Substance

In this paper I try to combine the objectology of Meinong with a neutral substance monism of the kind originally proposed by Spinoza (deus sive natura). Yet Spinoza was still stuck in the Cartesian paradigm and therefore rather gave a dual monism (extensio et intellectus) than a proper neutral monism. I propose that there are only two attributes of the one substance: existence and non-existence. Everything else is/are mere modes of them.

"This 'paper' is meant to be an introduction to three other papers of mine, namely: 'The "Emergence" of Existence' (cf. http://www.academia.edu/4310644/The_Emergence_of_Existence_-_from_Pregeometry_to_Prephysics), 'Names and Objects' (cf. http://www.academia.edu/4310705/Names_and_Objects_-_Outlines_of_an_Essentialist_Nominalism), and 'Information Monism' (cf. http://www.academia.edu/4310969/Information_Monism_-_and_its_Concepts_of_Substance_Attributes_and_Em ergent_Modes). In this introduction also some light shall be shed on the mutual dependence and interrelatedness of these mentioned papers. It also includes a hefty attack on Russell's 'On Denotation' with respect to his alleged refutation of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (objectology aka theory of objects).".

I begin by showing that absolute nothingness is not only incoherent but also cannot obtain anywhere: it has no standing in logical space. Existence pervades every locus of description. There are no gaps for nothingness to “occupy”, since any alleged outside would be either something (thus already within existence), or an inadmissible “nothing” (ruled out by direct inconsistency). Boundlessness leaves no coherent outside from which a distinct creator could act (the No-Beyond result). The familiar picture of a deity dwelling in (...) a featureless “void” and then making a world fails: any state able to serve as a base for agency already has structure and so belongs within existence; there is no “beyond” from which to act. This reframes the Kalam Cosmological Argument (beginnings are rearrangements within what already exists), blocks creatio ex nihilo, and yields the central Aseity Fork: either God is Existence itself (the Spinozistic identity: Deus sive Natura), preserving aseity but foregoing a distinct, personal responder “over” the whole—or God is within existence (a personal agent/mode), allowing selective prayer response, but failing to satisfy full divine aseity by depending on the very structures it must operate through. Causal finitism doesn’t rescue a distinct first cause: a finite ladder ends in reliance on a non-identical framework—or in the agent just being the framework itself. Concepts like ipsum esse subsistens and middle knowledge also converge on the same fork. The groundwork is brief: (i) the locution “absolute nothingness exists at a region r” is self-defeating (“at” requires a locus: a site where truth-conditions can apply), asserting ∃r affirms existence, while “nothingness at r” denies any existence; and (ii) any attempt to localize, model, or subtract down to absolute nothingness inevitably smuggles in structures, rules, or domains and thereby reintroduces existence. A “structured nothing” is a being-plus-non-being hybrid and dissolves into contradiction. No logical exterior remains for nothingness to obtain. (shrink)

In the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, the relationship between God and His Creation is a difficult and elusive matter. The following essay is an analysis of Cusanus’ idea of God as “Not-Other”—a concept that he develops in his 1461 dialogue, De li Non-Aliud (On the Not-Other). The main thesis propounded in the dialogue is that conceiving God as “Not-Other” is the least inadequate way for us to direct our minds towards the Divine. By diving into this difficult text, and (...) defending Cusanus’ ideas against potential criticisms, we can see how “Not-Other”—this elusive symbol, this perplexing double negation—provides us with a compass pointing the way towards a radically transcendent and radically immanent God. (shrink)

The logic of qualia is different than classical logic. We take the first steps in defining it and applying it to the Hard Problem.

هل يمكن إذن أن أكون أنا لست أنا بانطباعات الزمان على جسدي وفكري؟ أليس لي جوهرٌ ثابتٌ تتبدل عليه الأعراض من حين إلى آخر، ومن ثم لا أفقد هويتي الحقيقية؟ لقد وُلدت منذ سنوات خلت، وتعلمت وعلمت أنني هو أنا، ويعلم المحيطون بي أنني هو أنا، بل يستطيع العلم المعاصر أن يُثبت أن لي تركيبًا جينيًا وراثيًا يميزني عن غيري، وأن لي بصمات أصابع وبصمة صوت لا تتطابق مع بصمات غيري، وسيحاسبني ربي يوم العرض عليه بوصفي شخصًا واحدًا هو أنا؛ (...) والشجرة التي تظلل باب منزلي هي ذات الشجرة التي أراها منذ سنوات، حقًا لقد تغيرت أعراضها، لكن جوهرها بالضرورة ثابت؛ وكوكب الزهرة المضيء مساءً وصباحًا هو ذات الكوكب ال��ي أراه كل يوم، قد تعتريه تغييرات عرضية، لكن جوهره قطعًا ثابت. ألسنا جميعًا نشترك في معرفة أن هذه الأشياء هي هي مهما تغيرت أعراضها؟. (shrink)

