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Endurance
Edited by Paul Richard Daniels (Monash University)
About this topic
| Summary | Endurantism is, roughly, the view that an object which persists through time is wholly present at all those times through which it persists. That is, for instance, according to the endurantist no part of me is missing from now just as no part of me was missing during my last birthday. However, there’s disagreement about how best to further detail endurantism. Many regard enduring objects as three-dimensional objects, spread out in space but not in time. Some think enduring objects sweep or move through time, while others argue that enduring objects must be multi-located at different times. Then there are those who think endurantists maintain nothing more than that persisting objects do not have temporal parts. Opponents of endurantism argue that as we fill in these details about the endurantist picture we reveal problems. For instance: how can an object be wholly present now and be hot, yet also be wholly present at a later time and cold—does this mean it has incompatible properties? How can an object be wholly present at one time and wholly present at another—if all of it is here, how can any of it be there? Endurantists, of course, argue that there are tenable replies to these and other challenges. |
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Related
Siblings
- Occasional Identity (9)
- Perdurance (182)
- Relative Identity (102)
- Stage Theory (94)
- Three- and Four-Dimensionalism (487)
- Temporary Intrinsics (42)
- Persistence, Misc (109)
Contents
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| 1 — 50 / 180 |
- (1 other version)Is Endurantism the Folk Friendly View of Persistence?Samuel Baron, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - manuscriptMany philosophers have thought that our folk, or pre-reflective, view of persistence is one on which objects endure. This assumption not only plays a role in disputes about the nature of persistence itself, but is also put to use in several other areas of metaphysics, including debates about the nature of change and temporal passage. In this paper, we empirically test three broad claims. First, that most people (i.e. most non-philosophers) believe that, and it seems to them as though, objects (...)
- Mereological Atomism's Quantum Problems.Ryan Miller - manuscriptThe popular metaphysical view that concrete objects are grounded in their ultimate parts is often motivated by appeals to realist interpretations of contemporary physics. This paper argues that an examination of mainstream interpretations of quantum mechanics undercuts such atomist claims. First, mereological atomism is only plausible in conjunction with Bohmian mechanics. Second, on either an endurantist or perdurantist theory of time, atomism exacerbates Bohmianism’s existing tensions with serious Lorentz invariance in a way that undermines the realist appeal of both views. (...)
- Special relativity and endurantism.Alexander Pruss - manuscriptI identify a fallacy in Hales and Johnson ’s argument that endurantism is incompatible with special relativity and argue that an improvement on their argument also does not succeed.Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - (1 other version)Could we have experiences as of objects enduring?Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.It is often suggested that we have experiences as of objects enduring. If this is a claim about perceptual experience, it is unclear how it could be true. It seems plausible that however objects persist, we would receive the same inputs to perception. Hence, things would seem experientially the same regardless of whether objects endure, or persist in some other manner. So, it cannot be that in any interesting sense we have experiences as of objects enduring. My aim is the (...)
- (1 other version)Could we have experiences as of objects enduring?Kristie Miller - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.It is often suggested that we have experiences as of objects enduring. If this is a claim about perceptual experience, it is unclear how it could be true. It seems plausible that however objects persist, we would receive the same inputs to perception. Hence, things would seem experientially the same regardless of whether objects endure, or persist in some other manner. So it cannot be that in any interesting sense we have experiences as of objects enduring. My aim is the (...)
- Self-Visitation and the Metaphysics of Place, Causation, and Facts.Daniel S. Murphy - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.I explore how endurantists are to handle cases of synchronic bi-location, in which a thing bi-locates at a time (such as by time-travel). I argue that endurantists face significant pressure to posit distinct but structurally identical facts (DSIFs), and critique the fragmentalist approach to bi-location in Simon (2018). Both the positive argument and critique are animated by the observation that handling bi-location cases requires perspicuously describing their spatiotemporal and causal structure. Accordingly, the argument proceeds by considering how endurantists are to (...)
