullerenes are closed molecules: they are like C60 and... (60) fullerenes, which are also called buckyball and buckytube, include nanotubes, nanofibers, fullerene has a structure similar to graphite, but instead of completely hexagonal sections, carbon atoms are placed in the vertices of the 5th or 7th polygons.

FinFEET nanotransistors are field-effect nanotransistors (metal-oxide-semiconductor) that are made on asubstrate. The gate is located on two, three, or four sides of the channel or is wrapped. The channel forms adouble gate structure. These devices are given the general name "finfets" because the source/drain region formsfins on the silicon surface. FinFET devices, compared to flat technology and using nanowires in the structureand (complementary metal oxide and semiconductor), < a i=8>have significantly faster switching and highercurrent density.Due to the reduction of the (...) scale of semiconductor components and integrated circuits to thenanometer range, in the FinFET nanotransistor, the reduction of scale causes more short channel effects, lessgate control, an exponential increase in leakage currents, severe process changes, and power densities tobecome unmanageable. The connection between the carbon and metal nanotubes used to connect the sourceand the drain forms the Schottky barrier (SB) in a FinFET nanotransistor. The formation of Schottky barriers inthe source and drain of a transistor causes a significant decrease in the drain current of FinFET nanotransistors. (shrink)

The development of biosensors to measure the concentration of dissolved oxygen in the blood began. This sensor is also called COBD because it covers the surface of the electrode with an enzyme whose constituent is sometimes called (electro-calorie). Later, it helped oxidize glucose. This sensor was used to measure blood sugar. In the same Bapvshandn electrode, an enzyme that has the ability to convert urea into ammonium carbonate in the electrode material ++ ion, NH4, was used to create biosensors that (...) could measure the urea in the blood or urine. Each of these two early biosensors used a different transducer in its signal conversion section . In the first type, blood sugar was measured by measuring the electric current generated (ammetric),while in the urea sensor, the urea concentration was measured based on the electric charge created sensors are made (.Potentiometric) may someday the patient without having to visit a doctor and only on the basis of information that a COBD or Doctor-Board-on-Chip provides, the type of disease has been detected. And then injected into the blood. This will drastically reduce the dosage of the required drugs directly from the side effects of the Effect-Side drug , because the drug is very low and is also sent to the required place in the body. The drug acts directly on a biosensor that converts the biological response into an electrical signal and consists of two main components: the receptor and the detector. The ability to select one biosensor is determined by the receiving section. Enzymes, antibodies, and lipid layers are good examples of receptors. The task of the detector is to convert the physical or chemical changes by detecting the material to be analyzed into an obvious factor that the detectors can select in the type of reaction of the electrical signal. They do not have the perfect .They are electrochemical, optical, piezoelectric, and thermal. In the type of electrochemistry the action takes place in one of the following ways: amperometric, potentiometric, and impedance. The most common electrodes used in the potentiometric type include: the Glass electrode, the Selective-Ion ion electrode, and the FET sensitive-Ion ion field-effect transistor or ISFET. In general, a biosensor consists of an immobilized static biological system, such as a cell bundle, a micro enzyme, or an antibody, and a measuring. In the presence of a certain molecule, the biological system changes the properties of the environment. (shrink)

Note: Many types of nanosensors are designed using CP nanomaterials for nanobiological applications. (Conductive surface) The oxidation of conductive polymeric materials is easily altered by redox mechanisms, and the charge transfer properties of these materials are affected by structural parameters, such as diameter and dimensions. CP materials are able to provide sensitive and rapid responses to specific biological and chemical species. Techniques such as chemical polymerization are often used to make CP nanomaterials. Manufacturing strategies can be divided into three categories: (...) hard mold synthesis, soft mold synthesis, and mold-free synthesis. The most widely used conductive polymers in nanosensors are nanomaterials made from CP due to their unique chemical and electrical properties resulting from the properties of their pie-electron nanosystem. Many modeling and functionalization technologies are being developed to control the location, distribution, amount, or structure and orientation of biological nanomolecules at the nanomaterial level. Therefore, our level of contact between biological nanomolecules and nanomaterials is of particular importance in countless applications. Covalent and non-covalent modifications are two general methods for coupling biological molecules and CP nanomaterials. Covalent functionalization is a chemical process in which a strong bond or relationship between nanomaterials and biological molecules is formed. In many cases, surface chemical modifications are required to create active groups that can bind to biomolecules. Unlike covalent functionalization, in the non-covalent method, nanomolecules can be removed without destroying the geometric and electronic structure on the surface. Nanomaterials are formed. Conclusion : The large surface-to-volume ratio in nanostructures and the high potential for signal amplification provide ideal conditions for marking and detecting biological elements in the structure of nanosensors. (shrink)