Despite the notions of possible worlds and substances are very important subjects of contemporary metaphysics, there are relatively few attempts to combine these in a united framework. This paper considers the metaphysical model of the origins and the evolution of possible worlds that occurs from an interaction between substances. I involve Leibniz’s doctrine of the striving possibles that every possibility of substance has its own essence and tendency towards existence. It is supposed that the activities of substances are constantly aimed (...) at using this tendency in all possible ways. Only the consistent and stable interactions between the substances give birth to stable objects in one of many worlds. Thus activity of substances changes from the possible modality of being to the actual modality of being in form of existence of the worlds. I divide substance’s possibility into two aspects—dynamic (possible or virtual history) and static (possible or potential mutual state). Thanks to the summation of virtual histories, in the possible modality of being, the maximal number of virtual histories is combined into the actual history in the actual modality. (shrink)

In a pragmatic approach to ontology, what is necessary and sufficient for the dispositional causation of events is interpreted realistically, and postulated to exist. This leads to a concept of `generic substance' (Aristotle's underlying `matter') as being constituted by dispositions, not just being the `bare subject' for those dispositions. If we describe the forms of objects according their spatiotemporal range, then this form is best viewed as a field, and substances themselves are best conceived as `fields of propensity'.

An ontological extension of dispositional essentialism is proposed, whereby what is necessary and sufficient for the dispositional causation of events is interpreted realistically, and postulated to exist. This ‘generative realism’ leads to a general concept of ‘substance’ as constituted by its more fundamental powers or propensities appearing in the form of some structure or field. This neo Aristotelian view is reviewed historically, and in respect to quantum physics.

Since the failure of both pure corpuscular and pure wave philosophies of nature, process theories assume that only events need to exist in order to have a physics. Starting from an ontology of actual events, a dispositional analysis is shown here to lead to a new idea of substance, that of a `distribution of potentiality or propensity'. This begins to provide a useful foundation for quantum physics. A model is presented to show how the existence of physical substances could be (...) a reasonable consequence of a theory of processes. (shrink)

Historians of philosophy claim that Aristotle was the first to discuss substance extensively. He analyzed this issue in his books, Categories, Metaphysics, and Physics, for three different purposes. In Categories, after examining the different types of subject and predicate, the first and second substances have been distinguished from each other. In Metaphysics, he has dealt with substance with the purpose of a search for the existentiality of existents based on four aspects: essence, universal, genus, and subject. Finally, in his Physics, (...) another interpretation of substance has been given in order to clarify the issue of a fixed subject in the course of motion. Consequently, some of his critiques have accused him of self-contradiction in these works. This paper is intended to clarify this problem by reference to the works of Aristotle and the analyses of his commentators. (shrink)

I defend Spinoza's claim that extension is an attribute that an indivisible substance, such as God, could have. However, in order to explain why, we must abandon two long held orthodoxies in Spinoza scholarship. First, Spinoza acknowledges only parts that do not depend on their whole. Second, God, considered as natura naturans, has no parts of any kind. Against these orthodoxies, I show that having parts which depend on their whole, for Spinoza, does not entail divisibility and that God, considered (...) as natura naturans, must have such parts in order to be extended. Along the way, we will have a closer look at Spinoza’s mereology and address apparently conflicting statements that Spinoza makes about the relation of part and whole that have long vexed commentators. (shrink)