- Endurantism and the psychological approach to personal identity.Khalid Saeed - forthcoming - Theoria.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Harmonious four-dimensionalist endurantism.Raul Saucedo - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.I articulate a new version of the view that reality consists of temporally extended simples, which is immune to the argument from vagueness for temporal parts and is perfectly compatible with diachronic universalism. Following Josh Parsons’s classification of views about persistence, I take this to be a four-dimensionalist form of endurantism (4DE, for short). What’s distinctive about my version of 4DE is that it incorporates an independently plausible harmony principle about temporal location. I formulate the relevant harmony principle and show (...)
- Time and Modality.Samuele Iaquinto - 2026 - In Nina Emery, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Time. Routledge. pp. 261-269.This chapter offers a brief overview of the main analogies between time and modality. The first part of the chapter is devoted to the analogy between presentism and actualism. The second part explores the analogy between non-presentist theories and possibilism. The third part discusses the analogy between temporal and modal persistence.
- The Growing-Block View: Philosophy of Time, Change, and the Open Future.Graeme Forbes - 2025 - London: Bloomsbury Academic.What makes time interesting and what is time? Graeme A. Forbes presents a robust defence of the metaphysical asymmetry between past and future, providing a compelling argument for the acceptance of the Growing-Block view. -/- Taking us from the armchair to philosophy of physics, and then out to the human world Forbes considers the ontological questions that have been the focus of most of the literature on the metaphysics of time. -/- Across three parts, he addresses questions central to the (...)
- Temporal Dynamism and the Persisting Stable Self.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Shira Yechimovitz - 2025 - Philosophical Quarterly 75 (3):999-1025.Empirical evidence suggests that a majority of people believe that time robustly passes and that many also report that it seems to them, in experience, as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists deny that time robustly passes, and many contemporary non-dynamists—deflationists—even deny that it seems to us as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists, then, face the dual challenge of explaining why people have such beliefs and make such reports about their experiences. Several philosophers have suggested the stable-self explanation, according to which (...)
- (1 other version)Is Endurantism the Folk Friendly View of Persistence?Sam Baron, Andrew J. Latham, Jordan Veng Oh & Kristie Miller - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (10).Many philosophers have thought that our folk, or pre-reflective, view of persistence is one on which objects endure. This assumption not only plays a role in disputes about the nature of persistence itself, but is also put to use in several other areas of metaphysics, including debates about the nature of change and temporal passage. In this paper, we empirically test three broad claims. First, that most people (i.e. most non-philosophers) believe that, and it seems to them as though, objects (...)
- Getting back in shape: Persistence, shape, and relativity.Jack Himelright & Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 (1):75-96.In this paper, we will introduce a novel argument (the “Region Argument”) that objects do not have frame-independent shapes in special relativity. The Region Argument lacks vulnerabilities present in David Chalmers' argument for that conclusion based on length contraction. We then examine how views on persistence interact with the Region Argument. We argue that this argument and standard four-dimensionalist assumptions entail that nothing in a relativistic world has any shape, not even stages or the regions occupied by them. We also (...)
- The problem of too many mental tokens resonsidered.David Mark Kovacs - 2024 - Synthese 204 (169):1-21.The Problem of Too Many Thinkers is the result, implied by several “permissive” ontologies, that we spatiotemporally overlap with a number of intrinsically person-like entities. The problem, as usually formulated, leaves open a much-neglected question: do we literally share our mental lives, i.e. each of our mental states, with these person-like entities, or do we instead enjoy mental lives that are qualitatively indistinguishable but numerically distinct from theirs? The latter option raises the worry that there is an additional Problem of (...)
- Modes of Being and Non-Being: Existence, Occurrence, and Validity.Friederike Moltmann - 2024 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (4):549-560.Existence as reflected in natural language is not a univocal notion, but divides into different modes of being, such as existence (as, roughly, endurance) and occurrence. One aim of the paper is to distinguish sharply between abstract artifacts and non-existent objects (e.g., plans vs. planned events that fail to occur); another is to argue for validity as a mode of being distinct from existence, as well as for corresponding distinctions among non-being.