Nanosupercapacitors, also called electrochemical supercapacitors or nanocapacitors, thus emerge as promising fuel sources with astonishingly fast charge release rates. Incredibly fast charging occurs. Created to improve power execution (high-speed capability), they still depend on similar inherent breakpoints. About the electrical characteristics and the manufacturing process of a nanocapacitor structure using (metalinsulator-carbon-metal nanotube layers). This structure shows high capacitance and the possibility of extremely high integration density due to the unique structure of the nanotubes. Nanoscale patterns and a high aspect ratio (...) are obtained by electron beam lithography to make these vertical nanostructures. This structure can be used to replace capacitors that use a silicon pillar structure in dynamic random access memory (DRAM) or as a nanoscale capacitor for various nanoelectronic devices. .To build nano supercapacitors, high voltage and high energy density developed multilayer nanostructure technologies to make an improvement in capacitor performance. Controlled sputtering techniques can deposit ultra-smooth submicron layers of dielectric and conductive materials. Using this technology, high voltage nanosupercapacitors with an order of magnitude improvement in energy density may be achievable.. Dielectrics and new materials that are well understood for use with this technology. Nano supercapacitors developed with multi-layer nanostructure technology are inherently solid and show excellent mechanical and thermal properties. >Dielectric materials and exchanges design with more layers. Nanostructure multilayer capacitors will be developed and specified. (shrink)

Philosophical analyses of causation have been centred on the question of what causation is. More precisely speaking, philosophers tend to address four different issues: metaphysical (what is causation out there?), epistemological (how can a causal claim be established and assessed?), conceptual (what does the word ‘cause’ mean?), and methodological (what methods ought one to use in order to establish and assess causal claims?). This chapter argues that the practical issue of causation (what is a causal claim for in practice?) is (...) highly relevant to the metaphysical, epistemological, conceptual, and methodological issues of causation. Any philosophical enquiry into causation without an examination of this practical issue is incomplete. In other words, a promising approach to causation ought to take all of the metaphysical, epistemological, conceptual, methodological, and practical issues into account. (shrink)

English Translation from "(Anti)Necessitarismo, Simultaneidade e Possibilidade de Prevenção". In: Merlussi, P. & Nunes, R. de O. (2024). Metafísica Analítica. Toledo: Editora Quero Saber.

The causal closure of the physical poses a familiar causal exclusion problem for the special sciences that stems from the idea that if closure is true, then fundamental physical properties do all the causal work involved in bringing about physical effects. In this paper I aim to show that the strongest causal closure principle that is not ruled out by some simple physics in fact allows for a certain kind of downward causation, which in turn makes room for robust special (...) science autonomy. I focus on the case of vector composition, arguing that it involves irreducibly multilevel causation. To give a complete causal explanation of what goes on in cases that involve the effects of multiple forces, we need to appeal not only to the fundamental properties that generate those forces, but also to geometric properties that determine how multiple vectors compose. However, if all the causal work involved in such cases were due to fundamental physical properties, there would be a one-level explanation available. Hence, I argue, it cannot be the case that fundamental physical properties do all the causal work. The extra causal work, I suggest, comes from the fact that the causal powers bestowed by fundamental physical properties have irreducibly geometric manifestation conditions. I defend the resulting form of downward causation as a solution to the problem of special science autonomy, and discuss two potential accounts of its source, in terms of the debate between kinematic and dynamic theories of the origins of spacetime symmetries. (shrink)

This paper presents and critically discusses the “logos approach to quantum mechanics” from the point of view of the current debates concerning the relation between metaphysics and science. Due to its alleged direct connection with quantum formalism, the logos approach presents itself as a better alternative for understanding quantum mechanics than other available views. However, we present metaphysical and methodological difficulties that seem to clearly point to a different conclusion: the logos approach is on an epistemic equal footing among alternative (...) realist approaches to quantum mechanics. (shrink)

We examine Sophie Gibb’s emergent property-dualist theory of mental causation as double-prevention. Her account builds on a commitment to a version of causal realism based on a powers metaphysic. We consider three objections to her account. We show, by drawing out the implications of the ontological commitments of Gibb’s theory of mental causation, that the first two objections fail. But, we argue, owing to worries about cases where there is no double-preventive role to be played by mental properties, her account, (...) which solely affords mental properties a double-preventive role, is incomplete and vulnerable to a causal exclusion objection. We propose a friendly modification to her theory of mental causation that is consistent with her theory’s ontological commitments. Specifically, we sketch an account on which mental properties have a more pronounced causal-structuring role that is not exhausted by the role Gibb assigns them as double-preventers. The result is a novel emergentist theory of mental causation. (shrink)

A recent, seemingly appealing version of the powerful qualities view defines properties’ qualitativity via an essentialist claim and their powerfulness via a grounding claim. Roughly, this approach holds that properties are qualities because they have qualitative essences, while they are powerful because their instances or essences ground causal-modal facts. I argue that this theory should be replaced with one that defines the powerfulness of qualities in terms of both a grounding claim and a ‘meta-grounding’ claim. Specifically, I formulate and defend (...) a view on which qualities are powerful just if instances of those qualitiesat least partiallyground dispositionsin virtue of the essences of those qualities. (shrink)