Since the early 21st century, processualist approaches have gained prominence in analytic metaphysics and the philosophy of science, prompting diverse responses from advocates of substantialism. However, the polarization of the debate between process and substance metaphysics has often led to oversimplifications that obscure the potential for constructive dialogue. This paper argues that these frameworks should not be treated as monolithic systems, but rather analyzed through the lens of specific metaphysical problems—namely, fundamentality, persistence, and individuation. Focusing primarily on process metaphysics, we (...) examine how different interpretations within both traditions conceptualize these issues. Our analysis reveals areas of compatibility as well as points of divergence, indicating that the divide between processualism and substantialism is more nuanced than commonly assumed. We conclude by advocating for a metaphysical approach that allows for the integration of criteria from both frameworks. (shrink)

Property dualism posits one kind of substance (physical), but two kinds of properties: physical and mental. The view has been criticized for either collapsing into substance dualism or enjoying no distinctive advantage over it. We wield a similar criticism, but our argument has a unique spin: we scrutinize what it could mean for a property to count as mental given different conceptions of the relation between substance and property. We consider various versions of universal realism and trope theory and argue (...) that they either render property dualism incoherent or saddle it with commitments that undermine its initial motivation. (shrink)

Substance dualism is the view that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substances: physical and mental. By contrast, according to property dualism there is only one kind of substance (physical) but two fundamentally different kinds of properties: physical and mental. Property nominalism is the view that there are neither repeatable nor non-repeatable fundamentally predicable entities (i.e. neither universals nor tropes) and that things being a certain way or being related in a certain way must ultimately be accounted for in (...) terms of concrete particulars. In this paper, we consider a number of different kinds of property nominalism and argue that none of them sits well with property dualism. We pay special attention to the question of what it could mean for a property to count as mental given different nominalistic accounts of properties. Our conclusion is that property nominalism and property dualism are not a stable match. This is surprising, since property dualism has usually been understood as a thesis that is neutral about the nature of fundamental ontological categories and the relation between them. (shrink)

Wiredu uses the term ‘empiricalism’ to characterize a mode of thinking that is essentially empirical in orientation but admits non-transcendental metaphysical categories and existents into its systems of thought. Wiredu finds evidence of this mode of thinking in the Akan language. The central question I engage with in this paper is this: what makes empiricalism a plausible system of thought that has universal validity and intelligibility? I argue that the plausibility and universality of empiricalism is evident in Wiredu’s logical and (...) semantic thinking that underpins the theses of empiricalism. Rather than it being an isolated doctrine of Wiredu, the central theses of empiricalism are rooted in, and cast in terms of, his logical and semantic analysis of distinctions such as signification and reference, concept and object, and of his analysis of terms such as ‘existence’. These analyses show that the attractiveness of empiricalism is dependent on theoretical principles other than, and in addition to, the linguistic evidence that Akan provides. (shrink)

This paper is about the relation between two venerable and revisionary metaphysical doctrines: Monism and Qualitativism. Monism says, roughly, that reality is in some sense one. Qualitativism says, roughly, that reality contains no facts about particular objects, but is rather purely qualitative. I distinguish various versions of these two doctrines, and in each case argue that proponents of the Monist doctrine should instead embrace a corresponding Qualitativist doctrine. I conclude that Monism culminates in Qualitativism.

This thesis uses a biosocial anthropological approach to explore the wide variety of human-environmental interactions exhibited by the Shuar of the Ecuadorian Amazon. Based on 10 months of ethnographic inquiry and deploying a comparative and evolutionary perspective, this thesis focuses primarily on the holistic nature of ancient subsistence patterns. I delve into the adaptive strategies exhibited by the contemporary Shuar and attempt to delineate the socio-ecological, ritual and cosmological significance of these patterns of behaviour. I suggest how subsistence adaptations, like (...) hunting, which have been greatly diminished in the Shuar communities, nevertheless reveal particular forms of cross-species interactions likely deeply rooted in coevolutionary processes. As clearly indicated by informants' oral histories, hunting patterns and meat-eating behaviour show complex trophic, socio-structural and ritual associations between humans and animal taxa. I then hypothesise that food taboos against eating particular animals (mostly large mammals) may have functioned as mechanisms for the preservation of prey and likely arose from ancient relationships with extinct megafauna. Further, concerning horticulture, a subsistence strategy still practised by the Shuar, I reveal how specific forms of human-plant interactions, such as those with Manihot esculenta Crantz and Guadua spp., inform patterns of patterns of growth, fertility and reproduction. This Amazonian form of human-plant coevolution exhibited by traditional horticulture underscores, in principle, basic and higher-order relational processes exemplified by the biosocial, ritual, ontological, and myth-cosmological associations between organismic kingdoms. Concerning the use of medicinal and psychoactive plants, I show how these kinds of botanical knowledge frequently intersect, thus representing adaptive behaviours highly dependent on embodied and cognitive engagements with plant materials. Both conceived as elementary forms of cure and primary triggers of metaphysical formulations, relationships with these elements of the plant kingdom are likely to be well-embedded in our evolutionary history. Lastly, the thesis' attempt at cross-species comparisons linked to different evolutionary periods (i.e., archaic hominins, extant forager-horticulturalists and non-human primates) may shed new light on the nature of complex adaptive patterns exhibited by Indigenous peoples in general and the Shuar in particular. (shrink)