- A Humean Non-Humeanism.David Builes - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):1031-1048.How should we account for the extraordinary regularity in the world? Humeans and Non-Humeans sharply disagree. According to Non-Humeans, the world behaves in an extraordinarily regular way because of certain necessary connections in nature. However, Humeans have thought that Non-Humean views are metaphysically objectionable. In particular, there are two general metaphysical principles that Humeans have found attractive that are incompatible with all existing versions of Non-Humeanism. My goal in this paper is to develop a novel version of Non-Humeanism that is (...)
- Mereological Endurantism Defined.Damiano Costa - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10):2063-2073.I develop a definition of mereological endurantism which overcomes objections that have been proposed in the literature and thereby avoids the charge of obscurity put forward by Sider against the view.
- Endurantism, presentism, and the problem of temporary intrinsics.Yanssel Garcia - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (4):573-584.The most common form of endurantism takes enduring objects to be wholly located at every time they occupy. Such a view is believed to give rise to a problem concerning intrinsic change. My laptop may have been shut before, but it is currently open. Yet, if we understand endurantism as above, then my laptop is in possession of two contradictory properties: the shapes of being open and shut. This problem is known as the “problem of temporary intrinsics,” and, to avoid (...)
- Mereological Destruction and Relativized Parthood: A Reply to Costa and Calosi.Jonathan D. Payton - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1797-1806.Metaphysicians of various stripes claim that a single object can have more than one exact location in space or time – e.g. endurantists claim that an object persists by being ‘all there’ at different moments in time. Antony Eagle has developed a formal theory of location which is prima facie consistent with multi-location, but Damiano Costa and Claudio Calosi argue that the theory is unattractive to multi-location theorists on other grounds. I examine their charge that Eagle’s theory won’t allow an (...)
- Ontology Generator.Alik Pelman - 2023 - Metaphysica 24 (1):109-128.The paper proposes a simple method for constructing ontological theories—an ‘ontology generator’. It shows that such a generator manages to produce major existing ontological theories, e.g., Realism, Nominalism, Trope theory, Bundle theory, Perdurantism, Endurantism, Possibilism, Actualism and more. It thus turns out, surprisingly, that all these seemingly unrelated different ontological theories that were designed by thinkers hundreds of years apart, can all be generated using the same simple mechanism. Moreover, this same generator manages to produce entirely novel ontological theories, that (...)
- The Situationalist Account of Change.Martin Pickup - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 13:248-282.In this paper I propose a new solution to the problem of change: situationalism. According to this view, parts of reality fundamentally disagree about what is the case and reality as a whole is unsettled (i.e. metaphysically indeterminate). When something changes, parts of the world irreconcilably disagree about what properties it has. From this irreconcilable disagreement, indeterminacy arises. I develop this picture using situations, which are parts of possible worlds; this gives it the name situationalism. It allows a B-theory endurance (...)
- Enduring Senses.Graeme A. Forbes & Nathan Wildman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (291):1-21.The meanings of words seem to change over time. But while there is a growing body of literature in linguistics and philosophy about meaning change, there has been little discussion about the metaphysical underpinnings of meaning change. The central aim of this paper is to push this discussion forward by surveying the terrain and advocating for a particular metaphysical picture. In so doing, we hope to clarify various aspects of the nature of meaning change, as well as prompt future philosophical (...)
- Persistence.Kristie Miller - 2022 - Cambridge University Press.Persistence realism is the view that ordinary sentences that we think and utter about persisting objects are often true. Persistence realism involves both a semantic claim, about what it would take for those sentences to be true, and an ontological claim about the way things are. According to persistence realism, given what it would take for persistence sentences to be true, and given the ontology of our world, often such sentences are true. According to persistence error-theory, they are not. This (...)