Do powers have parts? Mereological thinking is typically guided by two different metaphors: building versus carving. The building picture treats wholes as constructed from fundamental bits; the carving treats wholes as the result of carving some interconnected space. After considering some suggestions for how to view powers as built from other components, this chapter opts for the carving picture and suggests that a mereology of powers can be generated by carving the underlying space of an interconnected web of fundamental powers. (...) The space of powers is a network of manifestation/triggering connections that can be modelled graph-theoretically where the identity of a fundamental power is importantly tied up with its position in the overall structure. This chapter considers the idea that powers are completely identified by their position in the structure (as pandispositionalists have thought), which then places limits on the sorts of structures that powers theorists can help themselves to. This chapter also considers another novel suggestion on the identity of powers borrowed from non-well-founded set theory. It shows how to identify principles governing ‘carving’ the web into groups of closely connected powers, such that one group can naturally be called ‘part’ of another group, and explore the resulting mereology. (shrink)

This article investigates the causal efficacy of social properties, which faces the following puzzle. First, for both intuitive and scientific reasons, it seems social properties have causal import. But, second, social properties are also characteristically extrinsic: to have some social property depends, in typical cases, on what one’s society is like around them. And, third, there is good reason to doubt that extrinsic properties make a genuine causal contribution. After elaborating on these three claims, I defend the following resolution to (...) the puzzle: social causation occurs at the level at which social properties are intrinsic. (shrink)

My interest in this chapter is to investigate this crossroad as applied to mental properties, considered powers. In particular, I scrutinize the possibility of taking the phenomenal property of feeling pain as a complex power or disposition. This possibility comes in handy in discussing panpsychism, the view that the ultimate elements of reality are phenomenal properties, which would ground physical properties as well.

Analyzing causation in terms of Woodward's interventionist theory and describing the structure of the world in terms of causal powers are usually regarded as quite different projects in contemporary philosophy. Interventionists aim to give an account of how causal relations can be empirically discovered and described, without committing themselves to views about what causation really is. Causal powers theorists engage in precisely the latter project, aiming to describe the metaphysical structure of the world. In this paper, I argue that interventionism (...) can benefit from incorporating considerations about causal powers. I describe a previously undiscussed problem for Woodward's definition of an intervention variable that arises when interventionist causal models include disjunctive variables. This problem is solved not by excluding disjunctive (or logically compound) variables per se, but by excluding variables whose values represent disjunctions of too different causal powers. This suggests that interventionism and causal powers theories may be less distant from each other than is often assumed. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of intersectional feminist theory by critically examining the notion of identity implicitly assumed in major critiques of intersectionality. Critics take intersectionality to fragment women along the lines of identity categories such as race, class, and sexuality. Underlying this interpretation, I argue, is the metaphysical assumption that identity is a fixed entity. This is a misunderstanding of identity that neglects how identity is actually lived. By exploring how Asian American women experience their “Asian” identity in their (...) everyday lives (e.g., the “Asian-as-patriarchal vs. White-as-gender-progressive” stereotype, growing anti-Asian racism amid COVID-19, and Asian-Black feminist solidarities), I demonstrate that Asian identity is not fixed but changing according to how it is related to power. I identify and discuss three characteristic types of the identity-power relationship: manifestation of power-as-oppression through the construction of identity, reproduction of power-as- oppression, and creation of new forms of power, namely resistance and solidarity, through the reconstruction of identity. The lives of multiply-oppressed women (e.g., Asian women) can be understood as the locus at which the identity-power relationship is worked out, that is, the power dynamics of oppression are manifested, reproduced, and resisted through the (re)construction of identity. Building on this analysis and engaging discussions on non-ideal theory in social/political philosophy, I argue that intersectional feminist theory can be best explained as a non-ideal theory in a strong sense: a theory that, by focusing on the lives of the multiply oppressed, presents the intersecting dynamics of oppression as central and theory-guiding. (shrink)

The bulk of the literature concerning the governing role of non-Humean laws has been concentrated on the alleged incapability of higher order nomic facts to determine the regularities in the behaviour of actual objects, the so-called Inference Problem. Most recently Ioannidis, Livanios and Psillos (2021) argue that an adequate solution to the Inference Problem requires an answer to the question of how nomic relations manage to ‘tell’ properties what to do. Ioannidis et al. dub the difficulty that all extant accounts (...) of governing laws face to give such an answer, the Governing Problem and introduce a Dualist Model, according to which the specific behaviour of things in the world is the outcome of both the thin powers things have to be subjected to laws, and certain nomic features of the world. The aim of this paper is to show that the most plausible form of the Dualist Model can provide the basis for a novel version of the Powerful Qualities View about properties. To this end it presents ways of developing two aspects of the Dualist Model. It defends the view that nomic relations must be relata-specific in order to play their theoretical role within the Model and provides arguments for the view that natural properties should have the minimum (compatible with the core tenets of the Model) modal strength. (shrink)