Some properties come necessarily clustered. Something, a clustering device, must necessarily keep them clustered. Compresence is one candidate, and it is unclear how to understand it. I discern two aspects of it: compresence as simultaneity and compresence as co-location. Then I clarify certain issues over it, particularly regarding whether or not it is transitive and whether or not it figures in the bundle. Contrary to popular belief, I argue that compresence, under the two-aspectual reading, is transitive and constitutive of the (...) bundle. (shrink)

The aim of the present work is to reconstruct the divisio scientiarium expounded in an anonymous and unpublished commentary on De anima preserved in ms. Florence, BNC, Conv. Soppr. G.3.464, ff. 45ra-68vb, and to place it within the 13th-century tradition. This will be done by comparing it with the divisiones presented in the prologues of other commentaries on De anima and in the accessus philosophorum circulating in the universities of the same period. The interest in the place of the scientia (...) de anima in the hierarchy of the sciences and its characteristics is clearly evident at the beginning of this anonymous commentary, where the unknown master engages in a broader discussion of the epistemic status of the Aristotelian sciences. (shrink)

The disappearing agent problem is traditionally cast as a tension between events and event-causation, on the one hand, and agents and agent-causation on the other. How- ever, as we show, the tension between events and agents can be recast as a tension between causation by agents and causation by parts of agents. If this is right, agent- causalists have their own disappearing agent problem to deal with. After setting out a version of this problem in the form of an overdetermination (...) argument, we present available responses to it. By examining these responses, our aim is to motivate the elaboration of an idea of derivative causation within agent-causal theories of action, whereby complex agents with parts cause whatever they must cause in order to act by way of their parts causing it. (shrink)

In Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates’ argument for the immortality of the soul fails due to his insufficient explanation for how the soul, as a particular, could partake in an immortality that belongs to universals. Simmias’ objection brings this to light by providing an analogy of a particular. This particular is exemplified by the specific harmony belonging to one instrument, and its relationship to that instrument itself. The soul, having an analogous relation to the body, remains separated from Socrates’ establishment of universals (...) as eternal. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics comprises the topics in contemporary metaphysics which bear similarity to the interests, commitments, positions and general approaches found in Aristotle. Despite the current interest in these topics, there is no monograph length general introduction to the methodology and themes of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics. One underdiscussed question concerns demarcation: what unifies the topics that fall under the heading of neo-Aristotelianism? Contemporary metaphysicians who might be classified as ‘neo-Aristotelians’ tend towards positions reminiscent of Aristotle’s metaphysics—such as sympathy with grounding, substance ontology, (...) non-modal construals of essence, hylomorphism, causal powers, presentism, endurantism and agent causation. However, prima facie it seems that one might hold any one of these positions while rejecting the others. What perhaps unifies a neo-Aristotelian approach in metaphysics, then, is not a shared collection of positions so much as a willingness to engage with Aristotle and to view this historical figure as providing a fruitful way of initially framing certain philosophical issues. However, also missing in the literature is a sustained methodological discussion on the contribution historical scholarship on Aristotle might make to contemporary metaphysics, and the contribution contemporary metaphysics might make to historical scholarship. Little hinges on whether what gets labelled neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is or isn’t Aristotle’s metaphysics. But historical scholarship is useful within contemporary metaphysics not merely to to apply historically accurate labels to positions. There are topics where the historical and contemporary issues dovetail in mutually rewarding ways: serious engagement with the history of philosophy can yield living philosophical rewards for today’s metaphysician; and serious engagement with contemporary philosophy can yield exegetical rewards for the historian. The monograph will introduce these methodological issues, and then turn to case studies on ontological dependence, substance ontology, category theory and hylomorphism. These are all topics where there is robust debate within both Aristotle studies and contemporary metaphysics, and topics where historians and metaphysicians are working somewhat in isolation from each other. The aim of the monograph is to make the relevant exegetical questions accessible to contemporary metaphysicians, and the corresponding contemporary topics accessible to historians. The target audience includes researchers, graduate students and advanced undergraduates, in both metaphysics and Aristotle studies. (shrink)