- Persistence as a Four-Dimensionalist: Perdurantism vs. Exdurantism.Richard Callais - 2021 - Dialogue 64 (1):24-29.The debate over persistence currently involves three competing theories—one three-dimensionalist theory called “endurantism” and two four-dimensionalist theories called “perdurantism” and “exdurantism.” This inner debate between the latter two persistence theories is what I aim to clarify, and ultimately, I argue that perdurantism is superior to exdurantism because exdurantism is too extravagant in counting ordinary objects in the world. Extravagant for the reason that objects in their entirety are bound to their momentary stages, and there is practically an interminable number of (...)
- Was Bonaventure a Four-dimensionalist?Damiano Costa - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):393-404.Bonaventure is sometimes taken to be an ante litteram champion of the four-dimensional theory of persistence. I argue that this interpretation is incorrect: Bonaventure was no four-dimensionalist.
- Persistence in Time.Damiano Costa - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Persistence in Time No person ever steps into the same river twice—or so goes the Heraclitean maxim. Obscure as it is, the maxim is often taken to express two ideas. The first is that everything always changes, and nothing remains perfectly similar to how it was just one instant before. The second is that nothing … Continue reading Persistence in Time →.
- To Be is to Persist.Dustin Gray - 2020 - Philosophy Now 141 (141):8-11.What does it mean for an object to persist through time? Consider the statement, ‘My car is filthy, I need to wash it.’ Consider the response, ‘How did it get that way?’ The answer is that dirt, dust and other particles have collected on the car’s surface thus making it filthy. Its properties have changed. At one point in the car’s career, none of that dirt and grime existed on its surface and the car was said to be clean. The (...)
- Are personites a problem for endurantists?Harold Noonan - 2020 - Philosophical Forum 51 (4):399-409.Personites are shorter lived, very person‐like things that extend across part but not the whole of a person's life. That there are such things is a consequence of the standard perdurance view championed by Lewis and Quine; it is also a consequence of liberal endurantist views which allow such things coinciding with persons during part of their lives, though not themselves parts of the persons. Johnston and Olson argue that the existence of personites has bizarre moral consequences and renders what (...)
- How to endure presentism.Sam Baron - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (6):659-673.Presentism and endurantism are natural bedfellows: arguments have been mounted from endurantism to presentism and vice versa. I generalise an argument against the compatibility between presentism and endurantism offered recently by Tallant. I then show how to reformulate endurantism so that it is compatible with presentism. I demonstrate that this reformulated version of endurantism can do the same work with respect to the problem of temporary intrinsics as can standard definitions.
- Weak Location.Antony Eagle - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):149-181.Recently, many philosophers have been interested in using locative relations to clarify and pursue debates in the metaphysics of material objects. Most begin with the relation of exact location. But what if we begin instead with the relation known as weak location – the relation an object x bears to any region not completely bereft of x? I explore some of the consequences of pursuing this route for issues including coincidence, extended simples, and endurance, with an eye to evaluating the (...)
- Non-branching personal persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.Given reductionism about people, personal persistence must fundamentally consist in some kind of impersonal continuity relation. Typically, these continuity relations can hold from one to many. And, if they can, the analysis of personal persistence must include a non-branching clause to avoid non-transitive identities or multiple occupancy. It is far from obvious, however, what form this clause should take. This paper argues that previous accounts are inadequate and develops a new proposal.
- Presentism and Cross-Time Relations.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2019 - In Patrick Blackburn, Per Hasle & Peter Ohrstrom, Logic and Philosophy of Time: Further Themes from Prior, Vol. 2. pp. 53–72.This paper is a partial defence of presentism against the argument from cross-time relations. It is argued, first, that the Aristotelian view of causation and persistence does not really depict these phenomena in terms of relations between entities existing at different times, and indeed excludes the possibility of such cross-time relations obtaining. Second, it is argued that to reject the existence of the past—and thereby be unable to ground the truth of claims about the past—does not lead to any absurd (...)
