Thomson's How to Divide When There Isn’t Enough is a textbook on allocation problems (aka bankruptcy problems). I have a trouble understanding the following excerpt from it (p. 13):
[I]n various theories of resource allocation, one may ask that a rule always provide each agent the incentive to be truthful about the information the agent holds pri- vately [...],17 but this requirement is often incompatible with very minimal demands of efficiency and fairness in distribution.
where footnote 17 is
[...] This property of a rule known as “strategy-proofness” is the requirement that, for each economy and each agent, truth-telling be a dominant strategy in the manipulation game associated with the rule.
Here's how I tried to figure out that passage. I understood that this property was what Sprumont (1991) called strategy-proofness. Now, it is true that Sprumont's models are not bankruptcy problems, but I believe that some translations between results on both kinds of models are possible. In fact, what Sprumont calls the uniform allocation rule is what Thomson calls constrained equal awards rule (up to restriction and scaling).
Then I do not understand why that rule violates any reasonable basic requirement.
What does Thomson mean here?