This article examines the interplay between limit, thought, and human nature in Ludwig Feuerbach’s early philosophy, with particular attention to his dissertation De ratione una, universali, infinita (1828) and Thoughts on Death and Immortality (1830). It argues that Feuerbach presents reason as an infinite power that transcends the limits of sensibility and individuality. By framing reason as a universal substance and the foundation of human essence, Feuerbach highlights a fundamental tension between universality and individuality – one defined by a profound (...) asymmetry. He challenges dominant theological notions of immortality, proposing instead that death – understood as a real limit – is the very condition for grasping infinity within life itself. Ultimately, Feuerbach envisions history as the ongoing process of life’s self-realization, independent of any external metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

This paper examines Nicolai Hartmann’s interpretation of Hegel’s dialectics, with particular attention to what he terms “real dialectics.” It is divided into three sections. The first provides a concise account of Hartmann’s reading of Hegel in its historical and historiographical context, emphasizing its independence from contemporaneous interpretations, such as those of Wilhelm Dilthey and Neo‑Hegelianism. The second analyzes Hartmann’s treatment of the relationship between Aristotle and Hegel—a key step toward understanding his conception of "real dialectics.” Central here are the notions (...) of the “concept” and the intellectual proximity between Aristotelian aporetics and Hegel’s dialectical method. The final section develops Hartmann’s account of Hegel’s “real dialectics,” examining its connection to the notion of Erfahrung and concluding with an evaluation of the elements Hartmann considers still philosophically relevant in Hegel’s dialectical thought. (shrink)

Weak Supplementation (WSP) is the view that if a thing x has a part y with which x is not identical, then x has a part z that does not overlap y. I note that there is a slightly weaker principle, Quasi-Supplementation (QS), which says that that if a thing x has a part y with which x is not identical, then x has at least two parts, z and w, that do not overlap each other. I then argue that (...) QS has WSP’s main virtues while avoiding its main vices. That is the primary aim of this paper. A secondary aim is to explore some potential applications of QS. I note that QS can be used in (i) an argument from a plenitudinous form of coincidentalism to the non-existence of simples and the ‘strong gunkiness’ of all things, (ii) an argument in the other direction—from the possibility of simples to the conclusion that plenitudinous coincidentalism is not necessary, and (iii) arguments for and against certain constituent ontologies, according to which ordinary concrete particulars have formal components. (shrink)

Scholars disagree about whether Avicenna’s corporeal form exists in the elements as a numerically distinct substantial form. By translating texts that have not yet been brought to bear on this debate, I argue that it is. I also look at two attempts by contemporary scholars to show that the disunity of corporeal and elemental forms is incompatible with Avicenna’s understanding of substance. I argue that both attempts fail since the relationship between corporeal and elemental forms is such that the elemental (...) form can exist in the corporeal form without turning the elemental form into an accident and without violating Avicenna’s rule that substances do not exist in a subject. (shrink)

This article considers Avicenna’s insistence on the disunity between the souls of humans, animals, and plants and the mixed elemental bodies in which they inhere. In particular, it looks at (1) why Avicenna rejects their unity and (2) why this rejection, pace some contemporary scholars, is compatible with the status of these souls as substances. I show that both points derive from the causal role that these souls and the elements play in the coming to be and passing away of (...) mixed elemental bodies. (shrink)