- Self-Colocation: A Colocation Puzzle for Endurantists.Justin Mooney - 2019 - Synthese (6):5297-5309.The recent literature on the nature of persistence features a handful of imaginative cases in which an object seems to colocate with itself. So far, discussion of these cases has focused primarily on how they defy the standard endurantist approaches to the problem of temporary intrinsics. But in this article, I set that issue aside and argue that cases of apparent self-colocation also pose another problem for the endurantist. While the perdurantist seems to have a fairly straightforward account of self-colocation, (...)
- Presentism, Endurance, and Object-Dependence.Harold W. Noonan - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (9):1115-1122.According to the presentist the present time is the only one that there is. Nevertheless, things persist. Most presentists think that things persist by enduring. Employing E. J. Lowe’s notion of identity-dependence, Jonathan Tallant argues that presentism is incompatible with any notion of persistence, even endurance. This consequence of Lowe’s ideas, if soundly drawn, is important. The presentist who chooses to deny persistence outright is a desperate figure. However, though Lowe’s notion is a legitimate and worthwhile one, this application is (...)
- A reason for the non-specialist to care about the metaphysics of properties and persistence.Daniel Giberman - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):162-177.We have compelling extra-philosophical reasons for caring about identity, parthood, and location. For example, we desire ceteris paribus that nothing every part of which is very near to our location be very near to the location of something dangerous, evil, or otherwise unpleasant. This essay argues that such considerations are relevant to certain first-order metaphysical debates, namely, the debates over immanent universals and tropes and endurantism and perdurantism, respectively. As a consequence, even the non-specialist has a reason to care about (...)
- Ontological Dependence.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - In Form, Matter, Substance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 135-162.This chapter focuses on the question of whether concrete particular objects deserve to be classified as substances within a hylomorphic ontology, despite their metaphysical complexity, and, if so, according to what criterion of substancehood or “ontological privilege.” It is common to conceive of the substances as ontologically independent, following some preferred sense of “independence.” But what is this sense of “ontological independence” and do matter–form compounds qualify as substances when this notion is applied to them? This chapter discusses various relations (...)
- Conclusion.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - In Form, Matter, Substance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 241-246.After briefly summarizing each of the chapters as well as the main results reached in this study, the Conclusion points to several worthwhile topics for future research which were left open along the way: (i) to extend the doctrine of hylomorphism beyond the specific case of concrete particular objects; (ii) to clarify further the relationship between metaphysics and science particularly as it pertains to the hylomorphic approach to matter; (iii) to provide additional independent considerations in order to narrow down further (...)
- Matter.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - In Form, Matter, Substance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 32-61.This chapter examines the question of how hylomorphists should conceive of the matter composing concrete particular objects. It considers three conceptions of matter: the traditional Thomistic doctrine of prime matter, as developed by David Oderberg; the matter-as-stuff hypothesis, as defended by Jeffrey Brower and Ned Markosian; and the hylomorphic conception of matter, according to which the matter of a concrete particular object is nothing other than its material parts and these are themselves conceived of as matter–form compounds, unless or until (...)
- Concrete Particular Objects.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - In Form, Matter, Substance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 11-31.This chapter reviews existing approaches to the metaphysics of concrete particular objects and positions the doctrine of hylomorphism with respect to competing accounts. The literature is divided over whether concrete particular objects are or are not further analyzable into constituents which do not themselves belong to the ontological category of concrete particular objects and in terms of which the character of these latter entities is to be explained. This chapter briefly surveys constituent ontologies (e.g., bundle theories or substratum theories) as (...)
- Artifacts.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - In Form, Matter, Substance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-240.This chapter continues the examination of the special features of artifacts by discussing their place within existing essentialist and anti-essentialist frameworks. It will be argued that prominent essentialist treatments of artifacts, such as those proposed by Amie Thomasson, Simon Evnine, and Lynne Rudder Baker, are susceptible to the concern that they exaggerate the creative and discriminating power of human intentions. Existing anti-essentialist frameworks, however, tend to trace the ascriptions of modal features to objects back to our semantic, inferential, or explanatory (...)