Donald C. Williams (2018 [1953]) coined the term “trope” for simple or thin particular natures such as determinate qualities (like redness) and quantities (like -e charge or electron mass) in some specific location. According to trope theorists, tropes constitute the sole fundamental category of entities. Therefore, trope theorists analyse objects as mereological sums of tropes fulfilling certain specific conditions and eliminate the object-property dichotomy by means of the analysis of inherence (an object having a property). Moreover, most trope theorists (e.g., (...) Williams, Campbell. Maurin and Ehring) defend the possibility of free-floating tropes as a global thesis: any (non-relational) trope t can exist without being accompanied by any wholly distinct trope u. Even if we can take mutual independence of wholly distinct tropes as a "default setting", I argue that there are good reasons to reject the global thesis. My main conclusion is that the superiority of our Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT) in the analysis of objects and inherence provides us with sufficient reason to adopt SNT instead of any broadly Humean trope theory assuming the global thesis. Yet a trope theorist might allow for some free-floating tropes. (shrink)

Contemporary debates about the metaphysics of material composition occur within the framework set by the Special Composition Question, as proposed famously by Peter van Inwagen. This question asks what one must do, what conditions must be satisfied, for some things to compose one object as proper parts. Hylomorphism is a theory that has regained prominence in contemporary metaphysics, explaining the unity of composite material objects by appealing to a special metaphysical part of those objects: structure or form. My book defends (...) hylomorphism as a meaningful and significant answer to questions about the composition of material objects. Specifically, I propose that, if it is false that substances can have other substances as parts, hylomorphism can be shown not only to be a plausible theory but that all consistent accounts of restricted composition can be shown to be hylomorphist. After introducing and summarizing the trajectory of the book, I turn to reviewing and responding to objections from my interlocutors for this symposium. (shrink)

Hylomorphism provides an explanation of material composition: the material parts, the Xs, will compose a whole, a Y, belonging to a given natural kind, when those parts are characterized by a substantial form. While there are a number of those who hold that each human person is identical with a human animal – ‘animalists’ – most of these are not hylomorphists. One could worry that hylomorphism contributes little unique to debates about personal identity, collapsing into either a form of property (...) dualism or substance dualism. What I aim to do is apply a robust and classical hylomorphic account of persons (derived from Thomas Aquinas) to two contemporary problems, illustrating the way in which hylomorphic metaphysics can offer elegant solutions to tricky situations posed against animalists. Specifically, I will propose that hylomorphic animalism can help provide principled resolutions to worries that seem to undermine animalist intuitions which are raised by ‘brain transplant’ or ‘remnant person’ scenarios. Hylomorphism can capture the advantages of ‘hybrid’ animalist responses without the cost of denying a singular, biological criterion of personal identity. Further, hylomorphism provides a distinctive upshot for Christian theologians and the moral positions that they want to affirm by rendering morally anodyne apparent epistemic difficulties in identifying personal identity over time. (shrink)

I consider cases of multifetal pregnancy in which one fetus with a fatal birth defect poses a risk to the survival of another healthy fetus to show that the substance view anti-abortion position leads to a contradiction. In cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy, if intervention by selective abortion to terminate the defective fetus is not performed, both fetuses will die due to the conditions created by the defective fetus’s fatal birth defect. Because abortion is wrong on the anti-abortion position, and (...) a moderate anti-abortion position cannot make an exception for selective abortion in cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy if it operates on the substance view, choosing selective abortion must be wrong, so one must let both fetuses die. However, the substance view anti-abortion position must take letting both fetuses die to be wrong, otherwise it will undermine itself as an anti-abortion position. Further, the substance view provides grounds for why letting fetuses die would be wrong anyway. Thus, the substance view anti-abortion position must take both having an abortion and not having an abortion to be wrong, which is a contradiction. Therefore, cases of complicated multifetal pregnancy show that the substance view anti-abortion position is false. (shrink)

Conocer los elementos que forman parte del mundo advierte de la presencia de un saber general que responde a definiciones universales, al ser estos rasgos de un saber que explica las causas y principios de todo ente lo cual implica comprender aquello por lo que las cosas son. En efecto, los conceptos del ser, de ente y substancia adquieren un nuevo sentido en el pensamiento de Aristóteles dejando un claro nexo entre estos, precisamente en el consorcio entitatividad-esencialidad que define a (...) la sustancia. Por eso, este artículo es un esclarecimiento de la novedad de Aristóteles frente a una tradición metafísica de la cual se hace heredero, además de crítico. (shrink)

According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation. I defend my view from objections, including C. D. Broad's influential “timing” argument, and I (...) conclude with implications for agent‐causal theories of free will. (shrink)

Considérez les énoncés suivants : « La bombe a causé la destruction du pont » ; « L’explosion de la bombe a causé la destruction du pont » ; « Booth a causé la mort de Lincoln » ; et « Le tir de Booth a causé la mort de Lincoln ». Ces énoncés suggèrent que les objets, tels que les bombes ou les personnes, font partie de la catégorie ontologique des causes, au même titre que les évènements, comme le (...) tir de Booth et l’explosion de la bombe. À première vue, le fait que les objets et les personnes puissent être des causes n’a rien de particulièrement surprenant. Cependant, les philosophes du XXe siècle ont fait preuve d’une extrême méfiance à l’égard de cette idée. Une majorité de philosophes ont trouvé l’idée même de causalité par des objets ou des agents inintelligible, à tel point que les théories standards de la causalité présupposent que les entités reliées comme causes à effets sont des évènements, ou encore des faits, des propriétés ou des états. Pourtant, cette hostilité à l’égard de la causalité des objets est relativement récente ; la causalité agentive semble, au moins jusqu’à Thomas Reid (1710-1796), avoir été la norme, et non le mystère. La mise à l’écart des objets et des agents de la catégorie de cause est-elle justifiée? Un nombre grandissant de philosophes, les agentialistes (agent-causalists), soutiennent que non et cherchent à réhabiliter l’idée de causalité agentive (par des agents) et/ou substantielle (par des substances), tandis que d’autres, les évènementialistes (event-causalists), défendent que celle-ci est au mieux réductible à la causalité entre évènements, ou au pire que l’idée est incohérente. L’importance de cette question n’est pas négligeable, car elle revient à demander quels sont les moteurs du changement. En effet, nous voulons savoir si certains objets tels que les couteaux, les bombes, les animaux et les personnes sont parfois à l’origine du changement, ou si tout effet procède uniquement de changements antérieurs, d’évènements. Existe-t-il une relation causale, la causalité agentive ou substantielle, reliant objets et changements, différente des relations causales habituellement traitées par les philosophes de la causalité? Quelle est sa relation avec la causalité évènementielle? Et comment fonctionne-t-elle? (shrink)

This paper explores the distinction between active and passive powers. Interest in the distinction has recently been revived in some quarters of the philosophy of action as some have sought to elucidate the distinction between action and passion (the changes that happen to a substance) in terms of the former (Hyman, 2015; Mayr, 2011; Lowe 2013). If there is a distinction between active and passive powers, parallel to the distinction between action and passion, what is it? In this paper, I (...) distinguish two ways of drawing it. According to the first one, active and passive powers are distinguished by the ways in which their manifestations come about. According to the second, they are distinguished by their directedness, i.e. what they are powers to do. Both accounts are examined and the latter is defended against the former. I argue that active powers are powers to alter, modify, corrupt or change something. (shrink)

Any account of Spinoza's understanding of attribute must be able to satisfy his definition criterion; that is, it must coherently accommodate the elements involved in his definition of attribute as “what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence” (E1d4). But this is not enough. There are several available readings that satisfy this criterion and are mutually incompatible. To know what Spinoza means we must supplement his definition criterion with a criterion aiming at consistency with other principles in (...) his system. With the definition and consistency criteria in the backdrop, the aim of this paper is to offer a critical overview of the current state of the debate on Spinoza's theory of attributes. (shrink)

The general concept of a trope – that of a non-shareable character-grounder – admits of a distinction between modifier tropes and module tropes. Roughly, a module trope is self-exemplifying whereas a modifier trope is not. This distinction has wide-ranging implications. Modifier tropes are uniquely eligible to be powers and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes are uniquely eligible to play a direct role in perception and causation. Moreover, each type of trope theory faces unique challenges concerning character- grounding. Modifier trope theory (...) faces challenges concerning the inscrutability of predication and the incompatibility with bundle theory, whereas module trope theory faces challenges concerning character overdetermination and a collapse into austere nominalism. These differences indicate that the modifier/module distinction divides the advantages of general trope theory and thus presents the trope theorist with a pivotal choice. (shrink)