- Independence Criteria of Substancehood.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - In Form, Matter, Substance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 163-190.This chapter examines some initially attractive attempts by E. J. Lowe and Michael Gorman at formulating an independence criterion of substancehood in terms of a particular essentialist construal of ontological dependence. It is argued that the stipulative exclusion of non-particulars and proper parts (or constituents) from these accounts raises difficult issues for their proponents. These results indicate that, in order for a criterion of substancehood to yield the desired results when applied to hylomorphic compounds, a unity criterion for composite substances (...)
- Introduction.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - In Form, Matter, Substance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-8.The Introduction briefly lays the groundwork for the main project of _Form, Matter, Substance_: to defend a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects. According to Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism, entities are in some sense compounds of matter (_hulē_) and form (_morphē_ or _eidos_). Since Aristotle introduced this doctrine in the context of his analysis of change in _Physics_ I, it has found wide application throughout the history of philosophy and across many different subdisciplines of philosophy. The Introduction briefly summarizes each (...)
- Hylomorphic Relations.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - In Form, Matter, Substance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-124.This chapter takes up the question of how hylomorphists should conceive of the relations between a matter–form compound, its matter, and its form. It responds to the challenge issued to hylomorphists by the Grounding Problem, which asks what (if anything) explains the apparent differences between an object and its matter. Chapter 4 argues that hylomorphists should opt for a “robust” construal of form according to which forms do not simultaneously bear the same relation to a matter–form compound (essentially) and to (...)
- Unity.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - In Form, Matter, Substance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 191-215.A serviceable account of unity is needed which can capture the idea that matter–form compounds are more unified than other types of composite entities (e.g., heaps, collections, or mereological sums). This chapter develops a conception of unity according to which a structured whole derives its unity from the way its parts interact with other parts to allow the whole and its parts to manifest their “team-work”-requiring capacities. With this conception of unity in place, interesting differences emerge between paradigmatic matter–form compounds (...)
- Form.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - In Form, Matter, Substance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-103.This chapter turns to the question of how hylomorphists should conceive of the form of concrete particular objects. It argues that hylomorphists should endorse the individual forms hypothesis and reject the universal forms hypothesis on grounds primarily having to do with the cross-world identification of concrete particular objects. Other issues, e.g., the causal roles ascribed to form or the relation between form and essence, perhaps surprisingly, turn out to be neutral between the individual forms hypothesis and the universal forms hypothesis. (...)
- Form, Matter, Substance.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.In _Form, Matter, Substance_, Kathrin Koslicki defends a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects (e.g., living organisms). The Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism holds that those entities that fall under it are compounds of matter (hulē) and form (morphē or eidos). Koslicki argues that a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects is well-equipped to compete with alternative approaches when measured against a wide range of criteria of success. A successful application of the doctrine of hylomorphism to the special case of concrete (...)
- Enduring Through Gunk.Matt Leonard - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):753-771.According to one of the more popular endurantist packages on the market, a package I will call multilocational endurantism, enduring objects are exactly located at multiple instantaneous regions of spacetime. However, for all we know, the world might turn out to be spatiotemporally gunky and spatiotemporal gunk entails that this package is false. The goal of this paper is to sketch a view which retains the spirit of multilocational endurantism while also recognizing the possibility of certain types of objects which (...)
- The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence.Damiano Costa - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (2):57-75.This paper develops an endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, (...)
- The Limit Decision Problem and Four-Dimensionalism.Costa Damiano - 2017 - Vivarium 55 (1-3):199-216.I argue that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e. the view according to which substances that persist through time are extended through time as well as through space, and have different temporal parts at different times.
- Sweeping Endurantism Is a Micharacterization of Endurantism.Paul R. Daniels - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):295-302.Endurantism is commonly characterized as a sweeping thesis, according to which enduring objects persist by sweeping or moving through time. I argue that the endurantist should resist this characterization as it makes her view incompatible with eternalism, the moving spotlight theory, and the growing block theory. Moreover, even the presentist endurantist should resist this characterization as it undermines the modal analogy. As a result, those who argue against endurantism should avoid characterizing endurantism in this way. Through this discussion we can (...)
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