The task of distinguishing universals from particulars is difficult twice over. It faces a host of first order challenges, since first order proposals about the distinction (e.g. only universals are instantiable, or only universals can be multi-located) tend to be threatened by counterexamples. But it also faces formidable methodological challenges, such as how to decide whether the distinction ought to be exclusive and exhaustive. After discussing the relationships between the distinction and several pairs of pre-philosophical notions, this chapter aims to (...) provide an instructive—albeit non-exhaustive—examination of some principal first order approaches and methodological challenges, respectively. (shrink)

Does Anne Conway (1631–79) hold that the created world consists of a single underlying substance? Some have argued that she does; others have argued that she is a priority monist and so holds that there are many created substances, but the whole created world is ontologically prior to each particular creature. Against both of these proposals, this article makes the case for a substance pluralist interpretation of Conway: individual creatures are distinct substances, and the whole created world is not ontologically (...) prior to the individual creatures that compose it. The basic argument for such a view draws on Conway's claims about the freedom and moral responsibility of individual creatures. The pluralist reading is straightforwardly compatible with these claims, while the monistic readings are not. (shrink)

Priority monism is the doctrine that there is only one basic object: the entire cosmos. Priority monists often take this to be a metaphysically necessary thesis. I explore the consequences of modalizing the priority monist thesis. I argue that, modulo some assumptions, the modalized thesis entails the necessary existence of the actual cosmos. I further argue that, if the modalized thesis is true, and the actual cosmos necessarily exists, then the only possible concrete objects are the actually existing ones.

In this chapter, we provide an opinionated introduction to contemporary trope bundle theories of substance. We assess different trope bundle theories on the grounds of their two main aims: to provide an adequate account of substances or objects by means of tropes and a reductive analysis of inherence, that is, object's having tropes as their properties. Our discussion begins by a presentation of Donald C. Williams’ and Keith Campbell's paradigmatic trope theories, which maintain that tropes are independent existents. After highlighting (...) the central problems of paradigmatic trope theories, we discuss two more recent developments of trope bundle theory that also take non-relational tropes as independent existents, Anna-Sofia Maurin's and Douglas Ehring's independence theories. Finally, we present two alternative trope bundle theories, according to which tropes are dependent existents, dependence theories, namely, Arda Denkel's Saturation theory and our Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT). Although the latter two theories introduce existential dependencies among tropes, we argue that dependence theories provide a more satisfactory account of substances dividing into natural kinds than independence theories. (shrink)

Ontologiset kategoriateoriat pyrkivät vastaamaan metafysiikan klassiseen ongelmaan: kysymykseen siitä, mihin eri kategorioihin oliot eli entiteetit jakaantuvat. Olioilla tarkoitetaan tässä mitä tahansa, joka on olemassa. Olevan kategoriat eli ontologiset kategoriat (lyhyesti kategoriat) ovat alustavasti olioiden hyvin yleisiä lajeja. Jäsenyys olioiden kategoriassa ei niinkään kerro sitä, mitä piirteitä oliolla on, vaan sen olemisen tavan ¬– miten se esimerkiksi on tai voi olla maailman rakenneosa. Esimerkkejä mahdollisista kategorioista ovat konkreettiset partikulaariset yksilöoliot (substanssit), ominaisuudet, relaatiot, prosessit, tapahtumat ja joukot. -/- 1. Mitä ovat ontologiset (...) kategoriateoriat -/- 2. Uusaristoteelinen realismi -/- 3. Russellilainen realismi -/- 4. Universaalikimpputeoriat -/- 5. Nominalismi: substanssi-modus-teoriat -/- 6. Trooppiteoriat -/- 7. Jyrkkä nominalismi -/- 8. Tapahtuma- ja prosessiontologiat -/- 9. Ontologisten kategorioiden tutkimus Suomessa -/- 10. Suositeltavaa jatkolukemista -/- 11. Lähteet . (shrink)

Possible world semantics has been gradually fine-grained over the years. First, simple extensional semantics was fine-grained by relativizing it to worlds considered as counterfactual, thus generating standard possible-world semantics, which was later further fine-grained by relativizing it to worlds considered as actual, thus generating two-dimensional semantics. However, worlds considered as actual were only considered with respect to the empirical facts obtaining in such worlds. This paper shows that no less of an important role is played by another feature of actual (...) worlds, namely, the criteria of identity that obtain in such worlds. (shrink)